Regional economic growth in China: towards an analysis of regional disparities in a socialist economy. by Lin, Cyril Roca
REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN A SOCIALIST ECONOMY
by
CYRIL LIN
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Science
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
February, 1973
'A
Signature of Author...............
Dept. Urba tudies gnd annin , January 22nd, 1973
Certified by .
Thes4s Supervisor
Accepted by..
V Chairman, Departmental Committee on Theses
Rotch
ASS- INST, TEC.
MAY 2 2 1973
I 
a " _ 
3
IN CHINA: TOWARDS AN
ABST RACT
REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA: TOWARDS AN
ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN A SOCIALIST ECONOMY
by
CYRIL LIN
This thesis represents the first step of a'research
effort undertaken to understand the problems of regional deve-
lopment in the People's Republic of China. It is designed
primarily to (1) determine the nature and extent of the regional
problem in China with specific reference to regional income
disparities; (2) analyze and describe the dynamics of regional
economic growth in a Socialist economy; (3) review theoretical
and operational models which offer analytical insights into the
problem and which could serve as a prototype in the construc-
tion of a model of regional growth that could simulate the
pattern of regional income convergence-divergence in China;
and lastly (4) measure the usefulness of Western regional eco-
nomic growth theory to developing Asian economies in policy
making.
Although no conclusions are made at this stage of the
research, the essential feature of Chinese regional economies
and the relevant variables and relationships are described.
The development of the Chinese spatial economy is also discussed.
Finally, a research strategy for future work into the topic is
mapped out given the basic information of Chinese regional
economies presented in this thesis.
Thesis Supervisor John Harris
Title Associate Professor,
Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning
- Dept. of Economics
"The philosophers have interpreted the
world in various ways; the point
however is to change it."
-- Karl Marx
"Changes in society are due chiefly
to the development of the internal
contradictions in society, that is,
the contradiction between the pro-
ductive forces and the relations of
production, the contradiction be-
tween classes and the contradiction
between the old and the new; it is
the development of these contradictions
that pushes society forward and gives
the impetus for the supression of the
old society by the new."
-- Mao Tse-tung
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Perspective
Although many economic theories have paid particular
emphasis on the time structure of their analyses, they usually
omit specification of the spatial dimension. Traditionally,
economic theory has assumed that non-economic factors have a
preponderant influence on the spatial distribution of economic
activity: since the location of natural resources is fixed,
non-economic factors influence the decisions of where to
produce, sell, and live. The historical pattern of spatial
development, however, suggests the influences of systematic
forces other than the mere location of resources and factors.
In capitalist and mixed-market economies, automatic
market forces would theoretically maintain a spatial equili-
brium. Factors, e.g., labor and capital, would migrate to
places with the highest renumeration, thus inducing an equali-
zation of income. Where these factors were immobile or less
able to move, the exchange of commodities could play the
same equilibrating role.2
In planned economies of the Socialist type, spatial
equilibrium could also theoretically obtain through a central
See the discussion in Bos (1965).
2This is an adaptation of theorems developed in inter-
national trade theory to an interregional context. Mundell
(1957) showed that where factor mobility was perfect and
commodity mobility was not, factor price equalization could
obtain through factor mobility. This is the reciprocal of the
classic Heckscher-Ohlin factor price equalization theorem.
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determination of the allocation of resources and factors.
Aside from the problems of rationality (efficiency in central
planning in physical terms without prices), the question of
maintaining a spatial equilibrium becomes one of optimization.
Although such an approach would be severely limited by the
mathematical difficulties involved in solving an immense
system of equations describing all the constituent units of the
economy, the fundamental problem remains to be a lack of an
understanding of the dynamics of regional economic growth and
its attendant phenomenon of income disparities.
Differences in per capita incomes between regions of
a national economy have increased in the past, and examples
of draining of capital and labor from low to high income
regions can be found in both developed and developing countries,
in both market abd socialist economies. An international
cross-section study by Williamson (1965) of regional inequi-
ties (disparities) in 24 countries established the universa-
lity of the problem (cf. Table 1.1). Grouped according to
Kuznet's seven level-of-development classification, these
countries suggest a significant relationship between regional
inequities and the level of development for averages of each
income class. In yet another study by Mera (1970) on the
same topic, it is observed that per capita income of different
regions of countries differ greatly, and this disparity
appears to be related to the degree of urbanization.1
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Mera points to the fact that in the United States,
the per capita income of predominantly urban Connecticut is
slightly more than twice that of rural Mississippi, and in
Japan, the per capita product of Tokyo Prefecture is about
two and a half times that of rural Kagoshima Prefecture. In
the developing countries, the per capita income of the South
in Brazil is three times that of the Northeast. In India,
West Bengal and Maharashtra States which include the metro-
polises of Bombay and Calcutta have a per capita net domestic
product about 40 percent higher than the national average.
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TABLE 1.1
International Cross-Section Comparison of Regional Inequities a
Country and Kuznets Years Vb Vc Md Size 2
group classification covered w uw w (miles )
Group I
Australia
New Zealand
Canada
United Kingdom
United States
Sweden
Group I average
Group II
Finland
France
'49/'50-
'59/'60
'55
'50-'61
'59/'60
'50-'61
'50,'55,'61
50,
54,
58
50-
50,
52,
West Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Group II average
.Group III
Ireland
Chile
Austria
Puerto Rico
Group III average
Group IV
Brazil
Italy
Spain
Colombia
Greece
Group IV average
Group V
Yugoslavia
Japan
Group V average
'54,'58
'55/'56,
55,
55,'
57-'
60
58
60
60
58
57
60
50-'
51,'
55,'
53
'54
59
55, '60
57
'56,'59,'60
'51-'59
.058
.063
.192
.141
.182
.200
.139
.331
.283
.205
.131
.309
.252
.268
.327
. 225
.520
.335
.700
.360
.415
.541
.302
.464
.078
.082
.259
.156
.189
.168
4.77
4.93
17.30
11.39
16.56
15.52
2,974
103
3,845
94
3,022
173
,581
,736
'774
,279
,387
,378
.155 11.72
.276 26.64 130,165
.215
.205
.128
.253
20.
16.
12.
23.
80
98
45
84
212,659
94,723
12,850
125,064
.215 20.14
271
440
201
378
24
30
18
42
.20
.65
.69
.31
.323 28.96
.654 53.78
.367 30.94
.356 32.32
.561 46.70
.295 26.56
.447 38.06
.340 .444 25.54
.244 .222 19.98
26
286
32
3
601
397
369
435
3,288,050
117,471
195,504
439,617
51,246
95,558
142,644
.333 22.26
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
,
,
,
,
.
.
.
.
'
'
'
'
.292
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TABLE 1.1
International Cross-Section Comparison of Regional Inequities
(Continued)
Country and Kuznets Years 'M Size 2
group classification covered w uw w (miles2 )
Group VI
Philippines '57 .556 .627 29.59 115,600
Group VII
India '50/'51,
'55/'56 .275 .580 19.39 1,221,880
Total Average .299 .309 23.78
aFrom Williamson, (1965), p. 1 1 2 .
b
A weighted coefficient of variation which measures the
dispersion of the regional income per capita levels relative to
the national average while each regional deviation is weighted
by its share in the national population.
cThe unweighted coefficient of variation.
dAn alternative measure which sums the differentials
to the first power with signs disregarded. This statistic
produces a significantly different result only in the case
of the Philippines.
6.
Friedman (1966) describes the abrupt awakening to the
spatial dimension of economic development in part as a conse-
quence to rapid and dramatic changes in the economic life in
the postwar era:
"An urban revolution -- propelled by vast internal
population transfers and the automobile -- engulfed
the remnants of Europe's nineteenth century cities.
Old agricultural problem areas clamored for the
attention of a population newly grown rich and
demanded a rectification of ancient and patiently
borne griefs. Technological progress often bypassed
traditional centers of commerce and industry and
left them to cope with obsolete facilities, high
taxes, and an overaged but underemployed labor
force. Finally, the spatial shifts in productive
facilities which were predicted to follow from the
realization in full of the objectives of a Common
European Market raised serious problems of adjust-
ment in the areas of rapid expansion -- the 'growth
poles'of the New Europe -- no less than in the areas
of stagnation or decline."
In the developing countries, "growth pains" often
manifest themselves in the form of an urban-rural dichotomy,
epitomizing regional differences in the distribution of
economic activities, incomes, and welfare. Consequently,
urban growth has become a problem identified within the domain
of regional policy.
Thus, the existence of regional disparities in the
-course of national economic development in the developing
countries on the one hand, and its persistence in the developed
countries on the other hand, have spurred the addition of
regional development as a fourth concern in what Friedman
(1966) calls the original triad of national independence,
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national economic development, and national planning. More
than just recognizing the existence of geographical inequities
in the distribution of activities and welfare, regional econo-
mics, which is the substantive content of regional policy,
implies a corollary belief that national development stra-
tegies are often best implemented at the regional level.
Witness that a principal research area in regional economics,
the phenomenon of regional disparities, derives basically
from policy concerned more with the political implications of
regional differences in income levels than with the optimal
spatial distribution of economic activities. The thesis that
regional policy is a function of the spatial transformation
engendered by economic growth has been maintained by Friedman
(cf. Table 1.2).
It is the same host of concerns that have prompted
the simultaneous emergence of regional economics in the
Socialist-bloc countries. Although theory has not evolved
as formalized in the West, Marxist research has been more
preoccupied with the practical problems of maintaining both
a spatial equilibrium and a material balance in planned
economic growth. While it appears that almost all the Socialist-
bloc countries have delineated national development strategies
along regional lines, very little published information makes
it difficult to ascertain the importance of regional development
in the People's Republic of China.1 Yet the problem of
1 The numerous articles and books on the subject as well
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TABLE 1.2
Phases of National Development and Regional Policya
Type of
Economy
Industry as
% of GNP
( 1950-1955)
Importance
of regional
policy for
national
economic
growth
Preindustrial
0-10
Transitional
10-25
inaprropriate critical
Industrial
25-50
vestigal
Pos t-
industrial
declining
shift to a
new focus
Policy
emphasis
Examples of
countries in
category
creating pre-
conditions for
economic
development
Tanganyika
Paraguay
Bolivia
Afghanistan
Cambodia
Burma
creating a
spatial
organization
capable of
sustaining
transition
to indus-
tralism
Venezuela
Brazil
Colombia
Turkey
India
Pakistan
Iraq
Mexica
depressed
areas,
area
redeve-
lopment;
spatial
adjust-
ments to
common
markets
France
Italy
West
Germany
Japan
Israel
England
Australia
urban
renewal,
spatial order
and circula-
tion within
metropolitan
regions;
open spaces
U.S.A.
aFrom Friedman (1966), p. 7 .
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regional development appears intuitively to be most serious
in China. Consider the Chinese policies of developing new
inland industrial centers in the frontier regions of Sinkiang,
Kansu, and Tibet; the welfare implications of the migration
from the countryside to the cities and the attendant govern-
ment policies of relocating youths to the frontier regions
and other rural restification programs; the problems faced
by Chinese planners encountered with a poor transport net--
work led them to emphasize regional self-sufficiency and to
restrict interregional trade. These facts lead one to infer
the presence of a regional problem whose order of magnitude
must be commensurate with her population size.
This thesis represents the first step of a research
effort this writer is undertaking to understand the problems
of regional development in the People's Republic of China.
The research effort is designed primarily to (1) determine
the nature and extent of the problem in China; (2) analyze
and describe the dynamics of regional economic growth in a
Socialist economy; (3) construct a model of regional economic
growth that could trace the historical pattern of regional
growth in China from 1949 to the present; and secondarily to
(4) measure the usefulness and validity of Western regional
as their participation in various international conferences
dealing with regional policy are good indications of Socia-
lists' attempts to develope regional development policies.
China, in contrast- has produced no available treatise on the
subject to date to reflect a serious governmental level inquiry
into the subject. See, for example, other Socialist-bloc
countries' regional problems, Robinson (1969) and Isard (1961).
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economic growth theory and operational models to the deve-
loping Asian economies.
This paper is not a Bachelor's Thesis in the tra-
ditional sense; no hypothesis is posed and tested. Nor is
the bulk of the material covered in this thesis original
contributions. Instead it represents more of a log-book of
progress in my research effort. Nevertheless, the research
effort, of which this thesis is the first part, will be a
valuable educational experience in the fullest sense.
The problems involved in this research make it
extremely difficult to delineate a logical sequence of study.
The most basic concerns the availability of reliable Chinese
data: I am gambling on the supposition that with increased
exchanges between the West and China, this writer may be able
to obtain much needed information with the assistance of the
Chinese government; alternatively, there are good secondary
sources in Hongkong and various research organizations in the
United States.
A second difficulty relates to the selection of theory
and models for my purpose. This problem is, in fact, of more
immediate concern to me than anything else. Hopefully, this
problem may be resolved as I develope a better understanding
of the theoretical material when the research progresses.
My plan of study will, therefore, be.guided by expediency and
my final product, a model of regional economic growth in
China, will have to be an additive and cumulative result
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integrated by parts.
The rest of this first chapter will be devoted to a
brief exposition of the planning and analytical problems
involved in this study: it defines the research area I want
to focus on.
Chapter Two gives the institutional and structural
framework of the Chinese political economy. It lists the
objectives and elements of the Chinese development effort
in so far as they are relevant to this study. The emphasis
will be on isolating the factors determining national economic
growth, and more importantly, the influences of structural
change in the economy on regional growth. The spatial economy
is also presented at length to show the influences of national
economic growth on the regional distribution of economic
activities.
Chapter Three is a quasi-comprehensive review of
regional economic growth literature and operational models
taken from various sources. It is an attempt to collect
diverse theories into a coherent package immediately relevant
to the question of regional economic growth. This will be
the main body of knowledge from which I shall derive elements
and principles towards formulating a theory of regional growth
.in China. Because these theories and models were developed
in the West and are oriented towards market economies, my
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interest is on their logic. They are not reviewed in the
context of possible calibrations to the Chinese economy. but
are regarded instead as treatises providing us with an under-
standing of the dynamics of regional growth in the abstract.
It remains to discriminate between that which is contradictory
to this purpose and that which offers analytical insight.
Chapter Four describes briefly the parameters,
variables, and relations in a socialist economy for which
my model will be designed. It is the most inadequate chapter
in the thesis and this aspect will have to be substantially
strengthened by future research.
The last cIjapter, Chapter Five, summarizes the
progress made in this initial stage of the research effort.
It compiles the most important information and insights,
learned in the previous chapters but, at the same time, it
points out the deficiencies which have to be rectified.
A research strategy for the next stage is mapped out and
the critical issues to be investigated are defined. No
conclusion is made because none can be made at this point.
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1.2 The Planning Problem
When the Chinese Communists ascended to power in 1949,
they inherited an economy marked by a spatial concentration
of modern industry in a few industrial centers, mainly in the
coastal areas. Transport facilities, mostly railroads, were
confined to a relatively small number of provinces in the
eastern part of the nation. China proper (i.e., excluding
the autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet,
etc.) had only a few vital lateral and longitudinal trunk
lines while Manchuria, the center of concentrated heavy
industries developed during the Japanese occupation, had a
fairly developed transport network. Thus, the inherited
economy was often envisaged as comprising of three sectors:
(1) a vast, largely self-sufficient agricultural sector; (2)
a modern sector located almost entirely along the coastal areas
and concentrated in the urban areas, devoted largely to the
management of goods and other light industry; and (3) a heavy
industry sector located primarily in the Northeast in Manchuria
and not linked to the rest of the national economy until after
Liberation in 1949. Years of civil wars, regional military
movements initiated by ambitious warlords, and the Sino-
Japanese wars had limited economic relations between the
coastal cities and the agricultural sector. Relations
between the various sectors, although limited, were impor-
tant to the economy. It has been pointed out that import,
and later Chinese manufacture, of factory-made textiles
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eroded the traditional handicraft industry in the
countryside. Advantages of the resultant cheaper costs of
textiles had to be evaluated in light of the consequent failure
of village economies to find alternative productive uses for
the marginal time and labor left to peasants beyond their basic
task of cultivation. Expanding cities also increased the
demand for agricultural imports and supplies for urban needs.
The most urgent task facing Chinese planners in 1949
was the restoration of the basic capacity of the economy to
pre'49 levels by 1952, and the integration of the various
sectors for the exchange and flow of goods and services, pre-
paring the way for a long-term program of socialization of
the economy, massive industralization, and agricultural
modernization.
The regional problem is reflected in one of the
development objectives announced by Chou En-lai in 1955:
"We shall locate the productive forces of industry
in different parts of the country in such a way
that they will be close to producing areas of raw
materials and fuel and also to consumer markets.
They will also satisfy the requirement for the
strengthening of national security, lead to
gradual improvement of the irrational locational
pattern, and elevate the economic level of the
backward areas. In the establishment of indus-
trial areas, we shall, first of all, utilize,
reconstruct, and transform the existing industrial
bases so as to avoid over-concentration of enter-
prises and 1 to bring about a measure of decentra-
lization."
lFrom the Chung Hua Ren Min Kung Ho Kuo Fa Chan Kuo Min
Cheng-chi Ti I Ko Wu Nien Chi Hua (The First Five Year Plan of
the People's Republic of China), (1955), pp. 3 1 - 3 3 (in Chinese).
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The spatial distribution of economic activities planned for
the First Five Year Plan period was spelled out in even greater
detail by the then head of the State Planning Commission,
Li Fu-ch'un:
"The Five Year Plan of capital construction includes
a relatively rational spatial arrangement. Indus-
trial bases in Manchuria, Shanghai, and other cities
will be appropriately utilized so that they exer-
cise their function in bringing about the rapid
expansion of production to meet the demand of the
economy and to support the construction of new
industrial bases...active efforts will also be made
to establish new industrial bases in North China,
and certain areas in Northwest and Central China,
and to begin in part industrial construction in the
Southwest. On the basis of this policy, 472 of the
694 above-norm industrial construction projects plan-
ned to be started during the first five years will
be in the interior provinces and only 222 will be
in the coastal areas. Appropriate railway construc-
tidn arrangements are also being made to meet the
requirements of industrial construction and the
overall development of the national economy and
to provide links between the original and the new
industrial bases. At the same time, on the basis
of this industrial policy, our present task in urban
construction is not to develope the large cities
on the coast, but to develope medium and small
cities in the interior and to restrict appro-
priately the expansion of large cities. The
present blind or unplanned development of the
coastal cit ies is a phenomenon that has to be
corrected."
Because there were only a few metropolitan industrial
and commercial centers, major markets with concentrated demand
for producer and consumer goods were also few. In the large
lIn Ren Min Shou Ts'e,(People's Handbook), 1956,
pp.59-60 (in Chinese).
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hinterland areas areas with a primarily agricultural output,
production and population were concentrated in the few regions
of greater soil fertility.
The development of the economy under the Communists was
affected mainly by the known distribution of natural resources.
For example, although coal reserves are now found throughout
the country, a limited number of known large iron deposits
determined the locational development of the iron and steel
industry. Thus, despite impressive expansion in Chinese
industry since 1949, it remains relatively underdeveloped
in relation to the country's endowment of natural resources.
Factories and mines are still concentrated in the eastern third
of the country.
Regional statistics are fragmentary, but it appears
that China progressed in building up industrial centers in the
interior regions (cf. Section 2.5 in Chapter Two). To counter-
mand the concentration of industry along the eastern coast,
the First Five Year Plan specified that new industrial projects
were to be located mainly in the interior regions. Accordingly,
inland cities such as Pao-t'ou, T'ai-yuan, Wu-han, Sian, Lanchou,
and Ch'eng-tu were expanded greatly in both population and
physical size. Further, two-thirds of the some 300 projects
under the Russian technical and material assistance programs
from 1950 to 1956 were part of an inland development plan.
In 1956, however, a drop in national industrial output made
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Chinese planners realize the necessity of upgrading and
increasing production in the traditional industrial areas
while simultaneously constructing new plants away from the
old centers. The period of adjustment following the dis-
appointments of the Great Leap Forward and the cessation of
Russian aid seriously affected regional development. In both
the frontier and developed regions, small and uneconomic
factories that sprang up during the years 1958 to 1960 were
shut down.1
The National Economic Commission of the Nationalist
government showed that in 1948 only 18 cities in 13 provinces
had sufficient manufacturing capacity to be considered as
even modest industrial centers (cf. Table 1.3). Ten of the
26 provinces that comprise China (excluding Taiwan) had no
important manufacturing centers before 1949. The backward areas
can be identified as:
Provinces or
Region Autonomous Regions
North China and Shansi, Inner Mongolia
Inner Mongolia
East China Anhwei, Chekiang
Central-South China Honan, Kwangsi
Northwest China Ningsia, Tsinghai, Sinkiang
Southwest China and Tibet Tibet
1 Since most of newer, smaller, and less' viable enter-
prises were located in the frontier regions, these areas suffered
disproportionately during the retrenchment period when invest-
funds were conserved for the more reliable and older industrial
plants in the coastal regions.
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TABLE 1.3
Distribution of Manufacturing Motive Power, Employment, and
Factories in China Proper at the End of World War IIa
Cities or City Share % of Indicated Parameter
Combinations Nu nber.of
Motive Power Employment ac ories
Shanghai 57.7 60.9 60.4
Tienstin 16.8 9.9 9.4
Tsingtao 7.4 4.7 1.4
Peking 6.3 1.5 2.1
Nanking 2.5 1.8 6.9
Wu-han 2.2 3.6 3.6
Chungking 2.2 5.5 5.2
Canton 1.5 4.5 3.7
Kunming 0.7 1.1 0.5
Nan-chang & Chiu-chiang 0.7 1.1 1.3
Sian 0.6 1.1 0.5
Chang-sha & Heng-yang 0.6 1.5 1.7
Foochow 0.4 0.6 1.4
Lan-chou 0.3 0.5 0.3
Kuei-yang 0.2 0.8 0.6
Swatow - 0.9 0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
aSource: Wu (1967). Original data from Industrial
Survey of Principal Cities in China, Preliminary Report,
Nanking: National Economic Commission, 1949.
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In 1957, following Chou En-lai's speech emphasizing the long
time horizon over which decentralization would occur, the
country was divided into seven Economic Cooperation Regions:
Economic
Cooperation Regions
Northeast China
(Manchuria)
North China
Northwest China
East China
Central-South China
Central China
South China
Southwest China
A4eal and population data for
Table 1.4.
Provinces or
Autonomous Regions
Liaoning, Kirin,
Heilungkiang
Hopeh, Shansi,
Inner Mongolia
Kansu, Shensi, Sinkiang,
Tsinghai, Ningshia
Kiangsu, Chekiang, Shantung,
Anhwei
Honan, Hupeh, Hunan,
Kiangsi
Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien
Szechuan, Yunnan, Kweichow,
Tibet
these regions are given in
Northeast China, which includes most of former
Manchuria, continues to rank as China's largest industrial
concentration and the foremost center of heavy industry. The
region is also the largest producer of electric power, iron,
steel, gold, natural and synthetic petroleum, timber, and a
variety of machniery equipment. While heavy industry con-
tinues to be concentrated in the southern part of the region
(Mukden, An-shan, Pen-ch'i, Fu-shun, and Dairen), about a
30 00 120ouowee
Thaila )Hainan nOS
Provinces ------- Autonomous Regions (j Autonomous Districts
0 Capitol 0 capitar
China shares 9,000 miles of lantfrontier with twelve nations, At i
number of points there have beerfrontier disputes between China ancher neighbours, and one with Indidoveloped into a war in 1962. To sea
ward, within 600 miles lie Sout'Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippine
as well as the Ryukyu Islands occupied
by the United States. Nationalist China(Taiwan) also occupies the islands olQuemoy and Matsu, close to thu main.land. Macao (Portugal) and HongKong (U.K.) on the mainland areleased to foreign powers.
The administrative organisation oChina was changed after the Com-
munist ruvolution of 1949, and hasboon reorganised on a number of
occasions since. At various times the
large economic and political regions,
composod of a number of provinces,have boun formod but then abolished.
The first ordor administrative units are
the provinces (21), Autonomous Re-
gions (5) and the centrally admini-
stored cities of Peking and Shanghai.
The provinces are divided into hsiens(c. 1.600) and important cities (c. 150).Before 1958 the hsiens were furtherdivided into hsiangs (rural districts)
and small towns, but these have been
replaced by communes. Various types
of agricultural cc -operation were triedleading to the establishment of thefirst commune at Wuibsin (Honan) inApril 1958. By the nd of that year
nearly all the rural population had been
Oruaiso(J Into sonm 26,600 commuinus.
A small town and the surroundinghs/angs formed a typical commune,
and on an average there are about
fourteen communes in each hsien.
Communes have also been formed in
the urban areas.
The equality of the different paoples
Is recognised within the constitution,
in so far as this is compatible with
their inseparability from the People's
Republic. The larger concentrated
groups of peoples are organised into
Autonomous Regions, and even the
smaller groups occupying just a hsien
have a measure of autonomy. The Auto-
nomous Regions make up nearly half
the total area of China, but their popula-
tion forms only a twentieth of the whole.
FIGURE 1.la Map of China
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FIGURE 1.lb: Economic Cooperation Regions
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TABLE 1.4
Area and Population of the Seven Economic Cooperation Regions
(1957)
Region Area Population
(by province _& % of % of
autonomous region) Square miles nat'l total Thousands nat'l total
Northeast
Liaoning
Kirin
Heilungkiang
Regional total
North
Hopeh
Shansi
Inner Mongolia
Regional total
Northwest
Kansu
Shensi
Sinkiang
Tsinghai
Regional total
East
Kiangsu
Chekiang
Shantung
Anhwei
Regional total
58,301
72,201
178,996
289,498
76,139
60,656
456,756
593,551
141,506
75,598
635,829
278,378
1,831,311
39,460
39,305
59,189
54,015
191,969
Central-South, Central
Honan 64,479
Hupeh 72,394
Hunan 81,274
Kiangsi 63,629
Regional total
South
Kwangtung
Kwangsi
Fukien
Regional total
Southwest
Szechuan
Yunnan
Kweichow
Tibet
Regional total
281,776
89,344
85,096
47,529
221,969
219,691
168,417
67,181
471,660
926,949
1.6
2.0
4.8
8.4
2.0
1.6
12.4
16.0
3.8
2.0
17.2
7.5
30.5
1.1
1.1
1.6
1.5
5.3
1.7
2.0
2.2
1.7
7.6
2.4
2.3
1.3
6.0
6.0
4.6
1.8
12.8
25.2
24,090
12,550
14,860
51,500
44,720
15,960
9, 200
69,880
12, 800
18,130
5,640
2,050
38,620
45,230
25,280
54,030
33,560
3.7
1.9
2.3
7.9
6.9
2.5
1.4
10.8
1.9
2.8
0.9
0.3
5.9
6.9
3.9
8.5
5.2
163,100 24.5
48,670
30,790
36,220
18,610
7.5
4.9
5.6
2.9
134,290 20.9
37,960
19,390
14,650
5.9
2.9
2.3
72,000 11.1
72,160
19,100
16,890
1,270
109,420
11.2
2.9
2.6
0.2
17.0
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fifth of projects completed under the Soviet aid program are
located to the north in Kirin and Harbin, and Heilungkiang.
These projects therefore were instrumental in extending this
region's industrial areas.
Though smallest in size, East China contains about
a third of the country's population. This factor helps explain
the ranking position of the region in manufacturing of tex-
tiles and other consumer goods. It is second in total
industrial production with large electrical, chemical, iron,
steel, and machinery outputs. The region's productive ca-
pacity is located mainly in Shanghai, China's largest industrial
and commercial metropolis.
North China ranks third in total industrial production.
The major industralized area is located in a triangle formed
by the cities of Peking, T'ang-shan, and Tienstin. It leads
the nation in coal output and ranks high in iron, steel,
electric power, chemicals, and various consumer goods pro-
duction. Industrial development of this region has been
spurred by plentiful supplies of coal deposits and a relatively
good railroad network.
Central South China, second to East China in popu-
lation, is the country's largest producer of refined sugar
and second in textiles and paper. Light industry is centered
in the Canton area while heavy industry is concentrated in
the Middle Yangtze (River) valley at Wu-han and Hsiang-t'an
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and at Lo-yang in northern Honan province. The region is an
important producer of raw materials, especially in. non-ferrous
metals.
Northwest China, by far the largest region, is also
the least industralized. All industries in the region have been
developed since 1949. Besides the petroleum industry, which
is widespread, important industrial facilities are pocketed
around the cities of Lan-chou and Sian.
The general picture of the problems of regional deve-
lopment can further be discerned from the following tables:
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 give the ranking of the production areas
of the pre-Communist economy. Table 1.7 shows the degree of
economic development by administrative divisions (provinces
and autonomous regions). Table 1. 8 gives an indication of
1955 income levels for selected provinces.
The preceding discussion is intended to suggest the
nature of the regional planning problem in China. Because
of the insufficient data sources, it gives at best a partial
picture. Let us therefore conclude this section with a
consideration of regional planning problems in the abstract.
Rodwin (1963) states that planners in developing
countries often view the spatial aspect of regional policy
as involving a mutually exclusive choice between dispersal of
investments such that regions will receive a fair share of
the benefits of development or the concentration of activities
at planned or existing growth centers. This set of alternatives
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TABLE 1.5
Ranking of Production Areas in Modern Manufacturing in China
Proper at the End of World War Two a
Ranking of Cities (or combination) According to Indicated Parameter
Motive power
Shanghai
Tienstin
Tsingtao
Peking
Nanking
Wu-han
Chungking
Canton
Nan-chang
Chiu-chang
Kunming
Sian
Chang-sha
Heng-yang
Foochow
Lan-chou
Kuei-yang
Swatow
Employment
Shanghai
Tienstin
Chungking
Tsingtao
Canton
Wu-han
Nanking
Peking
Chang-sha
Heng-yang
Nan-chang
Chiu-chang
Kunming
Sian
Swatow
Kuei-yang
Foochow
Lan-chou
Number of
of factories
Shanghai
Tienstin
Nanking
Chungking
Canton
Wu-han
Peking
Chang-sha
Heng-yang
Foochow
Tsingtao
Nan-chang
Chiu-chang
Swatow
Kuei-yang
Kunming
Sian
Lan-chou
aSource: Wu (1967).
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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TABLE 1.6
Ranking of Provinces and Regions in Modern Manufacturing
in China Proper at the End of World War Twoa
Ranking of Provinces According to Indicated Parameter
Motive Number
Rank power Employment of factories
1 Kiangsu Kiangsu Kiangsu
2 Hopeh Hopeh Hopeh
3 Shantung Szechuan Szechuan
4 Hupeh Kwangtung Kwangtung
5 Kwangtung Shantung Hupeh
6 Yunnan Hupeh Hunan
Kiangsi
7 Hunan Hunan Fukien
Shensi Shantung
8 Fukien Shensi Kiangsi
Yunnan
Kiangsi
9 Kansu Kweichow Kweichow
10 Kweichow Fukien Yunnan
Shensi
11 -- Kansu Kansu
Ranking of Region According to Indicated Parameterb
Motive Number
Rank power Employment of factories
1 East East East
2 North North North
3 Central Southwest Central
4 Southwest Central Southwest
5 South South South
6 Northwest Northwest Northwest
aSource: Wu (1967).
bThe pre-Communist (1949) classification of regions had
only six regions.
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TABLE 1.7
Relati-x Degree of Economic Development .of Provinces in
Pre-Communist China a
Rank in Rank in
Province Modern Manufacturing Agricultural Production
Group I
(Relatively developed)
Man churia
Kiangsu
Shantung
Szechuan
Kwangtung
Hopch
Hup-ueh
Group II
(Relatively developed
in agriculture only)
Shensi
Hunan
Honan
Chekiang
Anhwei
Group III
(Relatively developed
in industry only)
Yunnan
Group IV
(Relatively undeveloped)
Kiangsi
Fukien
Kwangsi
Shansi
Kwe i chow
Inner Mongolia
Kans u
Tsinghai
Ningsia
Sinkiang
Tibet
3
5
6
2
4
10
9
14
14
14
7
8
11
13
14
13
14
12
14
14
13
14
2
3
4
1
5
8
7
8
9
6
10
11
16
12
14
13
15 -
17
19
20
21
22
23
23
aSource: Wu (1967).
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TABLE 1.8
Per Capita Income and Expenditures of Workers and Employees
and of Peasants for National Average and Selected Provinces a
1955 (in current Yuan)
Excluding non- Including non-
commodity expenditure commodity expenditure
Province Income Expenditure Income Expenditure
National average 148 138 183 173
Workers & employees 98 93 102 97
Peasants 90 85 94 89
Liaoning 170 157 207 194
Workers & employees 128 111 133 166
Peasants 122 105 127 110
Hopei
Workers & employees 138 132 166 160
(Excluding Tienstin) 149 136 176 163
(Including Tienstin) 104 97 114 102
Peasants 98 86 103 91
Kiangsu
Workers & employees 144 133 189 178
(Excluding Shanghai) 189 173 243 227
(Including Shanghai) 129 115 136 122
Peasants 123 109 130 116
Hupeh 128 120 154 146
Workers & employees 88 75 90 77
Peasants 84 71 86 73
Szechuan 123 116 157 150
Workers & employees 74 70 76 72
Peasants 68 64 70 66
Shensi 172 136 213 177
Workers & employees 100 98 105 103
Peasants 94 92 99 97
a Source: Chen,
A Handbook for Mainland
1967, p.430.
Nai Ruenn, Chinese Economic Statistics:
China, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,
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is often equated to the determination of priorities between
(1) social equity (decentralization), and (2) growth in
productive output (concentrated growth).
A further implication derives from the choice between
immediate benefits and greater but more distant returns,
although this issue as an economic problem is usually less
crucial than immediate political concerns. Therefore, in the
allocation of resources among unevenly developed regions,
welfare and social equity must be weighed against economic
growth and efficiency.
Friedman (1966) suggests that, in developed countries,
develbpment and functional specialization are two aspects of
the same process (at least in the Western developed nations).
Specialization has always been localized, and thus, the
articulation of areal and functional differences into a
compact, related economic system calls for the integration
of the spatial economy.
While both Rodwin and Friedman argue for some form
of decentralization, the former advocating a concept called
concentrated decentralization, and the latter emphasizing
the importance of transmitting growth factors to less deve-
loped areas (somewhat similar to Hirschman's (1958) "Trickling
down" effects), Alonso (1968), in contrast, states that our
present state of knowledge of urban-regional growth dynamics doesn't
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support any of the various growth strategies.
These issues suggest that regional development rests,
firstly, on the need to integrate stagnant or backward regions
into a national policy of economic development, and secondly,
a desire to decrease the gap between regions of a country in
terms of welfare and economic opportunities. Policy should
then be influenced by the desire for an eqailibrium with
respect to location, interregional trade, prices, and pro-
duction for a matrix of regions as instruments for fostering
national economic growth.
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1.3 The Analytical Problem
With the advent of industralization, population and
production become increasingly concentrated in agglomerations
or cities. During the earlier stages of development, margi-
nal returns to the factors of production differ between
regions, consequently income differences. At a more advanced
stage of development, most of the population and activities
tend to be polarized in large metropolises. These centers
epitomize not only urban-rural differences in income levels
but regional disparities as well.
Earlier we have shown that differential aggregate
growth rates among regions is an established pattern in many
countries of the world. Although location theory suggests
that regions grow at different rates due to economies of
agglomeration, factor and commodity flows would nevertheless
create factor price equalization leading to income convergence.
The process of income convergence and divergence has been
studied by Myrdal (1957). Myrdal hypothesized that an initial
random shock (of industralization) would favor regions with
good resources, transport facilities, and developed piarkets
from previous developments. Economies of agglomeration
would also lower production cots and raise the returns to-
factors at these growth points. The transmission of growth
or spill-over effects, would depend on market imperfections
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ard inter-industry linkages. A poor transport network
would also reduce interregional trade while either capital
market imperfections or high risks would inhibit capital
flows to less developed areas. Myrdal also lists a number
of disequilibrating factor flows: the more dynamic and
vigorous elements of a population might also migrate to
the growing centers leaving behind a fewer number of high
income earners. With capital more mobile than labor, it
depresses the wage of a region by leaving; there are also
intersectoral effects when traditional handicrafts industries
can not compete with the more efficient and productive
industries in the advanced region. Further, potential
inter-industry linkages are minimized by low supply elasticity
in poor region. Thus a cumulative and circular causation
from these "vicious cycles" continually increase disparities
between regions.
Basically similar to Myrdal's model, the Hirschman
(1958) model however considers a turning point in the
development process which permits per capita income conver-
gence. Convergence id achieved through "trickling down"
effects: a developing transportation network radiating from
the advanced region into the less developed region allows for
less selective migration and primary exports from the back-
ward region; diminishing returns at the margin also shifts
development from the advanced to the backward region. All
these lead to the development of the backward region and raises
33.
its income, leading to convergence.
Williamson (1965) hypothesized that "under conditions
of free factor mobility, and abstracting from transport costs,
spatial inequality can persist only via lags in dynamic
adjustment. That spatial inequality, depressed areas, and
backward regions appear to persist may simply suggest to
some that internal factor flows (tending to reduce interre-
gional inequality) do not occur with sufficient speed and
quantity to offset the dynamic indigenous conditions which
cause relatively faster resource augmentation and technological
change in the rich developing regions (tending to increase
inequality." In addition, he suggests that regions within
nations rarely have equal capacity for growth. And when growth
does occur in certain regions, barriers may exist to inhibit
interregional transmission of growth. Consequently, he argues
that "as long as the barriers to trade and factor flows
(as well as communication of technological change) persist,
regional inequality will clearly increase."
Williamson identifies four disequilibrating effects:
(1) interregional labor migration may be selectively charac-
terized as vigorous and enterpreneurial, the educated and
skilled, and of productive age. Selective migration of this
type accentuates a tendency towards regional income diver-
gence because labor participation rates, ceteris paribus,
will tend to rise in the rich and fall in the poor regions.
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In other words, growth centers, or regions where growth is
occuring, tend to act as a suction pump pulling in the more
dynamic elements from the poorer regions, resulting in a
greater regional differential in resource endowment.
(2) Regional inequality may also be a result of a
perverse interregional flow of capital. External economies and
economies of scale and agglomeration may induce capital
migration from the poor to rich regions; alternatively, high
apparent risk premium, lack of enterpreneurial ability, and
an insufficiently developed capital market in the poorer
region makes investments there by interests in the richer
regions unattractive.
(3) The national government's preoccupation with
rapid industralization and or national development may sacrifice
interests of the poorer regions. Thus, the central govern-
ment policy, in as much as it has control over factor flows
and over the allocation of resources directly influences
growth rates between regions.
(4) A lack of interregional linkages may-prevent
interregional transmission of growth factors. If national
development is viewed as an economic unification of regional
markets, then sluggish development of interregional linkages
'induces regionalization of the economy.
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1.3.1 Regional Disparity:Alternative Definitions
The description of the factors leading to regional
diaprity given above, although an incomplete one, serves
as a partial description of regional disparity in that dispa-
rity is defined as a consequence of a number of disequilibra-
ting forces. Disparity in the scientific usage of the word
means the existence of differences, but traditionally it has
(witness the emergence of regional disparity as a policy
concern) also been used to imply a moral evaluation, i.e.,
the humane problem of differences in living standards.
The difficulty of a precise definition stems from
the variable objectives of a national regional development
program. For example, the number of alternative measures of
disparity used by various countries participating in the
Varenna Conference is almost equal to the number of countries
participating. Ideally, we would like to employ two measures
of disparity in as much the regional problem in China appear
to be twofold: in the advanced regions, the focus is on
maintaining a convergence of income levels between the consti-
tuent provinces; the regional problem in this area resembles
that of backward areas in the developed countries. In
contrast, the problem of the backward regions is basically
that of developing frontier, sparsely populated, and virgin
territories. Disparity here can perhaps be more meaningfully
defined in terms of cross regional income or output.
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Since the arca is sparsely populated, no useful common standard
can be used to measure their welfare vis-a-vis those of the
advanced regions. Further, the economy in the frontier
regions resemble that of a preindustrial, primitive, and
nomadic society. As such, using per capita income as a
indicator of development in an unmonetarized economy assumes
an illusory significance.
The crucial difference between the developed and
underdeveloped regions is that in the former, regional policy
would be aimed towards maintaining a spatial equilibrium with
respect to growth rates and welfare levels among provinces,
while in the latter, policy would probably be oriented towards
economic development in the most elementary sense. In other
words, we can refer to Friedman's thesis of regional policy
as a function of the phase of national development; in China
different regions are in fact in different phases.
In addition to the two possible regional problem
mentioned above, a third could be the integration of the
frontier regions into an unified national space economy,
combining the more developed coastal regions with the less
developed to achieve a truly unified nation. Under such a
policy, regional disparity could perhaps be measured using
social indicators.
With respect to the developed regions, disparity
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can be measured multi-dimensionally: per capita incomes,
gross regional income, sectoral output in the case of
Marxist proportional development, employment levels, rate
of investment and savings, capital formation, etc.
The most important point to be made here is that
although an operational definition of disparity should be
defined by the purpose of a specific regional development poli-
cy, we are constrainted by a lack of information on the topic.
Therefore, I have only presented alternative definitions.
1.3.2 Measurement of Income: Accounts and Prices
While we are ultimately interested in a formulation
of social accounts at the regional level, insufficient
information prevents us from proceeding directly to the task.
Our best alternative is to present the Communist Chinese
concept of National Income and its accounting elements in
as much as it differs formally and substantively from the
Western definition. 1
The limitations of such an approach will become
apparent as the discussion progresses, but it remains for
1A good exposition of income accounts and its impli-
cation for modelling regional economic development in the
advanced Western countries can be found in A. Bloch (1971).
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us to attempt to overcome these difficulties as much as possible.
This task will have to be met in the later stages of the
research effort as it is obviously beyond the scope of this
thesis.
Before defining income acoounts in the Chinese Socialist
economy, let us consider the statistical implications of
alternative measures. If we are to define disparity in terms
of welfare, then income received by residents in the region
should be used. Alternatively, if we are concerned with
regional productivity and growth rates, then income produced
by factors within the region is the appropriate measure. As an
indicator of welfare, personal income per capita, exclusive of
non-distributed corporate income and inclusive of transfer
payments from non-local governments, is superior to regional
income per capita.
Income per capita also contains inherent biases
derived from non-quantitative or non-monetarized aspects of
welfare. In the previous section we pointed to the example
of undeveloped regions in China with a relatively unnonatarized
economy. Further, in the developed regions, a more urbanized
population distort comparisons of welfare in monetary terms;
the purchasing power of money in the backward regions is usually
greater than in the advanced regions. Further, great cultural
differences between regions, as in China, may distort con-
sumption levels in comparative analysis. However, since prices
are controlled by the central government, with wages determined
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in part by the local standard of living, an interregional
comparison of regional incomes per capita may not be as biased
as it may first seem.
Let us facilitate the characterization of the Socialist
concept of income by defining it in Western terms, i.e.,
net domestic product at market prices. National income in
China follows that of domestic product, precluding that of
national product. The domestic product is a geographical
concept inclusive of all outputs within the country, regardless
whether they accrue to residents or non-residents. Domestic
output in China is equivalent to national income minus factor
income accrued to residents abroad, plus factor income
accrued to non-residents in the country.
It covers only income generated by material produc-
tion and excludes the service sector. This is a corollary
of the Marxist distinction between productive and non-produc-
tive (i.e. services) labor, whereby productive labor is meant
only human efforts through which part of nature is transformed
into material goods.
National income in China is a net income concept,
excluding depreciation allowance of fixed capital, in contra-
distinction to the gross income concept. In Marxist terms,
national income is equivalent to what remains when c, inter-
mediate goods and capital consumption allowance, is deducted
from the total production value of the national economy,
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or V plus m (i.e., national income = v + m - c ). By res-
tricting national income to that of net income, it becomes
conceptually impossible to deny expansion of capacity in the
economy.
It covers all that is valued in terms of market prices
inclusive of taxes minus subsidies, and it precludes valuation
in terms of factor costs. While in the West national income
allows alternative valuations of market prices or factor costs,
in China it is invariably valued at realized prices, i.e., at
prices inclusive of indirect taxes less subsidies.
In the West national income purports to measure the
output of the economy ( in terms of either output or earnings)
over a defined time period. The scale of its measurement,
an exchange ratio or prices, is predetermined according to a
certain objective standard to be made comparable among its
various components. In China, however, national income is
conceived as the total value (exchange value) created in the
economy in a certain time period, or the total output pro-
duced over the same time period. The term value implies a
substantive (political) meaning in Marxist economics, but if
we leave aside its ideological content the problem of national
income reduces basically to the meaning of the prices used.
Since gross investment can only be either positive
or zero, and since it allows for capital consumption allowance,
capacity in the economy will not necessarily be expanded as in
the case where capital depreciation is greater than net invest-
ments. Since net income is exclusive of capital depreciation
allowance, any investment will only expand capacity.
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Three points concerning prices must be emphasized:
(1) in contrast to capitalist economies where prices assume
a resource allocative function, this function and the market
mechanism is denied in a socialist economy. Planning by
material balances, or planning in physical terms without
prices, plays the central resource allocative function. The
parametric function of price remains only in three cases:
a). allocation of consumer goods among consumers; b). procure-
ment of major agricultural products, and; c). allocation of
producer goods among the state enterprises.
(2) Almost all prices are controlled in varying degrees.
It is strictest over factory prices and transfer prices of
basic industrial commodities, which are determined planned
prices. Wage rates and interest rates are also strictly
controlled. Procurement prices of farm products and retail
prices of consumer goods strongly are strongly controlled by
the State Internal Trade Companies or the Supply and Marketing
Cooperatives who predominate the market share in each tran-
saction. In the minature "free market" comparable to the
Russian Kolhoz (collective market), transaction prices are sub-
jected to government supervision.
(3) Formation of these controlled prices however does
not seem to be consistent with a uniform price. The objec-
tive in pricing policy seems to be the maintenance of the
general price level and the historical structure of relative
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prices of the major commodity groups. As such, the present
structure of relative prices appear to be similar to that of
an economy characterized by scarce capital and abundant labor.
Planned factory prices of industrial commodities are set by
by industrial branches as the sum of the average planned
production cost and the planned profit, which is defined as
the planned ratio of profit to production cost multiplied by
the average planned production cost. These formulaes appear
to encourage differential incentives among branches and
enterprises to meet production targets and cost reductions
within the limits of an enterprise's de jure and de facto
discretionary powers on decision making.
On the basis of these points, it appears that the national
income measured by such a price structure is not very effective
in reflecting a true picture of its internal structure or in
making intertemporal comparisons. Nevertheless, centralized
planning by material balances without prices does not necessarily
imply nor result in an irrational allocation of resources as
commonly believed in the West. Zauberman (1971) states that
on the planning level, prices form the scaffolding of macro-
balances which expresses the macro-allocative decisions. In
fact, the planner's choices in capital formation are made to
a large extent on price-based calculations.
Just as national income in the West is constructed
in three phases, the Chinese concept is similarly constructed
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in phases through which the national income or product flows:
national income produced, distributed, and expended. The
difference here is that in China national income is derived
solely from the viewpoint of the production phase. The latter
two phases are determined not from a substantive content but
as a definitional adjustment to the production phase.
National income produced is constitued by the material
producing sector which until the end of the First Five Year
Plan had been divided into five departments: (1) industry;
(2) agriculture; (3) building industry; (4) transport, post and
telecommunications; and lastly (5) commerce and trade. Since
the Second Five Year Plan however, a sixth department "other
industries" has been added.
National income distributed describes the flow of national
income generated in the production phase and disposed through
two means: (1) primary distribution, and (2) redistribution.
Primary distribution indicates the distribution of national in-
come produced within the material producing sector. In this
initial phase, national income distributed is also called
primary income. Redistribution indicates the process by
which primary income is again distributed, this time among all
sectors of the society beyond the limits of the material pro-
ducing sector. This latter redistribution is also called
final income. Figure 1.2 graphically describes this process.
National income expended is defined as the sum total
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of national income distributed and foreign trade balance;
this is also called available national income. Available
national income is divided into two uses: consumption fund
and accumulation fund. Under the consumption fund, social
consumption, government consumption, is made distinct from
residents' consumption, or material consumption in the total
consumption expenditures.
FIGURE 1.2
Distribution and Redistribution of National Incomea
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service and administrative
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Primary distribution
Redistribution
aAdapted from Ishikawa (1965), p. 2 0 .
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CHINESE ECONOMY
2.1 Strategy for Development
2.1.1 Industry and Agriculture
The Chinese strategy for economic development calls
for a concentration of efforts on the development of the
industrial sector, a development focused on the rapid expan-
sion of capital goods industries to be accompanied by a more
modest rate of growth in the consumer goods industries. 58.2
percent of the total investment in the First Five Year Plan
was allocated to industry. Of this figure, 88 percent went to
heavy industry and 11 percent to light industry. At the end
of the Plan period, it was announced that the gross indus-
trial output had increased by nearly 120 percent; over 200
percent in capital goods and 85 percent in consumer goods.
Basic heavy industries such as iron and steel, underwent the
most rapid development and have assumed the role of "primary
growth sectors," while impressive development in mineral
fuels, electric power, metallurgical and machine building
industries were also reported. A few industries, notably
petroleum, fell seriously short of the planned targets. The
output of consumer goods also lagged and failed to meet ade-
quately the increase in demand generated by a relatively rapid
process of industralization, leading to serious shortages -and
tight rationing. Another serious problem was the inefficient
and overambitious planning by individual enterprises that
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resulted in wastage of investment funds and bottlenecks in
the supply of materials.
By the fourth year of the First Five Year Plan,
socialization of the whole economy had been achieved, and
rapid industralization based on the development of heavy industry
attained. A major wage reform raised the average incomes of
industrial and urban workers by 14.5 per cent. Basic construction,
planning and control, planning by material balances and
allocation, comprehensive planning of state budgets, business
finance and bank credit, were by this time systemized and
improved with practice.
In 1956, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party convened the Party's Eighth National Congress in
September to discuss a major item on the agenda, the proposal
for the Second Five Year Plan. This Plan proposed to make China
70 rer cent self sufficient in machinery and equip-ment including
some heavy and precision machines which would be needed for
further national development by 1962, the end of the Second
Plan period. The basic tasks of the Second Plan included
continued development of various industries with heavy industries
as the core and further promotion of industrial, agricultural,
and handicraft production with concomitant development of
transportation and trade. Expanding industries, such as metal
processing, machine making, coal, etc., were to be given special
emphasis together with the weaker industries, such as petroleum,
radio, and the planned industries of synthetic chemicals and
TABLE 2.1
Selected Official Data Relating to the Proposed Targets for the Second Five-Year Plan
Proposed targets
(FFYP) (SFYP)_
Actual
output
'57
1959
Output
(of f icial)'58
A. Heavy Industry
1.Coal
2.Crude oil
3.Elec. power
4.Steel
5.Ch. fertilizer
6.Metallurg. equip.
7.Power gen. equip.
8.Cement
mil. tons
mil. tons
bil. kw-hrs
mil. tons
thous. tons
thous. tons
mil. kw s
mil. tons
113.00
2.01
15.90
4.12
.58
8.00
.16
6.00
B. Light Industry
l.Cotton yarn mil. bales
2.Cotton cloth bil. meters
3.Salt mil. tons
4.Machine-made paper mil. tons
C. Crops
1.Food grains
2.Ginned cotton
3.Soybeans
D. Livestock
1.Cattle
2.Pigs
mil. tons
mil. tons
mil. tons
mil head
mil head
5.00
5.58
7.55
.66
181.60
1.64
11.22
190-210
5-6
40-43
10.5-12.0
3.0-3.2
30-40
1.4-1.5
12.5-14.5
8-9
7.3-8.0
10-11
1.5-1.6
250.00
2.40
12.50
73.61 90.00
138.34 250.00
130.00
1.46
19.34
5.35
.63
.20
6.86
4.65
5.05
8.38
.91
185.00
1.64
10.05
63.32
220.00
270.00
2.26
27.53
8.00
.81
.80
9.30
6.10
5.70
10.40
1.22
250.00
2.10
10.50
347.80
3.68
41.50
8.63
1.30
205.00
2.15
12.27
8.20
7.50
11.04
1.70
270.00
2.41
11.50
145.90 180.00
Source: Li (1964).
Item Unit
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nuclear power.
In comparison with the First Plan, basic investment
in the Second Plan period was expected to double with industry
increasing its share from 58.2 per cent to about 60 per cent,
while agriculture's share was to be increased from 7.6 per cent
to 10 per cent. The proposed targets for the Second Plan are
given in Table 2.1, which includes official output data for
1957 through 1959 as part of the statistics with which Chinese
planners were working.
In 1957, when it was realized that the rate of
agricultural output could not increase rapidly without sub-
stantial increase in state investments in that sector, the
Planning authorities conceded the importance of agriculture
relative to industrial development. The theme underlying
the Second Plan, which was that heavy industry should constitute
the center of the plan with priority in development over all
other sectors, however, remained unaltered, although policies
and controls began to reflect an increasing concern with
the role of agriculture in economic development.
As is the case with most developing countries,
agriculture in China is called upon to foster the process of
economic growth in three principal ways: (1) to provide a
food consumption standard required for fostering increased
productivity of labor and maintenance of political stabilization;
(2) to furnish a source of foreign exchange for needed imports;
and (3) to supply the needed raw materials and inputs for an
industralization program.
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Agriculture under the Communist leadership was developed
primarily through better organization and through the intro-
duction of better farm techniques rather than with capital
investment. Only 7.6 per cent of total investments during
the First Plan period was allocated to agriculture. However,
productivity was increased by such capital-saving measures
as the use of improved farm tools, soil improvement reclamation
of farm land, and other equally labor-intensive projects.
Capital was created by the recruitment of "disguisedly un-
employed"labor to participate in mass water-conservancy and
irrigation-building projects. Agricultural holdings were first
equalized by redistribution later to be amalgamated into
large units under cooperative managements. As a result,
agricultural production increased by 22 per cent in the First
Plan period. Although this exceeded the plan target by 1.9
per cent, it was probably below what should have been to keep
pace with the increase in industrial production and population
growth.
With an increasing realization of aqriculture's
role in development, a major social revolution was initiated
in 1958 that recruited 99 per cent of the peasants into
26,000 communes, each having an average membership of 5,000
households. It was hoped that the technical advantages of
greater efficiency in the mobilization of manpower, materials,
and financial resources would more than compensate for any
loss in enthusiasm. Since the start of the Second Plan, a
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"Great Leap Forward" in agriculture has been achieved.
Despite the failures and disappointments of the industrial
great leap-forw.vard, e.g., backyard steel furnaces, it was
claimed that agricultural output increased by 25 per cent in
1958 over 1957 and again by 16.7 per cent in 1959.
Li Fu-ch'un, Chairman of State Planning Commission,
published a report in 1963 entitled "Supplementary Plan for
the Last Three Years of the Second Five Year Plan," which
advanced the idea of regarding agriculture as the foundation
with industry taking the lead in economic development. This
change in the basic policy of priority on heavy industry began
to develope when the 1960 harvest turned out to be much worse
than expected. In the same year, a movement of "All People
to Agriculture and Food Grains" reached a peak in September.
In November, an editorial in the Party's theoretical organ,
the Red Flag, stated that "Simultaneous Development of
Industry and Agriculture is an Important Law in China's
Socialist Economy." When severe natural calamities further
depressed agricultural output in 1961, or so it was claimed,tbhe
Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee decided that "since
People's Daily, March 31, 1960, pp. 2-3. As quoted
C. M. Li (1964).
2
~Red Flag, November, 1960.
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there had been tremendous development in heavy industry in
the last three years, its output of major products already
far in excess of the planned level for 1961 and 1962, the
scale of basic construction should, therefore, be appropriately
reduced." To ease the severe shortage of consumer goods,
assistance was to be given to "further development of light
industry, rural and urban handicrafts, family side-line
occupations and suburban agriculture, and to the revival of
primary markets in the rural areas." Thus, official policy
was to be ",readjustment, consolidation, reinforcement and
improvement," which signalled the end of the Great Leap
Forward.
With the 1961 harvest still unimproved, the Party
issued to its field cadres secret directives contained in a
document known as "Seventy Articles of Industrial Policy."
It directed that all basic construction was to be suspended
together with the closing of all unprofitable enterprises
and to suspend the practice of recruiting labor from rural
areas. Despite a policy shift, warnings were still raised
against as one-sided emphasis on agriculture at the expense
of industry, transportation, culture, and education.
In September, 1962, the Tenth Plenum of the Party's
Central Committee completed the change from a priority
development of heavy industry to "agriculture first" by
resolving that "as the immediate urgent task of the people,
the development of agriculture, itself the foundation of the
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national economy with industry as the leading factor, must
be given the top-most position." The policy was to "relocate
resolutely our work from the industrial departments to the
sphere where agriculture is the foundation."
Hence, there was not any official or formal formulation
of a Second Five Year Plan aside from brief statements of
intent and output targets. The Great Leap Forward and its
attendant fluctuating time horizons (sometimes monthly, and
weekly, or even daily), and chaos made planning impossible
for the period 1958 to 1962. The first three years of the
Second Plan period basically continued the First Plan policies
of focusing on the rapid growth of heavy industry, while the
last two years witnessed increasingly severe applications of
measures of "readjustment, consolidation, reinforcement, and
improvement" in basic construction and industry with agricultural
modernization finally earning an over-riding priority in
development.
Since 1963, there has been no available official
information concerning the economy released by Chinese
authorities. Information and tidbit evidences collected
from refugees and reconnaisance by intelligence organizations
are too factually unreliable to work with, while projections
*for the 1960s appear to have no statistical nor planning value.
In January, 1963, Chou En-lai announced the opening
of the Third Five Year Plan. That announcement proved to be
premature, for it was not until January, 1965, was-the
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beginning of the Third Plan officially reported in the People's
Congress. A new 10-yuan note was issued in January, 1966,
apparently intended to supply additional currency necessary
for the economic expansion expected in the Third Plan. But
in 1966, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was started
and the Third Plan fell into oblivion.
Numerous references to a forthcoming Fourth Five Year
Plan have been made by various enterprises in their annual
reports in 1970, and in monitored radio broadcasts, but to
date there has been no official announcement of such a Plan.
And if the Plan is already in existence, its targets and policies
remain a secret.1
2.1.2 Investment, Capital, and Savings
Through forced savings in the form of taxation,
profits of government enterprises, control of the pricing
mechanism, subscription to bond issues and other types of
forced loans, the Chinese economy shifts income from con-
sumption and unproductive private investments to maintain
a very high level of investments.
Fixed investments more than doubled between 1950
and 1952, as shown in Table 2.2. It was almost doubled again
-The Fourth Five Year Plan was referred to in a report
by the Hsiang-t'an Steel enterprise, and also i'n a July 1970
Hunan Report. These were contained in monitored radio broad-
casts and are listed in China News Analysis, Aug. 7, 1970.
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in the next three years and increased by another fifty per
1
cent in 1957 as compared to 1955. The Leap-Forward period
pushed investment to nearly three times the 1955 level in
1958-1959. While in 1950, only about 10 per cent of output
went into fixed investment; by 1957, that figure was carried
to 16 per cent. The Leap-Forward figure for investments was
almost 25 per cent of the GNP.
While impressive, the rate of investment is not
remarkable because generally Chinese prices overstate the
value of investment goods and other producer goods relative
to consumer goods. Investments in China can be distinguished
between the Traditional and Modern sectors. Traditional
can be defined as those enterprises which carry out their
operation as they have done before industralization, or
"traditionally." The Modern sector consists of enterprises
using production techniques more comparable to those in
developed economics, and usually imply industrial units, that
is, exclusive of traditional enterprises.
When the Modern sector is defined as excluding
individual handicrafts, modern transport and communications,
public utilities, military construction, and investments in
science, culture, education and health, its investment amounted
-to about 55 per cent of all investments from 1951 to 1954
Fixed investment is inclusive of all additions and
major repairs to buildings and productive facilities and
exclusive of changes in inventories and procurement of military
equipment. Gross domestic fixed investment is estimated at current
prices. These estimates and other information presented in
this section are from W. W. Hollister (1964).
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(cf. Table 2.3). Excluding heavy industry, the rate declined
to about one-fifth of all investment in 1958-59. The priority
in which heavy industry is regarded (cf. the preceding section
2.1.1) is evident from the fact that its share of about 25 per
cent of all investment in 1952 reached about 45 per cent in
1958 - 59.
Traditional investment consists of investments in
agriculture, trade, non-agricultural investments in housing,
communal services, and government. Thus defined, its proportion
showed a decline in the period from 1950-59 simultaneous with
heavy industry's increasing share in the same period. This
decline after 1952 took place primarily not in agriculture
but in the other sectors identified under the Traditional
sector. Table 2.4 suggest that inspite of an absolute increase
in investment in the economy, agriculture's share continued
at about the same level. In monetary terms, agricultural
investment in 1956 was about 4.7 billion yuan, twice the figure
in 1952; and in 1959, the figure reached about 10 billion
yuan, again almost twice the figure in 1956.
Agriculture was the primary source of savings
financing the industralization program in the First Plan
period. These savings were generated by the agricultural
sector providing inputs at extremely low costs to the industrial
sector which was then able to sell products at high state-
controlled prices. Thus, enterprises' profits in China have
formed the major source of savings, such that in 1960, 93.4
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TABLE 2.2
Gross Fixed Investment in China, 1950-59
Gross Fixed Year
Investment '50 '51 '52 '53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59
Billion yuan 2.4 4.0 6.4 10.5 12.5 13.0 19.1 18.2 33.0 38.5
% of GNP 5.5 6.4 9.1 12.4 13.9 13.8 17.9 15.9 23.9 25.7
TABLE 2.3
Gross Fixed Investment in Modern Sectors, 1950-59
Modern Year
Investment '50 '51 '52 '53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59
Billion yuan 1.18 2.15 3.61 5.70 6.94 7.48 11.3411.1221.2425.31
% of total
fixed invest. 48.8 54.4 56.5 54.5 55.4 57.5 59.3 61.1 64.3 65.7
Heavy ind. as
% of total
fixed invest. 11.6 12.6 23.4 24.5 27.6 31.9 33.9 36.9 45.1 44.3
Other sectors
as % of total 37.2 1.8 3.1 30.0 27.8 25.6 25.4 24.2 19.2 21.4
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TABLE 2.4
Gross Fixed Investment in the Traditional Sector, 1950-59
Traditional
Investment '50 '51 '52 '53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59
Billion yuan 1.24 1.80 2.78 4.76 5.59 5.52 7.77 7.07 11.79 13.21
% of total
fixed invest. 51.2 45.6 43.5 45.5 44.6 42.5 40.7 38.9 35.7 34.3
Agricultural
invest. as
% of total 45.2 38.7 34.6 26.2 26.6 28.3 24.4 25.2 26.4 26.6
Other sectors 6.0 6.9 8.9 19.3 18.0 14.2 16.3 13.7 9.3 7.7
58.
per cent of the total budgetary revenue was accounted for
by profits and taxes from state enterprises. Savings pattern
in the state-owned sector differed in the implicit division
of labor between the large more modern enterprises and smaller
regional industries. The former were allowed more flexibility
in regard to capital and their primary preoccupation was
with increasing output, while the latter were called upon to
generate savings for the state. Since the light industry
sector was about 80 per cent dependent on the agricultural
sector for its needed inputs, and since ithad been a major
source of savings for the state, it became clear that expansion
in the heavy industry sector was heavily dependent on the light
industry sector, and ultimately on the agricultural sector.
Thus, heavy industrial growth was predicted on expansion in
agricultural output. Savings, then, became the chain which
linked the various sectors together.
2.1.3 Population and Migration Policy
Estimates of the total population vary from
approximately 650 million to 900 million. Official population
data have not been announced for nearly a decade and the
estimates reflect alternate projections from the 530 million
-figure officially reported in the 1953 census.
Population density varies strikingly within the
country; the greatest concentration lying between the eastern
half of China and western and northwestern lands. While Tibetan
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highlands and Sinkiang-Mongolia Region comprise more than 50
per cent of the total land area in China, this vast area
contains only about 5 per cent of the total population.
In the eastern half of China, where almost all the
agricultural land is concentrated, population densities range
upward from 130 per square mile. Major areas where this figure
exceeds 520 persons per square mile are the North China plain,
the middle and lower Yangtze Valley, and the Szechwan Basin.
The latter two areas have in some places exceptionally high
densities, of about more than 1,500 persons per square mile.
Areas in eastern China with low population density usually
denote marginal agricultural lands, rough terrain, limited
precipitation, and short growing seasons.
Slightly more than 90 per cent of the 216 urban
centers having a population of 50,000 or more are located in
eastern China. Of the 15 cities with population exceeding
1 million, only Canton is located in South China. Most of
the provinces in South China have been more recently settled
relative to China's long history, and they possess fewer and
more dispersed natural resources to support large urban
agglomerations.
Four cities in Northeast China have a population of
one million or more: Mukden, Ch'ang-ch'un, Fu-shun, and Harbin.
This reflects the development of this region as China's first
major base of heavy industry. To the northwest, the cities
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of Sian and Tai-yuan, each with over a million population,
have experienced very rapid growth under Communist. policies
to develope and expand industrial bases in the interior.
Official Chinese population policy varies with time
and reflects their outspoken views on Marxist theory against
Malthusian economics. Their argument is well known: population
growth threatens resources only in countries under the
capitalist system of production where benefits of technical
development are withheld from the masses. Under socialism,
with the means of production under the control of direct
representatives of the masses, benefits are returned to the
workers who are the source of all wealth. An increase in
population means an increase in the ranks of the working
class, and leads to an increase in productivity sufficient
to meet the needs of an increased population and affords a
rise in the living standard as well. As convenient as it
may be, this postulate did not hold true in China, and official
policy has been to encourage birth control and late marriages.
Furthermore, increased urban in-migration, large urban
population increases, and the policy of establishing industrial
bases in the interior regions have resulted in forced
population movements to the backward areas under development. Al-
though data is fragmentary, there appears a relatively
stabilized population growth rate in coastal urban areas and
some cities have, in fact, experienced little or no urban
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in-migration. The policy has been to restrict the growth
rates in these cities and to expand the population of cities
in the interior provinces so as to achieve a majority of
Chinese Han persons over local minority groups. Table 2.5
gives the size, population sizes and growth rates from 1949
to 1956.
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TABLE 2.5
Population Size and Growth Rates By Urban and Rural Residence
1949-1956
Total Urban Rural
Percent Percent Percent
Year (000s) increase (000s) increase (000s) increase
1949 541,670 - 57,650 - 484,020 -
1950 551,960 1.90 61,690 7.00 490,270 1.29
1951 563,000 2.00 66,320 7.50 496,680 1.31
1952 574,820 2.10 71,630 8.00 503,190 1.31
1953 587,960 2.29 77,670 8.43 510,290 1.41
1954 601,720 2.34 81,550 4.99 520,170 1.94
1955 614,650 2.14 82,850 1.59 531,800 2.24
1956 627,800 2.14 89,150 7.60 538,650 1.29
Source: "Data on China's Population from 1949 to 1956,"
T'ung-chi Kung-tso,(Statistical Bulletin), no.11, June 14,
1957; translated in ECMM, no. 91, July 22, 1957, pp. 2 2 -2 5 .
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2.2 Decentralization
Decentralization of control over various sectors
of the economy, trade, and taxation, was initiated in late
1957. This decontrol enhanced immeasurably the authority of
Party committees and secretaries at the local and enterprise
level. Decentralization was also one of the strategic
developments that made the "Great Leap Forward" possible.
Not only was the effect of decentralization on planning
profound, but planning itself was decentralized. Up to
1959, the process of drafting plans was known as the "single
track" system, which was, in essence, a scheme of centralized
planning mainly for the benefit of centrally controlled
enterprises. A "double track" system devolved upon local
authorities to draw up a co-ordinated plan for all the
enterprises in their locale. The local plans would have to
tackle the problems of balancing needs between different
enterprises, different economic sectors, and different areas,
of defining targets and scopes of plans, and of maintaining
proportionate development between different sectors. The
whole system was described as "centralized planning and
decentralized control."
Under this system, the planning unit was a geographical
area, a hsien, a special administrative district, a city, a
province, or even an economic region. Every unit aspired
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to become as self-sufficient as possible and, thus, tended to
ignore the needs of other units. This resulted in serious
disruption of the regular flow of supplies between areas.
However, the development of localism was not unanticipated,
and it was stated that these tendencies could be overcome by
strengthening the Party's leadership.
But decentralization was carried to a point where
even any pretence of unity in national planning and national
economic development was non-existent. Therefore, a return
to central control over fiscal and financial plans was
ordered by the State Council in 1960. Later, it was realized
that the financial control system had to be even more centralized
than the system of fiscal control. A slogan of "the whole
nation as one chess board" was introduced, with the
establishment of six regional "central bureaux" to exercise
control on behalf of the Party's Central Committee. However,
with decentralization, there were changes in the proportion
between local and central industries which reflected a
wider dispersion of industrial locations than ever before,
expecially in the iron and steel industries. The central
authorities controlled the larger and heavier strategic industries.
Since the modern industry sector produced about three-quarters
of industrial output and the centrally controlled sector
produced a little over one-quarter of industrial output,
about one-half of the modern industrial output.must be in
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the hands of the local authorities; by the same reasoning,
at least half of the heavy industry output must be out of
the hands of the central authorities.
In general, there has been a trend from concentration
to the distribution of administrative powers from 1949 to the
present. How did administrative decontrol relate to de-
centralization of economic activity? In Communist China,
government at the regional level has a unique importance.
Planners see the duality of center and region as a
contradiction that has to be resolved. The First Five Year
Plan period was characterized by branch-type administration
and centralization; but during the Great Leap FOrward,
the government stressed administration by interbranch
coordinative agencies and decentralization. 1
1The branch principle of organization means that all
units concerned with similar operation, i.e., administration
of machine building industry, form a single branch. A central
point in the national capital directs a hierarchy of regional
bureaux. In economic administration, this form of organization
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Decentralization in the economic field meant that
regional governments administered a complex array of small
enterprises that could not be governed according to the strict
principle of production. This decontrol could be envisaged
in certain ways as a means to facilitate easier controls
for the decentralization of economic activity into the less
developed regions. Decentralization, however, was also
intended to raise agricultural output. By putting decision-
making powers into the hands of the producing units, external
conditions were created for the autonomous exercise of such
powers, i.e., some form of market conditions. It was assumed
by Chinese planners that where production units were not
subjected to directives and regulatory controls, they would
produce for self gain; they would increase their output only
if they had something to gain in return. In other words,
decentralization would allow material incentives and thereby
increase agricultural and industrial output. In Chinese
economic theory, increased agricultural output has a
strong relationship to the industrial sector. The quality of
industrial performance in a given year depends on the quality
has also been called the production principle. In China, the
application of the branch principle generally means centralization
of command and administration. By contrast, the interbranch
coordinative agencies cut across branch lines and take the form
of committees. At the central level, the most important -
agencies are the state planning and economic committees. Along-
side, decision-making powers are trnasferred downward from some
central point, or decentralization. This parallels the type
of decontrol advocated by economists such as Liberman and Sik.
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of the agricultural output during the preceding year. There
is an equally close relationship between light industry and
heavy industry. Light industry constitutes the link between
the agricultural and heavy industry sectors; light industry
derives most of its raw materials from agriculture and is
also one of the major sources of savings for investment in
heavy industry.
Administrative decentralization was employed for
increasing the outputs of both the agricultural and industrial
sectors and to facilitate economic and population dispersion.
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2.3 Organization and Political Ideology
It is difficult to over-emphasize the role of
political ideology in China's development planning.
Communist Chinese view politics as the concentrated manifestation
of economics; no question is apolitical; an economic decision
is also, by definition, a political decision. Consequently,
Chinese planners are limited to a larje extent by political
parameters, and an understanding of China's growth strategies
necessitates a brief view of her politics and organization.
The orthodox Marxist notion of class polarization
is basic in Communist China's ideology. "Struggle" is
defined as class conflicts and is a manifestation of the
theory of opposites. Mao Tse-tung expands on this and
emphasizes Contradiction, of which class conflicts exemplify.
Accordingly, Communists, or Marxist Leninists, must use the
law of the unity of opposites to resolve problems, economic,
regional and otherwise. Major contradictions in Chinese
Communist ideology include:
(A) vs. (B)
I. Economic Contradictions (The Dialectic of the Economy)
Contradiction of Sectors
modern traditional
coast inland
industry agriculture
heavy industry light industry
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Contradiction of Goals
select development
long-term
Contradiction -of Scale
large-scale industry
Contradiction of Functions
production
production
accumulation
simultaneous development
short-term
medium & small-scale industry
consumption
accumulation
consumption
Contradiction of Operation
capital-intensive labor-intensive
II. Political Contradictions (The Dialectic of the State)
Contradiction of Conception
centralism
"from the top down"
democracy
"from the bottom up"
Contradiction of Administration
center
centralization
vertical rule
branch principle
(vertical)
region
decentralization
dual rule
committee principle
(horizontal)
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The list gives the Chinese Communist theory of the
Law of Contradictions, and indicates their ideological views
on economic and political questions. Needless to say, the
left side of the list is regarded as the bad boy to be stood
in a corner by himself.
During the Great Leap Forward period, the key economic
slogan was "simultaneous development" of the various economic
sectors, or the resolution by the law of the unity (simultaneous
development) of opposites (select vs. simultaneous). Mao
spoke on the questions of economic development in his speech
"The Ten Great Relationships" and revealed his dialectical
conception of the economy. The first five relationships are:
(1) The relationship of industry and agriculture, of
heavy and light industry.
(2) The relationship of coastal industry and inland
industry.
(3) The relationship of economic construction and
defence construction.
(4) The relationship of state, cooperative, and
individual.
(5) The relationship of center and region.
A persistent train of thought in Communist Chinese economic
literature is the "idea of sectoral contradictions." In his
report to the Eight Party Congress in 1956, Liu Shao-ch'i
spoke of the need to coordinate coast and inland, large-scale
and medium and small-scale industries, central and state-
owned with regional state-owned industries. Roughly, these
can be considered as contradictions between the modern and
traditional sectors.
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2.4 Regional Economics
As pointed out earlier, the Communist Chinese
inherited a country that did not constitute an economic
entity. During the first five years, the country was
administered as seven large regions. But by 1954, the political
difficulties obstructing complete unification of the country
had been overcome, and China for the first time in decades
became truly unified. Political unification was a requisite
for implementing the series of five year plans, which envisaged
a steadily growing modern sector cutting across regional
lines and under the direct administration of the central
authorities. The decentralization of 1967 was a tacit recognition
that the Chinese economy coulg not be directed as a single
entity. This implied that regional planning and cooperation
must play a vital role in propelling the economy forward.
In China, regional economic cooperation meant that
the industries should rely more on materials derived from
the particular given administrative region rather than on
materials that had to be imported from some distant source.
For example, if the needed materials were not available, they
were to be developed within their own particular region or
substitutes had to be found. While the earlier period of
centralized administration would have presented various
difficulties in administration in regional economic cooperation,
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the new power and authority that came with decentralization
greatly simplified intra-regional allocation of materials.
However, the decentralization measure did not include any
administrative mechanism between centres and provinces. It
handed down decision making powers to the local provincial
governments and thereby laid the groundwork for making the
provinces the units of economic cooperation. Despite the
fears of some members of the leadership that decentralization
had gone too far, and a recentralization was necessary, a
continued emphasis had been that of regional cooperation.
Enterprises were told that they must try to purchase
materials and equipment within their own administrative units,
and whenever possible, sell their products in the same area.
To facilitate this kind of exchange, the government even
went as far as to suggest that the exchanges take place directly
between buyer and seller, bypassing the state-controlled
commercial network. In other words, enterprises were urged
to confine their economic relationships as much as possible
within their own area or region.
A persistent complaint agaisnt the idea of regional
economics was that it would lead to inequalities. An advanced
region would move ahead faster while the poorer, less developed
regions would remains.bchind. An essential feature of the
Great Leap Forward had been the objective of overcoming the
inequities which had arisen in the First Plan period by
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encouraging simultaneous development of the entire economy.
In spite of this, the existence of inequity has been admitted,
and some China watchers claim that Chinese planners actively
encouraged it.1 If this is true, then regional differences
may be regarded as a spur for other less developed regions to
catch up with the more advanced.
The standard of living varies sharply between areas,
it generally being the highest in the cities. The effect of
encouraging regional economic cooperation may tend to further
widen the gap between the advanced and backward areas,
although the intent may be to effect the reverse. However,
with a leadership concerned primarily with economic development,
it can not afford to ignore the fact that the advanced regions
add proportionately more to the national economy than the
poorer regions.
2.5 The Spatial Economy
2.5.1 Urbanization Policy
Fundamentally, the Chinese sentiment that has under-
lined their urban policy can be summed up as anti-urbanism,
suspicion and distrust of the big cities. In Communist theory,
1 See Franz Schurman's article. "China New Economic
Policy, Transition or Beginning?" in China under Mao, op. cit.,
p.221.
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Marx and Lenin equate the traditional city with the habitat
of the exploiters, and thus regard eliminating the distinction
of the city as a sine qua non for destroying class differences. 1
Mao Tse-tung regards the same problem in terms of contradictions:
"Economically, in capitalist society, where the
town under bourgeous rule ruthlessly exploits the
countryside, and in the Kuomingtang-controlled areas
in China, where the town under the rule of foreign
imperialists, and the native big comprador bourgeosie
most savagely exploit the countryside is one of
extreme antagonism. But in a socialist country
and in our revolutionary bases, such an antagonistic
contradiction becomes a non-antagonistic contradiction;
and it will disappear when a communist society is
realised." 2
Indeed, this kind of ideological hostility by the Communists
towards the cities amounted to sheer hatred of metropolises,
of which Shanghai was the focus. The anti-urban attitude of
the Communist did not diminish after their takeover; at first,
the complicated urban socio-economic structure and organization
of the cities were too complex for guerilla veterans to
appreciate, let alone control. Later, the professionalization
This line from Lenin is a frequent quote in Communist
Chinese literature: "For the sake of eliminating the class, we
not only have to overthrow the exploiters, the landlards, and
the capitalists, not only have to abolish their ownership,
but also have to eliminate the difference between town and
country... ." Some Problems of Transition from People's
Commune to Communism, 1958.
2 Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," Selected Works of
Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1952
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and specialization prevalent, and indeed necessary, in cities
for urban administration sake added to the inherent fear of
class differentiation.
The Chinese also have economic arguments to depreciate
the city. Despite western economists' conclusions that urban
areas are relatively the most efficiently productive places,
the Chinese, perhaps through political bias, hold a parasitic
view towards the city. This argument is hardly effective
when one recalls that Shanghai is the single most productive
area in the whole of China today. But there are economic
difficulties: the first is maintaining a balance between
supply and demand in the areas with more than a million
population. In a rigidly planned economy, production,
transportation, and distribution of goods and services without
the benefit (or, with due respect, the evils) of the market
mechanism have apparently caused operational problems of
efficiency. A persistent problem seems to be the adequate
provision of foodstuff, especially perishablc goods like
vegetables, where incoming shipment and local distribution
were badly coordinated. Another.argument advanced by Chinese
economists concerns the cost of urban infrastructure. In a
country where the majority of the population live on marginal
subsistence level, the staggering cost needed to sustain the
cities appears overwhelming. In fact, the cost of urban
1The vegetable problem is more serious than it appears
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infrastructure far exceeded the estimates of the Peking planners.
In the First Five Year Plan, there was no budget allocated for
housing in the urban areas under the sector of Basic Construction.
There was, however, 1.6 billion yuan, or 3.7 per cent of the
total investment budget in Basic Construction that was
allocated to Urban Public Works.1 Actual spending for
housing in urban areas from 1953 to 1956 amounted to 4.0
billion yuan, or 10 per cent of the total national basic
construction investments in the whole Five Year Plan. In
addition, another 3.5 billion yuan were spent for the
construction of 6.57 million square feet of public buildings. 2
The actual spending for the Urban Public Works sector, although
not given, can be assumed to be at least six times the initial
figure. In the face of capital shortage, big cities are
at first sight. This problem perhaps accounted for the
frequent expansion of the municipal boundaries of many big
cities, so that the production, shipment, and distribution
of foodstuffs like vegetable can be consolidated under one
local agency. This incident has meaningful implications where
the absence of a land rent mechanism results in random and
inefficient land uses. See the article by Sun Chien,
"Problem of Year Round Supply of Vegetables," Impartial
Daily, Oct. 30, 1961.
1 People's Handbook, 1955.
2People's Handbook, 1958, p. 6 4 7 .
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are frustrating and expensive propositions. In due course,
a Bureau of City Construction was established in the Central
Government in 1953. Although it was later expanded to become
the Ministry of City Construction the following year, the
whole bureau was abolished in 1955.1 Such ambivalence
indeed permeates Chinese feelings on large cities.
2.5.2 Changes in the Economic Importance of Cities
One way of examining the spatial pattern of the
Chinese economy is to ascertain the location and relative
importance of the principal economic centers.
The first official census of China published in
1953 had 164 municipalities,2 which included two independent
municipalities, Peking and Shanghai, which are administratively
on the same level as provinces. Since all urban places
with more than a 100,000 population are municipalities,
economic centers of importance are listed. These population
statistics, which show their relative growth rates as well
as changes in absolute size, provide meaningful indications
of economic activity. Since consumption increases with
population growth, the latter is an indication of change in
the relative importance of cities as markets. Also, assuming
People's Handbook, 1954, 1955, 1956.
2 See Morris Ullman, Cities of Mainland China: 1953 and
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that temporary visitors are excluded from these statistics,
population growth can be a measure of the importance of
a center as an area of production. Assuming further that
controlled propulation movement in China does not allow
people to remain in an area for long periods without
employment, any sustained population increase can then be
inferred to be accompanied by a corresponding rise of
economic activity and employment.
Population increase in a municipality could understate
the importance of that area as a supply center. It there
was an initial period of large unemployment, increase in
employment could exceed the increase in population caused
by in-migration. Similarly, decrease in population could
understate the drop in employment if unemployment in the city
increases. Differences in growth rates for various industries
and in labor intensity per unit of output, which are
determined by the production processes utilized, could also
result in population changes that do not reflect the real
magnitude and economic importance of changes that cities
undergo. This is important especially in cities, as in China,
with only a few industries or low industrial mix. With these
.1958. Washington, D.C., Bureau of the Census, Foreign Man-
power Research Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1961, Series
P-95, No. 59, p. 2 .
Moreover, in Communist Chinese terminology, a municipality is
defined as an urban area designed as a separate administrative
unit.
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observation, we can go on to approximate the economic
significance of Chinese cities from 1953 to 1958.
The years 1953 and 1958 chosen for comparison are
determined by several factors. By 1953, sizeable unemployment
in the urban areas has disappeared as a result of increasing
economic activity during the post-Korean war initial
industrial rehabilitation period. By mid-year 1958,
government directives issued in 1956 and 1957 to curb in-
migration from the countryside and requiring unemployed
to return back to the rural areas have had their effects.
Furthermore, transient populations that had come to the
cities during the chaotic period of intense collectivization
programme were excluded from the 1958 registered urban
populations. As such, these years reflect a reasonably
accurate picture of the true resident populations. The
data for 1953 and 1958 span a critical period, that of the
First Five Year Plan and the first six months of the Second
Plan. Consequently, population changes during this period
reflect the impact of increased economic activity on city
size distributions.
Table 2.6 shows that most of the 117 cities in
the census had less than 300,000 populations. It also shows
a sharp discontinuity in the frequency distribution between
200,000 to less than 300,000. Quite a few number of cities
fall within the intervening intervals between 300,000 and
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TABLE 2.6
Distribution of 117 Cities by 1953 and 1958 Midyear Populations
Number Number
Size of Population of cities of cities Change Change
group (000 persons) in 1953 in 1958 (#) (%)
Small Less than 100 16 2 -14
100 to less than 200 47 40 - 7
200 to less than 300 18 26 + 8 -16.05
Medium 300 to less than 400 8 9 + 1
400 to less than 500 3 5 + 2
500 to less than 600 4 4 0
600 to less than 700 6 4 - 2 +25.93
700 to less than 800 2 6 + 4
800 to less than 900 3 4 + 1
900 to less than 1,000 1 2 + 1
Large 1,000 to less than 1,500 3 6 + 3
1,500 to less than 2,000 2 2 0 +66.67
More than 2,000 4 7 + 3
Total 117 117
Source: Wu (1967).
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1,000,000 at more or less decreasing frquency as the class
interval in population rises. From 1,000,000 up, the
frequency shows a rise again. We may then draw two arbitrary
division of city size: one immediately above the class
interval of 200,000 to less than 300,000, and the other
immediately above the class interval of 900,000 to less than
1,000,000. Cities below the first division are considered
small; those between the two divisions as medium; and those
above the second division as large. (Figure 2.1). The 1958
frequency distribution can also be classified similarly.
Comparison of 1953 to 1958 shows a decrease in the
number of small cities, accompanied by an increase in the
medium, and a slower increase in the large cities group.
However, the decrease in the small cities is not particularly
significant; the sample size for 1953 and 1958 being consistent,
an increase in the two other groups imply a decrease in the
small group. The number of small cities would not have
decreased if the 1958 sample size had been larger. If the
1958 distribution had been larger, small cities would experience
a net positive increase rather than the decrease shown in
our data. A larger distribution was not adopted for 1958
because the lack of complete data for all cities in both years
would result in distortions if we compared cities with one
another in measuring population growth within the city.
Accordingly, attention should be focused on the two
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groups that experienced increases, mainly the medium and largw
groups. The number of cities in the medium group increased
by seven, and the corresponding increase in the large group
was six. In relative terms, the large group increased by
67 per cent compared to 26 per cent by the medium group.
A comparison can also be made between 1948 and 1953
using 98 cities for which data are available. Again, the
same frequency characteristics for 1953 are evident in 1948
(pre-Communist era). During the following five years, there
was an increase of 7 medium cities, as compared with an
increase of only 2 in the large group (see table 2.7).
The relative rates of increase are 59 per cent for medium
cities and 29 percent for the large cities. As such, there
was a significant increase in the number of medium cities
between 1948 and 1953.
Increased urbanization is obvious. Although
percentage figures vary, the overall impact appears to contrast
with xthat might have been expected from an announced policy
of discouraging growth of the large cities in preference for
the expansion in number of medium and small cities. While
the medium group expanded, it is, however, the conspicous
increase in the number of large cities that is most significant.
Part of the answer may lie in the ambivalence of official
policy beginning in 1956 when planning authorities began to
deplore the over-sealousness in the establishment of new
81.
TABLE 2.7
Distribution of 98 Cities by 1948 and 1953 Midyear Populations
Number Number
Size of Population of cities of cities Change Change
group (000 persons) in 1948 in 1953 (#) (%)
Small Less than 100 21 2 -19
100 to 200 34 44 +10 -16.21
200 to 300 19 16 - 3
Medium 300 to 400 7 8 + 1
400 to 500 0 3 + 3
500 to 600 5 4 - 1
600 to 700 1 6 + 5 +58.82
700 to 800 3 2 - 1
800 to 900 0 3 + 3
900 to 1,000 2 1 - 1
Large 1,000 to 1,500 4 3 - 1
1,500 to 2,000 2 2 0 +28.57
2,000 or more 1 4 + 3
Total 98 98
Ullman,Source: Wu, (1967). Original data from
Cities of Mainland China: 1953 and 1958, p. 2 .
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economic centers at the expense of the general rate of national
economic expansion. Relatively lower rates of increase in
the medium cities relative to that of the large cities may
reflect a shift of policy.
The rank size distribution of Communist Chinese
cities and its conformity to a system of central places may
have significant implications for theoretical discussions.
However, this section is limited to a graphic exposition of
rank size distributions. H. W. Singer points out in his
1936 article:
"In the distribution of population among human
agglomerations, there appears to be a remarkable
statistical regularity which, besides being interesting
in itself and affording a complete analogy to
Pareto's law of income distribution, yields an
exact quantitative measure for the relative roles
of the smaller and larger types of human agglomerations,
so to speak, an 'Index of Metropolisation.' This
regularity can be charcterized by the equation
log Y = A - alog X, where X is a certain number of
inhabitants; Y the number of towns mire than X
inhabitants; A and aare constants."
A regression analysis was run for the 1953 and 1958 populations
for the 117 cities where linear regression lines were deduced.
In this study by Professor Wu, for 1953 he had Y = 3.837477 -
0.924794 log X, and for 1958, he had Log Y = 4.143997 -
0.993881 log X. The linear regression lines showed an increase
in the avalue or the Pareto coefficient between 1953 and 1958,
accompanied by a concomitant increase in A. The difference,
however, is not significant. The slight increase in a in 1958
would still be higher than in 1953 (see Figure 2.2).
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1 H. W. Singer, "The Courbs des Populations, A Parallel
to Pareto's Law," The Economic Journal, Vol. XLVI, No. 182,
June, 1936.
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G. R. Allen1 has pointed out that other things being
equal, the highest values for a should be obtained from data
derived from fixed boundary definitions of town sizes since
the number of large towns which have grown in recent years
by over-spilling legal boundaries are many in most countries.
Therefore, computation for the Pareto coefficients for
Communist China was based on population statistics of towns
with legal boundaries. The problem of spillover, however, is
not very vital because the inadequate municipal transportation
in Communist China would restrict such effects. It is interesting
to compare the a values just under 1 in both 1953 and 1958
with similar values in other countries. For England and
Wales in 1921, the corresponding coefficients were 0.9893
and 0.9314 for Canada in 1932. It was also pointed out that
the relative deviation of the data (Y-Y')/Y where Y is
actual and Y' the theoretical, is small for large values of
X, and tends to rise as X becomes smaller. This seems to
imply that the Pareto function over-estimates the number of
small towns,as Allen observes.
The population of Shanghai, China's largest city,
was estimated at 4,423,000 for the year 1948, the last of
- Nationalist rule before the Communist liberation. The
1953 and 1958 censuses reported figures of 6,024,000 and
6,977,000 respectively. Thus, from 1948 to 1953, Shanghai's
1 G. R. Allen, "The Courbs des Population, A Further
Analysis," Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of
Statistics, Vol. XVI, Nos. 5 and 6, May, June 1954.
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population growth rate was 36 percent, or 5.4 percent annually;
and 12 percent from 1953 to 1958, or 2.3 percent annually.
Total national urban population in 1949 was 57,650,000,
which implies an annual growth rate of 7.8 percent from
1949 to 1953. From 1953 to 1958, that national growth rate
of urban populations is estimated at 5.3 percent. In relative
terms, therefore, Shanghai lost its dominance with respect to
population weight. In fact, after 1953, Shanghai's population
growth was attibuted to the natural birth rates only. We
can conclude, then, that Shanghai's primacy dropped.
Many writers and students of urbanization take the
term primacy for a structural meaning. Professor Berry, for one,
equates primacy simply with the abrupt change of lognormal
straight regression lines in the city-size distribution of a
country. He presents a model to demonstrate how city-size
distributions will evolve from a primate type to a smooth
1 See Berry's articles "City as Systems within Systems
of Cities," in Friedman and Alonso (1964).
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lognormal distribution. In other words, primacy shall
tend towards a rank size relationship over time. In a sense,
this implies that once a straight lognormal distribution
has been reached, primacy will, in effect, be nonexistent.
This implication is questionable on two points. First, a
change in the slope of a lognormal regression line also
can be taken to imply a relationship to primacy in the
structural sense. Second, in a country where city size
distribution has a lognormal straight line character, as in
China, yet betrays aspects of primacy, the whole question of
primacy and rank-size being mutually exclusive becomes
confusing.
Primacy is perhaps best measured with references to
the urban structure of a country as a whole. We, therefore,
adopt El Shaks's methodology; he defines a city's primacy
values as the average ratio of the difference between the
given city's population size and that of each smaller city to
the population size of the given city. A country's primacy
indes can, thus, be determined by summing the averages.
While we adopt El Shaks' method, we also recognize
'its inadequacies. Other than the problem of a country's size,
this method of determining primacy values ignores the shape
of the distribution which Professor Berry regards as essential
and which is implied in the usage of primacy. Furthermore,
a primacy index computed form this method may be derived
from two different countries with contrasting city-size
distribution line, yet rEay result in similar values. El
Shaks' method describes the average cf the relative horizontal
distance rather than the shape of that distribution. This
point is not particularly crucial in this study as our analysis
has a time dimension of only five years, hence, vertical
relationships are more significant.
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Formally:
1nP =E P.
n- li=l
n
1 (C. 
-C.)
(n -1)C. j1 1
P is the primacy index of a country; P the primacy value
of the ith city over smaller cities; C is the city population;
n is the number of cities, and i the rank
Since our data is incomplete and does not contain
figures for all cities (only 117 cities are accounted for
in our study), the equation has to be calibrated for Communist
China. Basically, the concept remains the same, except
we classify the cities into four categories. The primacy
calue can then be determined for each group leading to a
primacy index for the whole system from 1953 to 1958. We
classify the 117 cities into four class groups, each having
largely the same aggregated population as of 1953. We, then,
compute the average population of the four groups to obtain
four representative shadow cities which function like dummy
variables, and use the shadow cities as asystem for
computing primacy values for each group and an overall
primacy index for the country (see Table 2.8). Our primary
index is:
- 0.83 + 0.71 + 0.69 0.74
3
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TABLE 2.8
Urban Population and Primacy Values, 1953-1958
Number Aggregate Average
Size of of population size Primacy
Population Cities (in 000s) (in 000s) value (P.)
'53 '53 '58 '53 '58 '53 '58
2,000,000
or more 4 13,966 16,827 3,492 4,207 0.83 0.80
750,000 to
1,999,999 10 11,466 15,866 1,147 1,587 0.71 0.71
300,000 to
749,000 22 11,398 15,248 518 693 0.69 0.69
less than
300,000 81
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- 0.80 + 0.71 + 0.68 0.73
1958
3
According to our figures, the primary index of Communist
China's urban system (of 117 major cities) decreased by
0.01 from 1953 to 1958. While the anount is extremely small,
it is not insignificant; even if we take or give a few point
as an error term, this result is still surprising in the face
of the Communist intensive economic development programme
and of increased industrial activities. In addition, despite
urbanization associated with economic development, China's
primacy actually dropped. Our result conforms to the rank
size relationship analysis in the previous section. If
we look at the 1953 and 1958 regression lines carefully,
we can notice a less steep function for 1958. A flattening
out of the curve would imply departure from primacy; as such,
the two results are consistent and complementary.
2.5.3 Industrial Location Policy
Summarizing on the draft of the First Five Year Plan
during the second session of the First National People's
Congress on July 5, 1956, Li Fu-ch'un, chairman of the State
Planning Commission, described the irrational pattern of
pre-Communist development and elaborated on future locational
policies (cf. Section 1.2, Chapter 1):
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"The Five-Year Plan of capital construction includes
a relatively rational spatial arrangement. Industrial
bases in Manchuria, Shanghai, and other cities
will be appropriately utilized so that they exercise
their function in bringing about the rapid expansion
of production to meet the demand of the economy and
to support the construction of new industrial centers.
This effort includes especially certain necessary
construction of new industrial bases complex. On
the other hand, active efforts will also be made to
establish new industrial bases in North China and
certain areas in Northwest and Central China, and to
begin in part industrial construction in the Southwest.
On the basis of this policy, 472 of the 694 above-
norm industrial construction projects planned to
be started during the first five years will be in
the interior provinces and only 222 will be in the
coastal areas.
At the same time, on the basis of this industrial
policy, our present task in urban construction is
not to develope the large cities on the coast, but
to develope medium and small cities in the interior
and to restrict appropriately the expansion of the
large cities. The present blind or unplanned
development of the coastal 1 cities is a phenomenon
that has to be corrected.
The First Five Year Plan's primary emphasis on the development
of heavy industry is an indication that the government
planned to concentrate on heavy industry in the medium and
small cities. It is important to note that urban policy
in China seems to be largely determined by industrial
location policies. As such, the emphasis on promoting
medium and small cities can only in part be attributed to
national and regional economic development strategies.
Principles of industrial location in the Chinese
Jen Min Shou-t'se, 1956, (People's Handbcok, 1956)
Shanghai: Ta-kung Pao-she, pp.59 - 60.
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socialist economy are: (1) proximity to the sources of
raw material supply and consumer markets to fully utilize
local resources, to lower production costs, and to minimize
transport inputs; (2) regional division of labor, although
consideration is given to national plans for using fuel,
raw materials, and transportation service, and, (3) the
development of remote and undeveloped areas and the establishment
of new industrial bases. These considerations point to the
desired optimal spatial arrangement with a proper balance
between intraregional self-sufficiency and interregional
specialization and exchange.
When the First Plan years brought about an over-
zealousness in developing the new inland industrial centers,
they also brought about a relatively slow increase in
production output. When this became apparent, Li Fu-ch'un
emphasized in his report to the third session of the First
National People's Congress the necessity of placing greater
reliance on the existing industrial bases on the coast and
that industrial development in the coastal and interior
regions should be properly coordinated and balanced. Li
saw the reason for the slow industrial growth as the failure
to utilize fully the existing industrial facilities. Chou
En-lai gave an official position and pointed out that the
movement of industrial construction toward the interior and
1 The slow increase can be seen in the changing rates
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western China had to be accomplished over a realistically
long period of time: --
"During the First Five Year Plan, our aim is to
utilize the original industrial bases in the east
in order to build new industrial centers in the
middle. The cities of pivotal construction are
Wuhan, Pao-t'ou, Cheng-chou, Lo-yang, Sian, and
Lan-chow, all of which are situated in the central
part of China. Further advance westward must be
preceded by the establishment of industrial bases
in the center and the completion of necessary
preparations in the western region .... The
Second Five Year Plan will have as its goal the
beginning of construction of industrial bases and
some industrial enterprises in the southwest, the
northwest, and Sinkiang. As for the general
development of industry in western China, this will
have to await the completion of future five year
plans. Those who expect the rapid and general
establishment of manu industrial bases in the
far reaches of western China are unrealistic in
their outlook."
As a result of this policy, seven Economic Coordination
Regions were established. Table 2.9 lists these regions and
their rankings as deduced from varied sources. The regions
of growth of industrial production and of the GNP. The rate
of increase of adjusted modern industrial output was 16
percent in 1953 - 54 and 8 percent in 1954 - 55. It later rose
to 26 percent in 1955 - 66. The GNP rose 4 percent in 1953 -
54 and 5 percent in 1954 - 55; it increased 12 percent in
1955 - 56. From Yuan-li Wu et al., The Economic Potential of
Communist China, Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research
Institute, 1963, Vol. I, PP. 220 and 241.
2Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1957 (People's Handbook, 1957),
Shanghai: Ta Kung Pao-she, 1957, p. 1 9 2 .
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TABLE 2.9
Relative Rank of Economic Coordination Regions by Selected
Economic Indicatorsa
Economic North- Central South- North
indicators east East North South west west
Land area 5 6 3 4 2 1
Population 5 1 4 2 3 6
Number of
Soviet aid
projects 1 5 2 4 6 3
Total ind.
production 1 2 3 4 5 6
Elec. power 1 2 3 4 5 6
Coal 2 4 1 5 3 6
Petroleum 1 4 . 5 3 2
Iron & steel 1 3 2 3 3
Machine bldg. 1 2 4 3 5 6
Chemicals 3 1 2 4 5 6
Textiles 5 1 3 2 5 4
Sugar 2 5 4 1 3 6
Paper 1 2 3 2 3 .
aIn this table, the country is classified into six
instead of seven Economic Cooperation Regions. The difference
here is that the South of the official seven-region classification,
which included Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, has been
reclassified accordingly: Kwangtung and Kwangsi is part of
Central South, while Fukien is considered part of East.
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were to be self-sufficient and were designed to reduce the
expenses of long distance transport and cross-country hauls,
to accomplish specialization on a regional basis and to
promote complementary enterprises within each region. Each
region was to have one major iron and steel complex, plus
a number of secondary steel centers and machine building
production sites. This concept of intraregional economic
coordination meant the delineation of specific market and
supply area for a subset of industries organized around the
steel complex.
Location policy also had important defence considerations.
Decentralization was intended in part to locate new industrial
bases in the more sheltered inland regions. Although nuclear
weapons would have eliminated any real distinction between
peripheral and interior locations, decentralization would
materially reduce the number of industrial complex vulnerable
to each attack.
2.5.4 Regional Distribution of Cities
An examination of the provincial and regional
distribution of cities and the regional level of economic
activities could indicate possible correlation between
urbanization and economic development. Table 2.10 presents
the change in the frequency distribution of 117 cities by
96.
TABLE 2.10
Changes in 1953 and 1958 Frequency Distributions of 117 Cities
By Size Groups in 24 Provinces and Autonomous Regionsa
Number of cities
Large cities Medium cities Small cities
Region Province '53 '58 Change '53 '58 Change '53 '58 Change
Liaoning
Kirin
Heilungkiang
Total
Hopeh
Shansi
I. Mongolia
Total
Kiangsu
Shantung
Anhwei
Chekiang
Total
Kiangsi
Honan
Hunan
Hupeh
Total
Kwangsi
Kwangtung
Fukien
Total
Shensi
Sinkiang
Kansu
Tsinghai
Total
Szechuan
Kweichow
Yunnan
Total
1 3 +2 6 4 -2 3 3 0
- - - 2 2 0 3 3 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 6 6 0
2
2
-
-
2
4
2
1
-
3
+2
0
+1
-
+1
9
3
1
-
4
7
4
-
2
6
-2
+1
-1
+2
+2
12
4
4
3
7
12
3
4
1
8
0
-l
0
-2
-3
2 2 0 4 4 0 7 6 -l
- 1 +1 1 2 +1 3 2 -1
- - - - 2 +2 5 3 -2
-
2
-
- - - 1 1 0 4 4 0
1
1
-
-
1
-
3
-
1
1
-
1
-
1
-
+1
-
1
6
1
1
1
9
1
3
0
+3
0
+2
5
20
1
6
5
16
1
4
0
-4
0
-2
0
0
-
0
-
0
-
3
-
1
2
-
5
-
3
2
5
- 1 +1 1
-
+2
1
12
1
10
- 4 4
+2
+1
+3
6
2
12
5
1
10
0
-2
0
-l
-1
-2
- -1 1 1 0
- - - - 1 +1 3 2 -1
- - - 1 1
-
1
1
2
+1
+1
2
1
2
-
0 1 1 0
- 1 1
0 6 5
-l 6 6
0
-1
0
- - - - 1 +1 1 - -1
-
1
-
2
-
+1
1
2
1
2
0
0
1
8
1
7
0
-1
9 15 +6 27 34 +7 81 68 -13
Excluding Tibet and Ningsia.
Source: Wu (1967).
North-
east
North
East
Central
South
North-
west
South-
west
TOTAL
97.
the three size group and by regions. It is intended to
show the most populated areas in 1953 and 1958, and where the
policy of developing small and medium cities over large ones
has been followed.
In 1953, the leading regions were Northeast China,
North China, and East China, a ranking which corresponds to
the pre-Communist ranking of regions in economic importance.
Table 2.9 shows the relative rank of Economic Coordination
Regions by selected economic indicators. For medium cities,
Liaoning province was first, followed by Kiangsu and Hopeh.
This same general order was maintained in 1958. Northeast
China headed the list of regions in 1953, followed by East
and North China. In 1958, East China became the leading region.
Given an increase in the number of medium cities
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without any change in the large cities, we may regard the
region to have increased the number of urban centers in a
manner consistent with the avowed policy to develop small
and medium sized centers at the expense of large ones. Alter-
natively,given an increase in the number of cities in the
large group with a concomitant increase in that of the
medium group, the region or province has increased its degree
of urbanization, but in a manner inconsistent to the restriction
of large cities' growth. All this indicates a general increase
in urbanization in that the number of urban market and
supply centers showed a net increase. There was an expansion
in all the Economic Coordination Regions; most developing
regions increased in urbanization according to official
policy. In the 1953 to 1958 period, the three more developed
regions (Northeast, North, and East) added four large cities
as compared with two in the less developed regions. However,
medium cities increased by three in the former group and by
four in the latter (the less developed). This indicates
that development was still very much concentrated in the
more developed regions, although the coastal areas alone
seemed to have enjoyed a slightly decreased preference (see
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4).
It is evident from the foregoing data that aihe
regions with the largest concentration of cities by all three
size groups are also the three most important and economically
C,)
DEVELOPED REGIONS
Large cities 11 (6)
Medium cities 20 (18)
g
FIGURE. 2.3 Distribution of Large and Medium Cities in the Developed and Less Developed Regions
in.1953 and 1958 (1953 figures in paranthesis)
I I
COASTAL PROVINCES
Large cities 11 (6)
Medium cities 16 (1
H
0
INLAND PROVINCES
Large cities 4 (3)
Medium cities 18 (12)
FIGURE -2.4 Distribution of Large and Medium Cities in the Coastal and Inland Provinces
in 1953 and 1958 (1953 figures in paranthesis)
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developed regions. Furthermore, the greater role played by
inland (less developed) regions in economic development of
the nation has been accompanied by a concomitant increase
of new centers and the expansion of existing cities. indeed,
the identification of important economic areas of Communist
China can be done by determining the location of emerging
urban centers alone. While this analysis is severely limited
in terms of explanatory powers, it does describe the impact
of increased economic activities on city size distributions.
2.5.5 Pattern of Regional Industrial Concentration
The Communist Chinese economy betrays a relatively
high degree of concentration of industrial capacities,
especially in a few relatively developed regions (cf. Table 2.12).
estimated value of annual industrial capacity in that city
is more than five times that of the next largest industrial
center, Tientsin, and over six times that of the third
largest urban-industrial complex, Wu-han. Table 2.13
the distribution of industrial capacity by provinces
Figure 2.5 shows the spatial distribution. The great
disparity between Shanghai and all other industrial centers
suggests that the Communist authorities had relied on
Shanghai's industrial capacity to a far greater degree than
they would have liked or have admitted. Furthermore,
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TABLE 2.12
Ranking of Economic Coordination Regions by Ind. Capacity
Annual capacity in
million '52 yuan gross % of total
Region value added in '58-'60 avg. capacity
East 11,563 40.77
North 4,951 17.45
Northeast 3,362 11.85
Central 3,178 11.20
Southwest 2,406 8.48
South 1,785 6.29
Northwest 1,120 3.95
TOTAL 28,365 100.00
TABLE 2.13
Ranking of -Provinces by Industrial Capacity
Annual capacity in
million '52 yuan gross % of total
Province value added in '58-'60 avg. capacity
Kiangsu
Hopeh
Liaoning
Szechuan
Hupeh
Kwangtung
I. Mongolia
Shangtung
Anhwei
Shansi
Hunan
Kiangsi
Honan
Kirin
Kansu
Fukien
Heilungkiang
Shensi
Kweichow
Sinkiang
Yunnan
Kwangsi
Chekiang
Tsinghai
Ningsia
Tibet
TOTAL
9,637
3,234
2,483
1,840
1,558
1,143
1,008
945
823
709
557
536
527
480
431
404
399
327
311
283
254
238
158
44
35
1
281,365
33.97
11.40
8.75
6.49
5.49
4.03
3.55
3.33
2.90
2.50
1.96
1.89
1.86
1.69
1.52
1.42
1.41
1.15
1.10
1.00
.90
.84
.56
.16
.12
100.00
0>
LiJ
S Large industrial centers
0 Medium industrial centers
FIGURE 2.5 Distribution of 63 Large and Medium Industrial Centers in 1961
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Kiangsu, Hopeh, and Liaoning provinces head the list in
terms of annual industrial capacity as they did in the pre-
Communist economy; over half the country's estimated industrial
capacity is concentrated in these three provinces.
The seven coastal provinces contain six cities with
a large industrial capacity against three in the inland
regions. These coastal provinces also contain proportionately
more cities of medium and small industrial capacity. The
developed regions have proportionately even more medium and
small capacity cities than the coastal provinces. This
implies a greater relative emphasis on the establishment
of industrial centers in the developed regions vis-a-vis
the less developed ones than in the coastal provinces vis-a-vis
the inland provinces. (See Tables 2.14, 2.15)
An explanation of the disparity between large
versus medium and small industrial centers is the presence
of smaller industrial production sites that might be new.
Over time, the pattern of industrial location may be greatly
altered in conjunction with the changing nature of Communist
China's economic development. As of 1961, which is the cut-
off date for most of the plant data available, the policy
of industrial decentralization of the Great Leap Forward,
and to a lesser extent, of the First Five Year Plan, has
succeeded in establishing a large number of small industrial
production centers. However, in light of the limited data
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TABLE 2.14
Comparison of Coastal Provinces with Inland Provinces and of
Developed Regions with Less Developed Regions in Terms of
Number of Industrial Cities and Locations
Number of Number of Number of Total
small medium large number of
industrial industrial industrial industrial
Area centers centers centers centers
Coastal provinces 88 18 6 112(seven)
Inland provinces 174 39 3 216
TOTAL 262 57 9 328
Formerly developed
regions (Northeast,
North, and East) 107 31 6 144
Formerly less
developed regions
(Central, South, 155 26 3 184
Northwest, and Southwest)
TOTAL 262 57 9 328
TABLE 2.15
Comparison of Coastal Provinces with Inland Provines and of
Developed Regions eith Less Developed Regions in Terms of
Industrial Capacity
% of large % of medium % of small''
cities in cities in cities % total
Area total cap. total cap. total cap. capacity
Coastal provinces 48.8 11.5 3.2 63.5
Inland provinces 10.9 19.5 6.1 36.5
TOTAL 59.7 31.0 9.3 100.0
Developed regions 49.0 17.5 3.6 70.1
Less developed 10.8 13.5 5.6 29.9
regions
TOTAL 59.8 31.0 9.2 100.0
106.
available and presented earlier, the preponderant share of
productive capacity remains concentrated in a small number
of industrial cities.
2.5.6 Summary of the Spatial Economy
If we compare Table 2..16 with Table 1.7.., we find
that three provinces (Honan, Hunan, and Anhwei) succeeded
in moving from the ranks of industrially undeveloped
(although agriculturally developed) into the industrially
developed sector of the economy during 1949 to 1961. Shansi
and Inner Mongolia both moved from the industrially and
agriculturally less-developed sector to the industrially
developed sector. This period shifted the distribution of
provinces into a virtual diagonal, which is indicative of the
industrial advances in a number of provinces. The advent of
industralization into such outlying regions as Sinkiang,
Ningsia, Tsinghai, Kansu, and Inner Mongolia was the factor
in this readjustment. On a different level, the relatively
most developed regions in the pre-Communist period continued
to retain their ascendancy in the Communist period.
. number of provinces and autonomous regions have
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TABLE 2.16
Spatial Pattern of Industrial Capacity and Agricultural Development
by Provinces and Autonoumous Regions (1961)
(C) if Rank in Rank in
Province coas tal industrial capacity agric. production
Group I
(Relatively developed)
Manchuria (C) 2 2
Kiangsu (C) 1 3
Hopeh (C) 3 8
Hupeh 5 7
Szechuan 4 2
Kwangtung (C) 6 5
Shantung (C) 8 4
Anhwei 9 11
Hunan 11 9
Kiangsi 12 12
Group II
(Relatively developed
in agriculture only)
Honan 13 6
Chekiang (C) 21 10
Group III
(Relatively developed
in industry only)
Shansi 10 15
I. Mongolia 7 19
Group IV
(Relatively undeveloped)
Fukien (C) 15 14
Kansu 14 20
Shensi 10 18
Kweichow 17 17
Yunnan 19 16
Kwangsi
. Sinkiang 19 23
Tsinghai 22 21
Ningsia 23 22
Tibet 24 23
Source: Wu (1967).
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become industrially more developed in terms of total indus-
trial capacity rather than in terms of the number of large
industrial centers. Therefore, most of the industrial
capacity must have been in the smaller industrial centers.
This pattern reflects the early status of industrial deve-
lopment in Northwestern and Southwestern China, and it pre-
saged efforts to decentralize (Figures 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9,
and 2.10).
DEVELOPED REGIONS
Relatively developed in both
agriculture and industry
Relatively developed in industry only
Relatively developed in agriculture only
Relatively undeveloped
FIGURE 2.6 Relative Degree of Economic Development in Pre-Communist China
(before 1949)
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FIGURE 2. 8 Stages of Industralization
FIGURE 2. 9 Location of Industry
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORY AND MODELS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
3.1 Introduction
As a statement of fact, and perhaps unkindly,
regional economic growth theory is a highly borrowed field.
It is indeed a bastard field of mixed ancestry searching for
esteem on its own right; and although of humble origins, it
portends of greatness.
Regional economics is a relatively new but rapidly
developing branch of economics that is gaining increasing
attention from both economists and urban and regional
planners who share a common concern of the problems of inter-
regional differences in growth rates and the implications
they hold for development and planning as discussed earlier
in Chapter One. Although this problem appears crucial in
the developing countries, it has become pronounced in the
developed countries as well. Consequently, there has been
an increasing volume of specialist periodical literature in
recent years. Responses to the problem, however, have been
as diverse and numerous as the disciplines that comprise
regional economics. The subject at once intersects economics,
geography, political science, law, city planning, and civil
.engineering. Within the field of economics alone, specialized
topics, such as development, urban economics, international
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trade theory, inter-industry economics, among others, have
each dfieveloped sub-topics dealing with regional economics.
Much that is classified under the heading of regional
economics developed from attempts (mainly by geographers)
to find useful criteria for a definition of regions, and
from attempts by. location theorists to explicitly consider
transport costs as a determinant of the geographic distri-
bution of economic activities. Spatial economists have
developed theories of interregional trade and regional
growth within a national boundary, their structural
framework of a regional system taken mostly from inter-
national trade theory. Although international trade theory
deals mainly with volume and aggregate value of trade
between nations, location theorists and land economists
have extended, or restricted, the analysis to pay particular
attention to the spatial aspects of the problem, specifically
the region. Significant contributions have also been
made by inter-industry economists, and these have usually
been applications of input-output techniques to regional
analysis. This has usually been assoicated with the
contributions of international multiplier theory, but their
usefulness has suffered from a lack of data on interregional
flow of goods and services. Regional economics, thus,
consists of piece-meal attempts to cope with particular
problems within the regional context rather than as an
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extension of the oldest branch of spatial economics, inter-
national economics, to the regional field.
Despite the meteroric rise in interest and literature
onthe subject, theory has fallen far behind policy. Regional
economics is, at best, in its "take-off " stages, and the
real development of the field is yet to come. Present
formulations on regional growth are highly hypothetical and
inadequate. This fact derives in part from the status of
its parent field: general economic growth theory. Growth
economics is still fundamentally theoretical and ascriptive
rather than operational and descriptive; it prescribes
conditions and paths for growth better than it explains
growth. Traditionally, modern economic growth theories
have paid particular attention to capital accumulation
and exports as the basis for growth. Exports have held
special, and even spiritual, significance for development
economists. On the supply side, exports provide the foreign
exchange necessary for growth by providing the capacity to
import, which, in turn, determines the level of economic
activities. On the demand side, exports create demand for
domestic production which leads to a chain of induced
output and income. Equilibrium growth in both cases can be
expressed by a multiplier relationship between income and
exports. In developing countries, therefore, exports represent
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the "engine" of economic growth.1
These models of export-propelled growth have, in
fact, become the major weapons in the regional economists'
arsenal of growth models. Indeed, much of the efforts in
calibrating these and other models have been devoted to the
technical and mathematical difficulties involved in reducing
their analyses to a regional framework, and less attention
has been paid to an independent analysis of the validity
of their assumptions when applied to regional economics.
These assumptions are highly restrictive and their abstractions
may hold for a national economy (as comprised of a given
number of regions) in the aggregate but collapse when applied
to regional economies, say, within a closed national
economy. It is convenient enough in the more general
models to explain capital accumulation by earnings in foreign
exchange from exports: the stock of capital is assumed
unlimited outside the model and as long as there is exports,
capital can be generated exogenously and continuously.
This, in effect, means unlimited growth as long as exports
continue to increase. Regional economic growth within, a
national boundary is dependent, however, among other things,
not on a fairy economists outside the system, but realistically
on the level of economic activities and limited capital
stock within the national system. It is true that one can
assumed unlimited capital outside the system in national
118.
1See, for example, Chenery and Bruno (1962) , Meier
and Baldwin (1957), McKinnon (1964) , Chenery and Strout (1966),
and Maizels (1968). Also, see the attempts to explain growth
in the Western European countries after World War II by
export-propelled growth model in Beckerman (1962) and
Lamfalassy (1963).
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economies, but it much less plausible with regional economies.
This serves to emphasize the limitations when an attempt is
made to hoist models from other branches of economics onto
regional economics without serious considerations of the
differences.
Even given the general usefulness of these models,
exports still cannot explain all growth. More poignantly,
we can point to examples of economic growth without the
benefit of exports: consider the case of Communist Chinese
development post Russian assistance. It becomes clear that
exports in China did not represent the engine of growth, and
we must instead attribute China's rapid growth to internal
determinants. These other factors of growth will be examined
in this chapter, but the inclusion of the Chinese example
brings forth some pressing points.
Regional economic growth theory as it has developed
in the West has paid particular attention to such issues as
factor mobility, industrial structure, and comparative advantages
in their search for determinants of regional growth. Indeed,
the whole system pivots on markets which perform a sectoral
allocative function as well as directing the flow of goods
and services between regions. It has been held that automatic
market forces would maintain a spatial equilibrium (which,
for our purposes here, we can take on to mean tending towards
equal growth rates between regions): labor and capital would
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move to places with the highest return, thus inducing as
equalization of regional incomes. Reality, however, has
proved contrary; regional differences persist and tend to
increase. While in market economics we can attribute these
to market imperfections and institutional factors, how do we
explain regional differences in socialist economies?
Planning by material balances, as discussed in the Chinese
example in Chapter Two, should theoretically induce an equal
growth among regions. The relevant questions here become:
what determines factor movement? How does it influence regional
economic growth? To what extent can Western theories
explain regional economic growth in Socialist-bloc countries?
The points raised in the preceding discussion are
those to which this chapter will address. This chapter is
an attempt to trace the development of the various theories
and models of regional economic growth, as they have developed
along different lines of assumptions. A by-product, of course,
could be the qualitative testing of these theories when
juxtaposed across a different economic system, but the main
purpose of this chapter is to derive certain elementary
principles and assumptions that would be useful towards the
construction of a model in the Chinese context. It is, so to
speak, putting eggs against the light to look for imperfections.
As such, we are looking for guidelines for the research
effort mentioned in Chapter One and not a critical review of
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the literature.
The first section discusses theoretical formulations
that have been the departure points for most of the regional
economics growth theory. They are delineated by their
assumptions concerning the driving force of the system:
(1) Extensions of Location Theory; (2) Export Base Theory
and Interregional Income Theory; and (3) Factor Mobility.
In each of the discussions, we want to pay particular attention
to the fundamental arguments in the abstract and consider
their applicability to the Chinese case. They are given at
length because they manifest the direction and level of
analysis attainable given the present state of the art.
In the second section, we present what the writer
feels are the better models that have been developed from
the theories discussed in the preceding section. Being the
logical extensions of the theories, they may be considered the
final products of the field and can reveal the strength and
weaknesses of the theories in an operational form. Both
theoretical and operational models are presented but a
common feature is their explicit consideration for describing
growth.
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3.2 Theoretical Formulations
3.2.1 Extensions of Location Theory
In the past decades, a number of economists and
regional scientist, building on the pioneering works of von
Thunen (1826), Weber (1909, 1928), Losch (1954), Palander
(1935) and others, have attempted to extend Location Theory
to consider regional economic growth. Early attempts to
construct a general location theory must be attributed to
A. Weber (1909), although it is von Thunen, the father of
location theorists, who first progresses towards a general
theory.2 Launhardt, in his studies of market areas and
industrial location, treats a narrower framework, but also
fails to achieve sufficient generality in his analysis.
Weber pursues an evolutionary analysis which inquires
into the mechanics of development when a given population
lSee also Laundhart (1882), MacKinder (1902), and
Friedrich (1929). The best books on the subject are W. Isard's
Location and Space Economy, 1956, and Losch's The Economics
of Location, 1954. A good summary of the literature is given
in Hoover, E. M., The Location of Economic Activity, 1948.
A distinction here is made between general location
theory and other specific location theories which are
essentially applications of the general theory to particular
cases. Residential locations, agricultural locations,
manufacturing location, for example, would fall in the latter
category. General theory, on the other hand, is the fundamental
or theoretical basis of these other developments.
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occupies an undeveloped country and establishes a closed
economic system. An agricultural stratum would form to provide
the means of subsistence and would also serve as the geographical
foundation for all other strata. It determines in the first
instance the location of consumption for the primary industrial
stratum which produces for the agricultural stratum. In
turn, the primary industrial stratum serves as the location of
consumption for the secondary industrial stratum. Thus, these
three major strata (there are also a number of substrata
within each major stratum) represent the core of the economic
system. Trade within the system also ten -) to stengtnen
proportionally the different sectors of the system. Given
these developments, a fourth stratum then emerges independent
of the other strata, and consists of officials and businessmen
performing managerial and organizational functions. Their
patterns of locations are not determined by economic forces
but by a fifth stratum, the central dependent stratum which
is tied to the central organizing (or fourth) stratum in the
same way the secondary industrial is to the primary industrial.
Therefore, the locational structures of these five strata are
inter-related and their features determined by forces playing
back and forth.
This analysis, as Isard points out," does not present
any general, heuristic principle by means of which one can
order the spatial complexities involved in the total location
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of economic activities." Although it fails to present the
specific operating characteristics of the model, the evolutionary
approach, however, does provide insight into the historical
sequences of locational development.
2
With the publication of Weber's book, Englander
came to appreciate the necessity for a general theory of
location. Such a theory, according to Englander, should be
a general theory of local conditionality within an economy.
An economic unit choosing a site to produce or render services,
considers the various supply prices existing in the various
localities for the inputs that he might employ; he simultaneously
considers the various prices which may be obtained in the
various localities for his products and services. When he
finally locates a site, he, in turn, influences the input
and output prices which he employs and produces respectively
at that locality. Through such interrelations, the pattern
of local prices differences and the subsequent location of
economic activities are determined by "local conditionality."
Somewhat earlier than Englander's work, Andreas
Predohl develops a general equilibrium approach applied to
location analysis employing the substitution principle.
Predohl attempts to deduce a general location theory as an
inherent and logical extension of it. He asks to what extent
See Isard (1956).
2See Englander (1926).
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is the location problem a price problem; location theory, a
price theory. In other words, to what extent does the
location of economic activities (specifically, the distribution
of production) lie within the relationships of interdependent
prices. Predohl suggests that the locational problem is
synonymous with the problem of the distribution of determined
groups of productive factors since every economic activity
uses a group of factors, or inputs. As such, a general
interdependence theory can explain the distribution of
productive factors by the principle of substitution. Isard,
however, contends that Predohl over-estimates the scope of
Walrasian-Casselian general equilibrium analysis, which, in
the main, contains a one-point world and does not embrace
space as Predohl overlooks. Nevertheless, his analysis has
shaped many later formulations and are worth considering.
Predohl begins with a von Thunen state1 and assumes
all locations fixed except that of one unit. Movement of this
unit towards the periphery implies that capital and labor
outlays are substituted for land-use outlays. Movement-in the
A von Thunen state implies a uniform plain of eqrual
natural endowment everywhere with a city in the center possessing
potential transport facilities of similar characteristics in
all directions. Production aligns itself around the city in
rings aa determined by price and transport costs of each
specific product.
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opposite direction, or towards the central consumption point,
implies a reverse in outlays and substitution. Such an analysis,
Predohl states, can be extended by means of general equilibrium
analysis to consider the location of all economic activities.
Indeed, the application of the substitution principle can
yield the site of minimum cost so far as these two groups of
all-inclusive groups of expenditure are concerned.1
Hans Weigmann, a relatively unknown economist of
the German school, is perhaps tLe first to construct a general
theory of location in a dynamic context.2 Weigmann attempts
to formulate the foundations for an economic theory that
embraces the spatial structure of economic process, the
spatial extent and bonds of market, and the spatial inter-
relations of all economic quantities. His first principle
is that a theory of space economy should be one of limited
competition. All factors and goods, regardless of natural
location, face immobilities of varying degree in all directions;
furthermore, in accordance with the specific nature of
impediments to movement (social, economic, or political),
markets are limited in scope. The point here is that competitions
between different goods or services in different locations are
incomplete; the existence of physical space implies immobility
1 Within these two groups, there are also other substitution
points. A detailed discussion of its fuller implications is
given in Isard (1956), Location and Space Economy, pp.33-35.
H. Weigmann, (1926, 1935).
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and limited competition. A second basic principle concerns
the determination of a "basic form." Weigmann favors an
approach of general equilibrium theory in using Gestalt
analysis in place of the more traditional linear causal
analysis; markets in the space economy are observed as a
whole in their full array of spatial markets. As such, he
aims at formulating a realistic functional picture of
economic life wherein various elements are weighted with
respect to their importance. Weigmann poses the dynamics
problems as one of choosing that time period which would
yield a resulting spatial array of markets within a competing
system that could be valid as basic form. The formulation
of the concept of "relative maximum" states that an increasing
amount of physical space (implying spatial friction) is to be
overcome in movement by an economic object; the time period
necessary for such movement increases until it reaches a
maximum defined as further movement which is improbable
because of the overpowering force of countless obstacles.
Competition at that maximum ends, and the competition
field vecomes bounded. The competition does not have the
force to span a distance greater than the radius of its
Terms such as "basic form," "form-full," "relative
maximum," and "economic object," are poorly defined concepts.
Isard himself points out that Weigmann's writings are very hard
to comprehend, and the problem is further complicated by
Isard's own confusing style. The reader may fare better by
reading the discussion firsthand: pp. 38-41, Isard (1956),
op.cit..
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field irrespective of the time factor, while basic form
can be defined as that unit of space (i.e., a market area)
of the relatively greatest time-weight, hence, of the greatest
stability. Weigmann further maintains that markets for
the productive factors of land and labor are primary consti-
tuencies of basic form. As such, each individual commodity
market, including its labor, capital, and land orientation,
possesses peculiar features which offer resistance to change;
changes in each factor vary.
Weigmann's theory of location incorporates distinct
features for each of the factors, land, labor, and capital,
and indeed presages modern theories of regional economic
growth theories that have attempted to explain growth through
these factors. In Weigmann's formulations, the land market
is a spatially linked area of supplied land services. Each
unit of land is distinct and immobilized by natural conditions
such that its supply area has no spatial extent. This
"Gestalt" whole ( a space economy) exerts a hypothetical
aggregare demand which, in turn, defines the boundaries
of the land market, its peripheries being considered as
marginal land.
The hypothetical aggregate demand is related to
the labor market, which, in contrast to the land market,
is much less rigid. Consequently, its conception is much
more difficult and contains various forms of Labor immobility
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and inelasticity. Labor market must then be explained with
respect to migration mobility and its spatial form. The
long-run labor base is hypothesized as a dynamic process
which is characterized by a movement over time from rural
areas to metropolitan areas through intermediates of urban
clusters of increasing size.
Capital can be distinguished between capital in
substance and capital in title; the former being less mobile.
It must also be classified to its utilization in the
production process and respective inelasticitie-s determined.
Therefore, the Weigmann model of the space economy is pictured
as a rhythmic development of a Gestalt whole comprised of
markets for land, labor, and capital, superimposed or over-
lapping each other.
In many of the theories we have discussed, general
equilibrium analysis has been employed to extend relevant
economic concepts to consider space. The question then
arises: to what extent are these assumptions of equilibrium
in a market situation consistent with the reality of a
spcialist economy? As Isard points out, Palander states that
"general equilibrium theory in its present form is meaningful
for a locational analysis only of an economic district
wherein transport costs are zero, capital and labor perfectly
mobile, and technical conditions of production uniform
throughout; in other words, where the district. in question
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can be compressed into a point market."' Furthermore,
interdependence theory which has formed the basis of a
general theory of a space economy is premised on the principle
of pure competition. Firstly, equilibrium in Marxian econmics
has almost entirely different meanings, and the problem
really becomes one of optimization. Secondly, depending on
one's approach to the problem and the nature of the analysis
employed, the existence of markets can indeed be assumed
to exist in socialist economies, although of a different
genre; at the very least, one can abstract from total reality
and can embrace simplifying assumptions in an analytical
model, which in fact is the basis of all models, even in
the Chinese case as exemplified by the computations of
shadow prices in Chinese planning. Competition exists where
scarcity prevails, the only difference in the socialist
economy being the resolution of competition demands not on
an open market but a centrally determined planning process.
The simplification of a socialist economy, therefore,
approximates these general theories of a space economy more
closely than do the complicated market economies. For
example, a typical problem in locational analysis concerns
the assumption of pure competition: if the various places in
a region are treated as different markets (the case in a
capitalistic market economy), the necessary condition of a
1Isard (1956), pp.42.
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large number of consumers and produces for each factor
and commodity in each market cannot be fulfilled. The Chinese
concept of regional self sufficiency with a minumum of inter-
regional trade as discussed in Chapter Two, on the other
hand, can treat a region as a single market, and allow the
interpretation of different prices existing for a given
commodity at the various localities within the region as
closer to the theoretical formulations discussed.
A genuine critical analysis of the usefulness of the
theories when applied to a socialist economy, such as China's,
can only be obtained in a model-by-model review. Since such
an effort would be beyond this paper's scope, we can instead
attempt to reconcile a yet potentially more useful model to
the Chinese case.
In contrast to the above models, A. Losch goes beyond
partial analysis and presents a highly simplified static
model of a space economy operation under conditions of
monopolistic competition, which approximates very closely
theoretically a socialist, centrally planned economy. The
spatial element is emphasized through a formulation of market
areas - a formulation that is a significant theory in its
own right. Consider a homogenous plain of uniform transport
features in all directions: an even endowment of resources
for industrial production; a uniform distribution of
agricultural population with uniform sets of tastes and
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and preferences and each population unit self-sufficient;
technical knowledge disseminated throughout the plain implying
equal production opportunities, If, in this setting, an
individual finds it profitable to produce a commodity over and
above his own needs, his market area would assume a circular
form. However, it is eq:ually probable that other individuals
would find it profitable to produce commodities, so competition
would not only contract his market area but transform it
into a hexagonal shape. Losch maintains that the hexagonal
shape is the ideal economic market because it exhausts any
area under consideration while circular ones would leave
unused corners. Furthermore, the hexagon deviates least
from circles compared with other polygons and, consequently,
minimizes transport costs of given demands, or, alternatively,
maximizes demand of a population of a given area. The
plain is then honeycombed into a series of market areas, and
a grouping can be made of market areas with respect to their
sizes.
General equilibrium can then obtain if we first
consider the locations of industrial productions. The location
of each production site for a given commodity is designeated
*by a set of x, y, coordinates; the boundary of the market
area of each production site can be described by a set of
equations. We are given the following variables:1
1Adapted from W. Isard, (1956), p.45.
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Given:
dm
m
q
D m
q
f m ( 'IT)
= (D
m
X (D q
individual demand for
commodity m
factory price of commodity m at
place q as function
average production costl of total demand.
m m m m m
x y ,
q 9i q q
. , a, a ) (total demand)
q q
S = Din (Trri - k ) profit on product m at place 9.
=r q q q
a= rural population per square kilometer
amqi = population of city Pmq
r = freight rate
n = number of products
G = total surface area
To be determined:
(2) Gm
imqi(3)
= factory price of good m
m
at location P
= market area of location P
q
in square kilometers
= number of towns which
produce good m
Number of unknowns
n
n
m
(4) xm m yin
qi q
= coordinates of location Pm
9
in m m(5) , ... = equations of boundaries
of market area of P m
9
Total:
In Table 3.1, the symbols of spatial arrangement are listed.
2n
N
4n + m + N
Table 3.1 Symbols of Spatial Arrangement
Product Number Production Places
Position
P1 (X1 yl)
p1 (x1 y),
Number
2
P M(x y ); P2
P 
1
a
P2
b
P
(total)
a
b
q
Market Boundaries
Abbreviation of equations
1 31
2 2
1' 1
am S,
n
1 2
2 22
2 2 2
*..., p ; a ,2 ...
P m aJ m 1m
(total)
Number
A
B
Q
N
A + B + + Q
2
1Position is designated along x, y, coordinates.
2
m
m
1
' 2
0
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There are also a number of equilibrium conditions to be
fulfilled. The first condition states that each producer
occupies a spatial position which maximizes his profits;
in other words, he locates at the most economic site, and
there would be no incentive to relocate. In terms of the
variables given, the equation for such a condition can be
written as:
BS m ;S m
q= 0= 0 (2 equations) (3.2.1.1)
3m 3ym (3.2.1.2)
q q
Secondly, the plain under consideration must be completely
exhausted by market areas for the various commodities:
Gm + Gm + Gm + ... + Gm = G (m equations) (3.2.1.3)1 2 3 q
Thirdly, there can not exist any abnormal profits. The
production cost of a given commodity must equal its factory
price:
m (Dq) = Xm (D) (n equations) (3.2.1.4)
q q q
The fourth condition states that changes in average price
and average cost ensuing from infinitismal change in the
size of a producer's market area must be equal and consistent.
3 Tr m 3kmq = q (n equations) (3.2.1.5)
3Gm 3Gm
q q
A fifth condition requires any consumer on any boundary
line to be indifferent to the number of possible production
sources from whom he may obtain commodity at the same
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minimum delivered price:
Any point x, y on boundary equation
m + rm / m 2 m 2 m 2
q q (x-x ) +(y-y) q-1 q-1 (x-x (y-yl)
(N equation) (3.2.1.6)
The system is determinate because the number of fulfilling
conditions equals the number of unknown, such that there
exists at least one solution for the unknowns.
Although this model may analyze the best locations
of both industrial and agricultural places in their roles as
consumption centers, the optimal location for production
does not, however, necessarily coincide with the optimal
location for consumption. Losch proceeds to derive a set
of equations which describes spatial relations within the
system. This approach minimizes elements of interdependence
and regards the system not as a whole space-economy, but as
consisting of several major sectors. Isard, discussing the
shortcomings of Losch's model, suggests that, from a functional
standpoint, one can sidestep the derivation of a set of
equations and can instead "design a set of equations depicting
general equilibrium in terms of input-output relations and
price-cost relations, including therein transport inputs in
order to give explicit recognition to the factor of space."1
Furthermore, Isard suggests the application of Leontief's
'See Isard (1956), p. 4 9 .
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input-output techniques. 1
We see in the Losch model a lot of potential for
application to a socialist economy. The topographical
assumptions are basic and indifferent to different economic
systems. In place of an individual producing commodities,
we can replace this with an economic unit such as the typical
production unit 2, e.g. the state enterprise, in China.
Therefore, along the various dimensions of this model, one
can visualize a realistic application to socialist economies
in general, and to Communist China in particular.
So much for the theoretical foundations of location
theory. Given the concepts discussed, how do we begin to
extend theory to a conceptual understanding of regional
economic growth? Location theory explains the location of
economic activity and therein suggests growth between regions
as a function of their locational advangages. It does not
attempt to arrive at the causes of growth, but indicates
within its theoretical framework where growth can and may
occur. Locational advantages may channel growth to certain
regions and deflect development from others. There are,
for example, some necessary locational conditions for regional
1 The application of Leontief's input-output analyses
to socialist economic systems is discussed at length in the
next chapter. As we shall see, Losch model is more useful
than a passing review suggests.
2A production unit could, for example, be an agricultural
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economic growth. In primitive regions, a high transport
costs retard the development of specialized production and
require that such a region produces a wide range of commodities
for domestic consumption, emphasizing local self-sufficiency.
Within the region, however, trade develops to link localities,
and production advantages of each locality become pronounced,
inducing a relative degree of specialization by concentrating
lines of production according to the principle of greatest
relative advantages. With increased production resulting
from locational specialization, income rises and a greater
proportion of consumption goes to services and manufacturing,
inducing industralization. Increasing industralization will,
in turn,create a distribution of economic activities influenced
by locational advantages. Location theory, therefore,
provides a powerful insight into regional economic growth
in terms of the pecularities, properties, and dynamics of
relative locations of productions and market areas.
3.2.2 Export Base Theory and Interregional Income
In the last section, Location Theory seeks to describe
commune in agricultural location analysis or an industrial
production brigade in industrial location analysis.
1 This sequence of consumption is often based on
Engel's Law.
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a sequence of development stages with differing spatial
distributions of economic activities in the process of regional
growth. The various spatial structures in each of the stages
are explained by transport costs, and this theory has assumed
a critical factor in the advancement through successive stages
of growth. Improvement in transport enhances trade, which, in
turn, induces specialized production at locations of relative
advantages and further promotes exports. At the later stages
of spatial development, therefore, exports assume a growth
propelling function and lead to increased domestic economic
activities and income. Where Location Theory leaves off,
Export Base Theory picks up and further elaborates on the
dynamics of regional economic growth.
The economic activities of a region can be divided
into those that produce for domestic consumption and those
that produce mainly for ecports, and the latter group of
activities are often termed basic. The theory of regional
economic base states that the main factor determining the level
of residentiary, or non-basic, activities is determined by
the level of basic activities. In other words, the growth
of a region depends upon the development and growth of its
export industries, implying that expansion in demand external
to the region is the crucial initiating c.eterminant of growth
in the region. Increase in export activities, thus, sets
off a multiplier effect on the regional economy where the
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multiplier is the ratio-between export and residentiary
activities measured in terms of either income or employment.
Base theory derives essentially from the theory of regional
income determination, and the base multiplier, a crude form
of regional income multiplier which ignores the repercussionary
effects of an expansionary process of imports and indirect
exports.
The arguments of base theory can be presented through
a simple model.1 Let Y represent a region's disposable
income, D the domestic net absorption (non-basic income),
X the total exports (inclusive of commodity exports, tourist
earnings, net wage payments, property income received by
region's resident from outside the region, and net transfer
payments). If our economic base is X, then the region's
disposable income is:
Y =D + X (3.2.2.1)
Let the region's current account balance be expressed by B
and regional imports by M such that:
B = X - M (3.2.2.2)
Output in the region may be allocated in three ways: consumed
domestically (D); exchanged for imports (M); or invested
outside the region (B).
Therefore,
Y = D + M + B
or alternately:
D + M + B(32.)
+= 1 (3.2.2.3)
Y
1This model is adapted from Richardson (1969).
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Substituting equation (3.2.2.2) into the base ratio D/X,
or non-basic income over economic base, we obtain:
D = D (3.2.2.4)
X M + B
Assuming that D, M, and B are functions of regional income Y,
and that exports (X) are autonomous and independent of Y
(meaning in effect that X is determined endogenously), we
can show the effects of changes in the regional economic
base by first determining the relevant marginal propensities.
Let d, m, and b represent the marginal propensities to spend
on domestic products ( AD/ AY), to import ( AM/ AY), and to
invest abroad ( AB/ AY) respectively. Given an increase of AX
in the base and holding d constant, the equilibrium level
of regional income will rise by:
AX m
m + b
If local income changes have negligible effects on income
changes outside the region. The increase in domestic
activities AD induced by increases in the base AX can be
expressed by:
AD = d AY= d
n + b AX (3.2.2.5)
Depending on the relationship between average and marginal
propensities to spend domestically, and assuming that
(M + B)/Y = m + b, changes in base ratio activity can be
evaluated. From equation (3.2.2.4), we know that
D = D
M+ B X (3.2.2.6)
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also, dividing equation (3.2.2.5) by equation (3.2.2.6),
we obtain:
AD _d M + B AX
D n + b D X (3.2.2.7)
Since (M + B)/Y = m + b, and d = D/Y:
AD _AX
D X (3.2.2.8)
This identity states that both basic and non-basic income
increases by the same proportion with the base ratio
unchanged. This, however, holds only when d = D/Y. If
d>D/Y, the base ratio will increase over time; if d<D/Y,
the base ratio will decrease.
In Figure 3.1, the characteristics of these relation-
ships are illustrated. Both expenditures on domestically
produced goods and imports are linear functions of Y, and
with the export base constant, the equilibrium income level Y
is given by the intersection of (D + X) with the 45 degree
line, where total effective demand equals total output. If
the export base increases by AX, it will raise the new
equilibrium income level to Y 2. Since D is a linear function,
then d = D/Y and the base ratio FY 2 /CF = EY 1 /AE (cf. Fig.3.1) remains
unchanged. An increase in the export base leads to an increase
in the region's current account balance (B) by an amount
equal to bAY. In other words, Y2 will be the new equilibrium
level if B increases by bAY. Alternatively, the balance of
payment gap may also be closed by an upward shift in the import
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function. If these forces do not operate, there will be a
reversion to the original income Y through a drop in the
export base acting to equilibrate the balance of payments.
The theory of the base multiplier as discussed above
poses a number of difficulties in applying the concept
to the Chinese economic system. The most fundamental
concerns the central assumption of base multiplier theory:
that the size of the export base is the single determinant
of the level of regional income. This contradicts the
Chinese principle of emphasizing regional self sufficiency
and of discouraging interregional trade.1 In a situation
where regions are forced to self-reliant, the critical
determinants of growth are internal and not external, such
as an autonomous demand for exports. The consideration of
this fact points to other shortcomings of the theory. In
dismissing the residentiary sectors as passive elements of
growth, base multiplier theory ignores the possibility
of rising income due not to expansion in basic activities,
but to other relevant economic concepts, such as changes in
consumption, investment, taxes, government expenditures,
1See Chapter Two. A poor network of transport
facilities makes interregional trade prohibitively high, thus,
Chinese planners in discouraging expensive imports automatically
limits expansion of export activities and the possibilities
of export-propelled growth.
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etc.. Indeed, what base multiplier theory fails to consider,
in effect emphasizes the internal determinants of growth.
Improvrements in efficiency in residentiary activities may
reduce factor costs of basic production, thereby raising
regional income. Alternately, growth could also be a result
of reallocation of resources if a transfer of factors to
residentiary activities approximates more closely to an
optimal allocation of factor use.
Residentiary activities may also expand independently
of changes in the export base. For example, changes in
consumption behavior or expenditure patterns could create
effective demand for specific types of products and lead
to an increased level of residentiary activities. Indeed,
higher regional income as a consequence of increased resi-
dentiary activities in import replacement industries is a
more general case and is discussed at length by North (1956)
and Tiebout (1956). An export base could remain unchanged
and with given level of total expenditures on domestically
produced goods and imports, one can have an upward shift in
income due to increased demand for domestically produced
goods.
Aside fro mthese limitations, a major drawback
of the base multiplier theory is that it is difficult to
extend the analysis to a multi-region system, as in the
case of China. In the model presented above, only two
regions are considered: that under study, and the rest of the
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world outside the region. The critical importance of this
limitation stems from the fact that not all regions have the
same marginal propensities to import; otherwise, the
simplification of a two region system does not pose a
ridiculous abstraction from reality. Since multiplier
effects of increased export activities on income depend
in part on the drain into imports and investments outside
the region, different marginal propensities to import
between regions would mean that the overall multiplier effect
will be determined by regions affected by increased import
demand and by the values of the marginal propensities of
the expanding region to import from one another.
In a multi-region system, the appropriate multiplier
would not be the crude export base multiplier but a general
one which accounts for feedback effects. A rise in imports
in the ith region in a n-region system would, through
multiplier effects, raise the incomes of the other regions.
The other regions with higher incomes, in turn, would
increase their demand and import from the ith region, thereby
raising its regional income, and the sequence continues.
In this context, one region's exports can be expressed as a
function of the other regions' income, and vice versa. This
means that, in a multi-region system, exports are not in-
dependently and autonomously determined; they depend in part
on the internal propensities to import and on regional income.
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Another assumption of base multiplier theory that
has to be relaxed in a multi-region system concerns the
repercussionary effects of increases in the export base on
interregional trade. While previously these effects were
considered negligible, we now have to account for the effects
far beyond the initial import or external lending leakages
associated with a rise in the region's income.
Metzler (1950), in recognizing these limitations,
has developed an interregional multiplier by introducing
interdependence into a system of many regions. Net income
of- a region is defined as consisting of consumption
expenditure plus net investment plus exports minus imports:
Y = C + I + (E - I)
Consumption, investments, and imports are assumed to
be dependent on domestic income. Exports are considered a
linear function of the n-l regions, implying an ancillary
assumption that the import content of a region's exports
are similar to the import content of domestic goods. Prices
and costs are held constant. With the system initially in
equilibrium, a disturbance in one region has effects that can
be traced through the n region system. In other words, if
domestic investment in one region rises, demand for goods
and services in the whole system rises. If the system is
stable, a new equilibrium will obtain in all regions.
We can trace the disturbances through a system of
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a system of equations for n regions: let M 1 (Y1 ) be the
import function representing the relationship of total
imports from other regions to net income of region 1. If
Mn (Y 1) represents imports of region 1 from region n, we
may write:
M 1 (y) = M21 (y) + M3 1 (yl) + ... + Mnl(y) (3.2.2.9)
With the whole system closed, one region's import is another
region's exports. All interretional trade can be expressed
in terms of import functions so that a specific export
function is unnecessary. Region l's export can be thus
expressed in terms of imports by region 2, 3, 4, ... , n.
Since both the consumption and investment are assumed
to be functions of income, we can combine both in a total
expenditure function. For region 1, E1 (y ) shows the
relationship of expenditures on consumption and investment
to net income. To show how expenditures by the region
affect the region's net income, we subtract total imports
M 1 (y1 ) from E 1 (Y1 ). Since the region's income y = total
expenditures - imports + exports, the n equations for a
general economic system of n regions can be described as follows:
Y, = E1 (y1 )-M 1 (y1 )+M1 2 (y2 )+M1 3 (y 3)+. .+Mln n
y2 = E 2 2)-M2 2)+M21 1)+M23 3 )+.*.+M2n n
Y3 = E 3 (3)-M 3 (3)+M 311 32y2) +.(..+M3n2n
(3 .2. 2'10 )
Y = E (y )-M (y )+M (y1 )+M 2 (y2 )+...+M (y )
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There are n equations for our system of n regions, so the
system is determinate,-and we can determine the level of
income for each region, given constant prices.
Stability in the region can be determined algegraically
if the marginal propensities to spend (on investment and
consumption) are less than unity in each and every region
(el, e 2 ' ... e n). Should the marginal propensities exceed
unity, then the system becomes unstable. In situations
where some regions' marginal propensities exceed unity while
others' are less than unity, stability will exist if the
weighted average of the Ee's for all regions does exceed
unity:
n
E a. E.(y.)< 1
i=l1
If the system is stable, a sustained increase in investment
will result in a new equilibrium corresponding to the higher
rate if investment. An analysis of the disturbance to the
equilibrium of the system imparted by an autonomous
investment, say, in region 1 (represented by A 1 ) can be
given through the interregional multiplier. Given such an
increase, the first equation in our system described above
becomes:
Y, = E 1 (y1 )-M 1 (y)+Ml2(y2)+Ml3(y )+...+Mln n)+A
(3.2.2.11)
The income expansion effects induced by increased autonomous
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investment in region 1 (A 1 ) depend on the interregional
multiplier K The stimulus A will increase expenditures1*Ln
in the region and lead to higher regional income, although
magnitude of income expansion will depend on the extent
of leakages through imports and the secondary rise in
region l's exports induced by higher incomes and import
demand in other regions spurred by import leakages from
region 1.
We can now calculate the multiplier k. Let:
e = marginal propensity to spend of region 1
m 2 1 , mi3 1 ,...1 mnl = the marginal propensity to import of
region 1 from regions 2, 3, ... , n.
m1 2 ' m1 3 ,..., mln = the marginal propensities of region 2,
3, ... , n to import from region 1.
k 2, k3 , ... kn = interregional multipliers for regions
2, 3, ... , n.
k = dy
dA l-e 1 +m 1 -( dM12 +dM13 +...+dMln 1
(3.2.2.12)
1
1-e1 +m 1-( m1 2dY2/dY 1 +m1 3dY3/dY 1 +...+m dY /dY 1
1
1-e 1+m 1 - (m12m 21k2+m 13m 31k3+...+mlnmnlkn
Region l's income increase is equal to A multiplied by the
multiplier. Consequently, import leakages from region 1 will
total mAK, and are distributed through the system according
to the disaggregated marginal propensities of region 1 to
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import from each of the other region. In turn, import
leakages from region 1 will raise region 2's (3,4,...,n)
exports by:
m 21 (m 3 1 , m 4 1 , . .. . mn )A1 K 1
Thus, any increase in exports in one region will have a
multiplier effects on the income of that region equivalent to
a rise in domestic investments. For the whole system, increase
in income of n-1 regions following the rise in autonomous
investment A in region 1 can be describcd by:
dY 2/dA = m21 A K K2
dY 3/dA 1 = m 3 1A 1 K 1K3
(3.2.2.13)
dYn/dA 
= mnlA K Kn
The basic regional trade multiplier is smaller than
K described above because it permits leakages through imports;
the region's exports are given and assumed autonomous of
imports. K is however smaller than the Keynesian multiplier
because it does not allow for leakages through imports nor
return of leakages through exports. Therefore, if all
regions satisfy the stability condition that their marginal
propensities to spend do not exceed unity, and that the
multiplier K lies between the upper limit of the Keynesian
investment multiplier and the lower limit of the basic
lSecondary rise in exports is usually smaller than
imports such that a closed economy multiplier will be greater
than K 
.
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regional trade multiplier.
The dynamics of income expansion through the
multiplier process has important implications for regional
balance of payments. When a new equilibrium obtains, some
regions will have more favorable balances while other regions
less favorable than in the preceding period. Effects of
income expansion in region 1 on the balance of payments
between it and another region may be delineated into two
components: (1) primary effects: imports- by region 1.from
region n rises as the former's income rises, causing a
temporary surplus in region n and a deficit in region 1;
(2) secondary effects: income expansion in region n asso-
ciated with increased export earnings will spur regional
demand for exports, resulting in expanded income in region 1
from exports to region n. Since the secondary effects
cancel some of the primary effects, net effect of each region's
balance of payments will then depend on the relative size of
the primary and secondary effects. Therefore, regional
balance of payments depend on the determinant of the magni-
tude of the changes.
An alternative approach is to treat a region's
trade balances in terms of its own income. When a region's
exports is greater than its imports, one can alternately
say that its total income exceeds total expenditure on
consumption and net investment. Further, the direction of
change in region n's balance of payment depends on its
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marginal propensity to spend.
3.2.3 Factor Movements
In the preceding sections, we have attempted to
view regional growth through the dynamics of locational
(push and pull) factors and the multiplier effects on income
induced expansion of the export base. We must now focus
on the movement of factors of production and the implications
it holds for growth.
Although space was originally introduced into
economic theory by international trade theorists, the explicit
consideration of space as an imoortant determinant of growth
has been developed mainly by regional economists adapting
international trade concepts to the regional context.
Mundell (1957) showed that in cases of perfect factor mobi-
lity and immobile commodity, inequality in factor prices
would lead to factor movements equalizing factor prices.
This is basically the reciprocal of the classic Heckscher-
Ohlin factor price equalization theorem in which commodity
trade would eventually lead to factor price equalization.
The same result was obtained by Samuelson (1948, 1949,
1952) through a more soghisticated analysis where in the
simple case of a two good two factor economy, factor price
equalization could obtain as a result of trade in the absence
of factor movement through a relationship between relative
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factor and commodity prices. This unique relationship was
however realized by assuming a series of restrictive assump-
tions.
Samuelson's analysis assumed free trade in goods but
factor immobility while Mundell's considered factor mobility
but no free trade. The same results could obtain from either
free trade or perfect factor mobility since both eliminate
price differentials in product and factor markets. But this
does not mean that they are perfect substitutes for one
another because although both may equalize prices, they do
not necessarily equalize at the same levels. In situations
where multi-equilibrium possibilities exist, one can not be
sure that free trade would result in the same equilibrium
reached through factor movements. In a n region system,
one would indeed find higher mobility of factors and a
closer approximation to free trade than between nations.
This point is important in the Chinese context where the
economy is characterized by strict policies concerning
interregional factor and commodity movements.
1 Samuelson assumed: (1) identical, linear homogenous
production functions for every good; (2) diminishing returns
along each good's isoquant; (3) irreversible factor intensities;
(4) perfect competition, and; (5) zero transport costs. The
last assumption ensure-s commodity price equalization under
conditions of free trade. As such, commodity price equali-
zation results in factor price equalization.
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Under conditions of perfect competition, an optimal
allocation of resources is defined as that which maximizes
national output. As such, any shift in resource utilization
would only decrease output. In such a model, there are three
equilibrium conditions: (1) equal factor prices between
regions; (2) equal marginal physical products of each factor
of each good in every region; and; and (4) zero transport
costs, implying equal prices of identical goods in all regions.
This model approximates a regional system because regional
production functions are more similar than between nations, and
further, danger of reversals in factor intensity is less
likely in regional production analysis. Demand functions
between regions are also more identical. The shortcoming of
the model, however, remains the assumption of zero transport
costs, -- a crucial assumption ensuring factor and commodity
price equalization but which also denies the existence of
space.
Although the assumptions of factor price equaliza-
tion may not deviate from the reality of a regional economic
system, it is still not clear that factor price equalization
will in fact occur. A number of cases exist which could
If the production function has a constant elasticity
of substitution with differing elasticities between industries,
then relative capital/labor ratios could reverse for any two
given commodity as factor prices change. Factor price
differentials between regions are however quite small.
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prevent price equalization. One problem stems from the fact
that these analyses are framed in static terms while factor
movements occur in a dynamic regional framework. Further,
in dynamic analysis, factor flows and regional growth rates
interact upon each other in a highly complex manner that
will not necessarily result in equilibrium; as such it may
tend tonlard a long-run equilibrium only. Secondly, the
assumption that prices are uniform throughout the regional
system denies the existence of space that is essential in
regional analysis. Transport costs of factors will in reality
impose peculiar constraints on factor movements in response
to regional factor price differentials. Thirdly, interregional
trade is intimately related to the consumption of trans-
portation, and production of these services require factors
that may be utilized inother production processes. In fact,
transport costs often create price differentials between
regions.2 Fourthly, there may not be constant returns to
scale. External and scale economies, agglomeration could
in fact tend to increase regional price differentials. These
See, for example, the discussion in Richardson (1969).
2Lefeber (1958) demonstrated that in perfectly com-
petitive equilibrium, not only do factor prices equal their
marginal products, but factor prices differ between regions
by the marginal cost of transDorting one unit of factor from
one region to another.
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differences may be manifested by the regional variation in
the level of urbanization. The existence of such centers
could then act to impede market forces and accelerate price
differential between regions.
Fifthly and lastly, although factor mobility
between regions may be more perfect than between nations,
it is not perfect. Non-economic forces and institutional
barriers may exist to retard factor movements, especially
in the case of labor.
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3.3 Theoretical and Operational Models
3.3.1 Harrod-Domar Model Adapted to a Regional System; A
Neo-Classical Model of Equilibrium Growth
This section reviews current efforts at adapting
classical and neo-classical models of equilibrium growth to
a regional context.
Macroeconomic growth models to be presented below
are primarily concerned with equilibrium growth, -- a concept
which is not necessarily useful in regional analysis because
equilibrium conditions for a regional system may be more
variable and complex than for a national economy. For example,
transmission of impulses across regions may result in disequi-
librating tendencies in certain regions because regional
economies usually lack the instruments for corrective
measures against external disturbances.
Equilibrium growth in regional analyssi assumes one
of two interpretations: (1) that poor regions grow at a
faster rate to catch up:v7ith the more advanced regions,
leading to a convergence of incomes; or (2) that all regions
grow at the same rate such that despite steady state growth,
regional income differential is allowed to increase. In
cases of dynamic equilibrium, however, there is an additional
stipulation that not only should growth rates increase at the
same level, but that they further be equal: g, = g2  '' . n
equals a constant. Therefore, these models are useful only
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to the extent that their meaning of equilibrium is consis-
tent with one's interpretation of the term.
The rationale of considering the Harrod-Domar group
of model in regional analysis derives from their Keynesian
demand-oriented theory. It has been postulated that growth
in lagging regions is more likely due to the lack of effective
demand rather than to supply shortages. Poorer regions in
developing countries are often characterized by unused or
underemployed factors, and this fact is accounted for in
Harrod-Domar models, in contrast to the full-employment
assumptions of classical models.
The model can be framed in a one-good economy, the
good used for consumption or as an input in production.
Homogenous labor is the only other input. There are constant
returns to scale and no technological progress. It assumes
(1) constant propensity to save; (2) fixed production coeffi-
cients; (3) labor force growth is equal to the natural popu-
lation growth rate = n. For steady growth, equilibrium
conditions must be met for both inputs and the growth must
be one which assures full capacity and full employment.
Further, capital stock growth rate must be equal to output.
In this model, an open regional economy would per-
mit interregional movement of commodity and factors to
. maintain equilibrium even where internal conditions for
equilibrium are not met.
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The static equilibrium condition for the model is that
Savings plus Imports must equal Investment plus Exports:
S + M= I + X
For the ith region, the equilibrium conditon for steady
growth is described by:
g. = s.+m.-(X./Y.)
1 1 1 1 1
V.
where g is the capital stock growth rate, s the marginal
propensity to save, Y output, and v the capital stock output
ration.
Since the capital output ratios and the propensities
to save are assumed equal in both regions, steady growth
requires that the balacne of payments of both regions
remain continously in equilibrium. When both regions'
income level are the same, this condition requires only that
their marginal propensities to import are equal; where their
incomes are not equal, then the poorer region must have a
higher marginal propensity to import to maintain equilibrium.
That is, their balance of payment must be equal.
The same analysis holds true for labor input. When
population growth rates in the two regions are not equal, then
equilibrium growth requires that migration must flow from the
region with the higher growth rate to the slower.
In this model therefore, equilbirium is maintained
through movement of factors except in cases where labor growth
rate and the marginal propensities to save are equal.
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While the Harrod-Domar model is demand-oriented, the
neo-classical model which follows is in contrast supply-
oriented.
The assumption of fixed production coefficients is
dropped in this model and in its place is replaced a conti-
nious function relating output to inputs of two factors: labor
and capital. Growth rate in this model is determined by three
elements: (1) capital accumulation; (2) labor supply increase;
and (3) technological progress expressed as a function of time.
Assuming that (1) factors receive their net marginal product;
and (2) constant returns to scale, the rate of growth in each
region can be described by the following equation:
y. = a.k.+(l-a.)n.+T. (3.3.1.3)
where y is growth rate of output or income, k and n the rates
of capital and labor respectively, T technological progress,
a the marginal product of capital, and (1-a) the marginal
product of labor.
This model also requires a continious full employ-
ment of the capital stock, requiring a further necessary
instrument for equating investment to full employment savings. 1
Discounting risk and uncertainty, the equilibrium rate of
interest will equal the rate of profit, which under our
assumptions equals the marginal product of capital. Thus,
for the ith region, the condition for equilibrium is:
Y.
MPK. = ai K. r (3.3.1.4)
I 1
In other words, the rate of capital accumulation must eqaute
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the marginal product of capital to the national interest
rate. When the interest rate is given, then Y and K must
grow at the same rate for a to remain constant, i.e., y.=k.
1 1
In this model, when all three determinants of growth
are constant and equal, there will be steady equilibrium
growth. However, if labor supplies are not equal but with
their marginal product equal, equilibrium could still be
maintained if the region with a faster labor growth rate has
a lower technological progress rate. Also, even with unequal
marginal product of capital, a flexible capital-output ratio
could still lead to equilibrium. In other words, each of
the three determinants could offset each other's effects
to maintain dynamic equilibrium.
In equilibrium, total investment must equal total
savings for the system as a whole, but this does not mean
that savings for each region will satisfy the condition of
equal growth rates between output and capital; since regions
may import capital from other regions, this condition may
be redefined as imports minus exports (M-X). For each region
the equilibrium condition is that M.-X. = I.-S.. Capital
imports into a region may be determined by comparing the
rate of investments with the rate of savings in the region.
It will be imported if:
k.K.> s.Y., or k.> s.Y.S i lk i > s i (3.3.1.5)
K.
1
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This inequality must exist for capital to flow from one
region to another and to maintain equilibrium in steady
growth.
Abstracting from steady growth, the main factor
influencing capital imports is the regions's rate of growth:
the higher its growth rate, the likelier it will import
capital.
Thus, the requirements for steady growth in the
neo-classical model in the regional context are quite similar
to that of the Harrod-Domar model, and lead to similar
results.1
Both of these models are presented in great detail
in Richardson (1969).
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3.3.2 Models of Spatial Equilibrium: Lefeber's Allocation
in Space
In his book Allocation in Space, Lefeber presents
theoretical and formalized models of spatial equilibrium which
focus on the problems of optimal resource allocation and commodity
distribution over the spatial dimension.1 Of particular
interest to us is his model of General Equilibrium: Competitive
Determination of Market Price Ratios in Geographically Separated
Markets.2 The analysis is framed on the following set of
assumptions: prices of final goods in different markets (or
welfare relations for spatially separated consumer groups) are
given; there exists a fixed number of discrete locations; both
production and consumption can take place at any of these
locations; each location is endowed with resources of productive
factors in non-negative quantitives; resources of one location
may be utilized at another location.
The last assumption means in effect that the location
of production does not necessarily have to coincide with
either the sources of inputs or with the location of markets.
Furthermore, assume that potential production locations are
connected by transport routes. Coefficients denoting the required
Lefeber (1968)
2 Ibid., pp.1 4 1-146.
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units of transportation services needed to haul factors or
commodities between any pair of points may be computed. A
feasible distribution of goods and the simultaneous allocation
of factors imply a corresponding total demand2 for transportation
services:
T 2 X2 + S 1 1+ + mXm (3.3.2.1)1 1 2 2 n n
where m are transportation coefficients defined for any pair
n
of location; X. the goods to be transported.
Equation (3.3.2.1) can also be expressed in the more
general form where it is a function of the quantities to be
transported.:
T = T(X m) X ... X ) (3.3.2.2)
Transportation service in this model is provided by a separate
transportation industry whose required inputs do not have to be
transported.
The model is framed in a purely competitive setting
such that no individual firm or owner of resources can affect
the market in which he is dealing. Conditions for maximization
is, in general, restricted to situations where the "convexity
of the feasible region defined by the transformation surface
This coefficient multiplied by the amount of goods to
be hauled between any specific pair of locations gives the total
amount of transportation service required to perform that task.
2 The parameters of transportation demand defined here
are technological data and are function of weighted distance only.
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is established."i When convexity of the re-transformation
is established, then the existence of a maximum is also
established.
The determinate competitive s.olution is obtained through
a set of balance of payments equations (one for each individual)
which equate the expenditures of each individual on consumption
goods with his income derived from hiring out of his factors.
Factors of production are institutionally, e.g. exogenously,
determined. Service flows are fixed; convexity on the production
side is assumed and quasi-convexity on the utility side.
Notation for the model is as follows: (All variables > 0)
Data:
r: number of consumption locations
n: number of production locations
m: number of final goods
s: number of transportable factors
d: number of consumers summed over all locations
k : number of consumers at location y
V6 p: total amount of factor 6 in pool at location y
-py: amount of factor 6 in pool at location y owned by
6P consumer p residing at location y
W : arbitrary weight (market price) for good delivered
at market y
Functions:
W: social welfare function
T: transport demand function
a : production function of good a produced at 6
m+1 : production function of transportation
Py : utility function of consumer p residing at y
Convexity here is defined such that if any tow or more
program falls within the same feasible region, then a normalized
weighted average of the two program also falls in the same region.
Lefeber, op. cit., p.11.
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Variables:
X : good a produced at location B and delivered at
location y
V a: factor 6 originating from location y employed in
the production of good a at location
factor 6 originating from location y employed in
the production of transportation
Y : good a consumed by consumer p at location y
py
Lagrange Multiplier:
A : f.o.b. price of good a at production location 6
m+1l
A : price of a unit of transportation service
X : rent of factor 6 at location y6 P
A : price of good a at market of consumption at location y
Y
price of transportation in terms of first good delivered
Y (consumed) at location y, i.e._, m+1 1
Y
The following holds unless otherwise stated:
a= 1, 2, ... , m
S= 1, 2, ... , n
y= 1, 2, ... , r
6= 1, 2, ... , s
p= 1, 2, ... , k k = d
= 1, 2, ... , n
Satisfaction maximizing relationships:
py - Y py 0 (3.3.2.3)
a l 13Y 3Y
Py Y Pya = 2, 3, ... , m
(a total of d(m-1) satisfaction relationship)
Each market has a separate set of price rations, such that
with m-1 independent ratios at each market, r(m-1) price ratios
for final goods must be determined.
The balance of payments equations are:
a 1 py m+l Y 6 p1 (3.3.2.4)
Y
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Distribution-supply of final goods at markets:
EYa (3.3.2.5)
P Py ^Y
Transport inequality:
Y 6P -1 y ly y syP
a ;/ P (3.3.2.6)
Distribution-supply of final goods at production locations:
EXasu al of rodcativ acY Y - p lyP P sy
Allocation-supply of productive factors:
EEV' + Vm+1 p = Vac 6y 6 P - py 6p Sp
(3.3.2.7)
(3.3.2.8)
Differential inequalities with respect to variables that
correspond to the production side:
w.r.t- X
Y
Yl - T~ ~
Y Y
m+ Y
< 0 (3.3.2.9)
w.r.t. V P
(for local utilization)
xcall 3$ay
m+1 ay
Sy
_ 6P < 0
M+ 1 (3.3.2.10)
(for utilization abroad)
- 6y < 0
m+1
(3.3.2.11)Ac$
m+1 3V
6y 3V6I
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(for utilization in transportation production)
m+- _I 6P < 0 (3.3.2.12)
Dvm+l m+l6p1
We determine the following in the competitive solutions:
r(m-1) market price ratios for final goods in terms of the first
good at each market (X U/ 1)Y Y
r price ratios of transportation in terms of the first good
at each market (i'D )
mn f.o.b. prices in terms of transportation X a xm+l)
sn factor rents in terms of transportation (X/6p m+)
md consumption variables (Y )
Py
mnr distribution variables (X )Y
sn(nm+l) factor variables (V6 )
A total of m(r+m+d+nr)+sn(nm+2) variables, with:
d(m-1) aatisfaction equations
d-l balance equations
mr market distribution equations
1 transport inequality
mn production-supply relationships
sn factor-supply relationships
mnr market-f.o.b. price relationships
sn(nm+l) factor allocation relationships
This model deals with a closed national economy. The
locations of production and consumption in this model may be
reformulated for out purposes to denote regions; hence, we may
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derive a model of interregional spatial equilibrium. At equilibrium,
rent differential between mobile factors in any tow locations
cannot exceed the marginal cost of transportation between the
two points. Furthermore, the marginal rate of substitution
between two factors is equal to ratios between their local
prices and to the ratios between their marginal productivities.
The price of immobile resources is equal to their local marginal
productivity, but price variations would be limited by the
possibilities of substitution with mobile factors. In other
words, a low transport cost would imply a greater price homo-
geneity over space.
3.3.3 Regional Growth Models: Miernyk's Dynamic Regional
Input-output Model; Bell's Econometric Forecasting Model
and Mera's Equilibrium Model of Regional Growth.
The model employed by Miernyk and his associates in
their study Simulating Regional Economic Development1 derives
basically from the input-output analyses for a national economy
formulated by W. Leontief (1953, 1966) and expanded on H.
Chenery and P. Clark (1959). The general dynamic model has
the basic balance equation:
X.- X.. - n D.. - n S Y (i=l,2,...,n)
El 13 z=1 13 Z= 13 1
(3.3.3.1)
where X. is the total output of the ith industry; X.. the total
1~ 13
Miernyk, et al., (1970).
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current input requitement by the jth industry from the ith
industry; D.. the capital needed by the jth industry from industry
i to maintain capital stocks at current levels; S.. the expansion
of capital goods stock produced by the ith industry and held
by industry j; Y.. the final deliveries by the ith industry.
Sales by the ith industry to the jth industry on current
accounts are proportional to the output of the jth industry:
X.. = a..X. (3.3.3.2)
13 J J
Sales of replacement capital and changes in the stocks of
industry i's capital output held by the jth industry are both
subject to the same proportionality specifications; respectively:
D.. = d X. (3.3.3.3)
1J ij J
S.. = b..X. (3.3.3.4)1J IJ J
The coefficients of proportionality are organized into
three matrices: A, D, and B respectively.
Substituting the latter three equations into equation
(3.3.3.1), the dynamic input-output equation becomes:
X.- a..X. n b..X. = Y. (i=1,2,...,n) (3.3.3.5)
i~~ J= 13j =i 13 J 1
and in matrix notation:
X - AX - DX - BX = Y (3.3.3.6)
In estimating the rate of change in output over time to obtain
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a solution to the dynamic model, output (X) can be equated to
Xt - Xt-,. The coefficient A can also be represented by linear
interpolation to account for technological changes and changing
trade patterns. Equation (3.3.3.6) thus becomes:
X -A X - DX -B(x -x =Xt-Att-Dt-B(t-Xt-l t (3.3.3.7)
and by rearranging terms:
(I-A t-D-B)X t+BXt-l = Y t(3.3.3.8)
The solution for X is therefore:
Xt= (I-At-D-B) 1(Yt-BXt-) (3.3.3.9)
To extend the dynamic input-output model to a simulation
framework, the balance equation (3.3.3.1) can be revised to
become:
Xt-A tt-D tXt-B t(X t+l-Xt t (3.3.3.10)
with the associated solution:
Xt= (I-A t-Dt+Bt t+B)t+lXt+ (3.3.3.11)
Final demand in the model is derived from (1) projections
of national final demand, and (2) considerations of resource
availabilities for the final year and interpolated linearly
for intermediate years. Current output is a function of
technology, final demand, output of both the current and the
previous periods. Current productivity of the various
industries, in turn, determines labor requirements.
Since the region under study (West Virginia) is assumed
to have a constant share of all markets, exports are not well
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FIGURE 3.la.
Miernyk's Regional Dynamic Input-Output Studya
AFrom A. Bloch (1971).
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explained. Projected employment and population are not fed
back to consumer expenditures and final demand; the internal
dynamic element is the feedback loop of capital expansion.
Increased output re.quires net capital investment, which, in
turn, increases output. As such, the driving force of the
model is the changes in final demand, technology, and productivity.
Bell's "Econometric Forecasting Model for a Region"
is a formalized, theoretical, regional macroeconomic model
intended to be linked to national forecasting models. This
model explicitly relates national forecasts of GNP to regional
economic growth. In contrast to Miernyk's inter-industry analysis,
Bell attempts to examine simultaneously regional investment
functions, technological change, migration, wage behavior, and
unemployment. The model is a dynamic extension of the export
base theory of regional growth discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Regional export income is a direct function of the
national GNP which represents markets and actions outside the
local region. In the model, this represented by:
Xt = a + bGNPt (3.3.3.12)
Local service income is generated by export sales and other
sources of foreign income where the marginal propensity to
import is assumed to be less than unity. Local service
1 Bell, F. W., (1967).
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income and total received income (e.g. income generated by
export earnings and foreign sources) are related by:
St = c + d(V1)t (3.3.3.13)
The regional investment function is:
Kt/Kt- = f( )gm (1+gp)-tK O<g < 1 (3.3.3.14)l -l1t t-l
where g is the percentage gap between desired (K ) capital
stock in year t and the actual stock (K t-l) at the end of
the previous year.
A Cobb-Douglas production (of the Constant elasticity
of substitution type) is specified:
(V2 t = A(l+r)tKhLl-h (3.3.3.15)
where r is the rate of natural technological changes and h
and 1-h are the capital and labor production elasticities
respectively.
Labor supply changes are primarily dependent on the
natural regional population increases:
(p) t = o t-1 + (B-D) (Po) t-l (3.3.3.16)
where B is births and D, deaths. The actual supply of labor is
the sum of the expected labor supply and migrations:
(NO)t = (Ne)t + kMt (3.3.3.17)
In other words, migration in this model acts as a regulatory
mechanism to allow regions to adjust to shifts or differential
growth rates in export demand.
Migration is based on the current year's divergence
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between the expected labor supply and the demand for labor:
Mt = S-M(N 
-L)t-l (3.3.3.18)
Real wage is considered a function of time and increases
secularly on the basis of technological change and capital-
labor substitution:
Wt = B(l+W)t (3.3.3.19)
As stated earlier, total received- income is the sum of local
service income plus export income:
(V1)t St + Xt (3.3.3.20)
The difference between the actual labor force and the demand
for labor determines unemployment:
Ut = (No)t 
-
Lt (3.3.3.21)
Total regional capital stock is the sum of manufacturing and
non-manufacturing capital stock:
Kt = (Km)t + (Knm t
Demand for labor may be solved to obtain:
L A(l-h)(l+r)tK 1/n
Wt
Received regional income solved in terms of GNP:
(V 1 )t = c +a + b GNP1- d 1- d t
(3.3.3.22)
(3.3.3.23)
(3.3.3.24)
and the combined investment function for both local and export
sectors may likewise be expressed in terms of GNP:
f 9 c+a + b G gm
1-d 1-d G
(1g)-t K-g(l+gp) t-
(3.3.3.25)
Kt
K
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TABLE 3.2
Notations of Bell's Econometric Forecasting Model for a Region
Exogenous and Predetermined Variables
GNP t gross national product(B-D) birth rate (per 1,000) minus the death
rate (per 1,000)
(Ne-L)t-l prospective unemployment (difference between
national increase in labor force and labor
demand)
(K )t- 1  capital stock in manufacturing
(Knm) t-l capital stock in non-manufacturing
t time
Exogenous Variables
Xt export income
St local service income
(V )t total received income
(V2 t total produced income
Kt total capital stock
(Km t manufacturing capital stock
(Knm t) non-manufacturing capital stock
(I M) t investment in manufacturing sector
(I nm t) investment in non-manufacturing sector
L t employment
(N0 ) t labor supply (actual)
(Ne t expected labor supply (national increase)
(P9) t actual population
(P ) t expected population (national increase)
W t annual wage per employee
Mt migration
U t unemployment
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FIGURE 3.2
Bell's Regional Econometric Forecasting Model.-Flowchart 1a
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FIGURE 3. 3
Bell's Regional Econometric Forecasting Model.-Flowchart 2a
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In this model, export and other income received from foreign
sources generate demand for local services which creates a
multiplier effect; thus, local service income is a linear
function of total regional income and, therefore, a linear
function-of export income; as such, regional income in the
model is driven by demand which simultaneously determines labor
and capital requirements through the investment and labor
supply-migration submodels.
Despite the feedbacks of the investment and labor
supply-migration conditions, only exogenous GNP growth,
technology, the average wage rate, and national population
increase determine regional income.
3.3.4 Equilibrium-Disequilibrium Models: Olsen's Model of
Regional Income Differences and Williamson's Equilibrium
Disequilibrium Model.
Olsen's model (1967) is a theoretical model of regional
income differences in per capita income which attempts to integrate
the general equilibrium theories of the Heckscher-Ohlin school
with the theories of the Social Physics school within the
framework of Myrdal's (1957) principle of circular and
cumulative causation. While the Heckscher-Ohlin and Social
Physics school hold that regional income differences will tend
to disappear over time as a result of equilibrating forces
outweighing disequilibrating forces, Myrdal maintains that,
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through the principle of circular and cumulative causation,
regional income differences will instead tend to widen over
time because disequilib rating forces will, in fact, outweigh
equilibrating forces.
Regional income differences are seen as the net result
of a complicated interaction between equilibrating and dis-
equilibrating forces. Regional income is regarded as a function
of capacity and labor stocks in the region, and of a regional
efficiency parameter. For each time period, returns to capital
and labor (the two factors in this model) are assumed equal
to their respective marginal productivities. The model is
structured on equations expressing equilibrium forces, capital
stock growth rate, labor force growth rate, and an efficiency
parameter which varies with urbanization, educational levels,
and income potential linked through an interlocking positive
feedback loop.
Equilibrating forces in the model tend to equalize
the returns of the factors of production while disequilibrating
forces manifest themselves in the speed of response to inter-
regional differences in the rates of return to these factors.
The aggregate production function is of the CES group which,
in this particular model, has the property that if a factor
becomes relatively more abundant, its marginal product declines;
this property in situations where we allow for interregional
factor movement, together with the production functions, are
L-
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the most important equilibrating forces in Olsen's model. The
aggregate production function is given as:
t t t
Y. = Y [6.(K ) i + (1-6 )(L ) i](3.3.4.1)
where:
t
Y. = flow of regional income from time t to time t+l in
1 region i (i = 1,2, ... , n)
K = stock of capital at time t in region i
t
L.t = labor stock at time t in region i
Y. = efficiency parameter from t to time t+l in the aggregate1 production function CES production function of region i
6 = distribution parameter from time t to time t+l in the
1 aggregate CES production function of region i
t
= substitution parameter from t to time t+l in the aggregate
CES production function of region i
The capital stock of the ith region at time t+l is considered a
function of: (1) the region's capital stock at time t; (2) the
net savings; (3) capital movements. In other words, capital
stock in a given region depends on the following: (1) the
regional index of the rate of return to capital, (2) the regional
index of income per capita in which it is assumed that the savings
rate varies directly with per capita income, (3) the relative
level of interaction between the given region and the rest of
the system measured in terms of potential ratios. Capital
stock at time t+l is given, therefore, by:
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t t tt+l t F Y. r. VK. _K i I
t =t (3.3.4.2)
t
P.
t t
P. = aL.
1 1
n t
t E Y.Y =i=l i
n tE P.
i=l1
n, t t
t E r k.
r = i=l i i
n tE k.i=1 i
t n
=1
t t t
d. . n1 d.dj 13
n t
vt .E .V
n
tY= flow of regional income from time t to time t+1 in region i
per inhabitant at time t in region i (i = 1, 2, ... , n);
yt = flow of national income from time t to time t+1 per
inhabitant at time t in the nation;
t
P. = stock of inhabitants (population) at time t in region i;
1
where:
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t
r. = flow of return on capital from time t to time t+l in the
nation per unit of capital employed at time t in region i;
t
r = flow of return on capital from time t;
t
.V= gross economic population potential at time t in region i;
Vt = average of the nation's n regional gross economic population
potentials at time t;
d..1J = distance between region i and region j (i=1,2,...,n;
e = base of natural log.
(U > 0, E > 0, p > 0, v > 0, constants)
(a > 1, constant)
Labor force at time t+l in the ith region is a function
of: (1) labor force at time t; (2) the natural increase in
the labor force, and (3) the migration of labor. The charac-
teristic is considered dependent on the wage rate index, the
income potential index in which the influence of.migration is
manifested, and the regional income per capita index. Labor
force at time t+l is thus given by:
tt tt+1 t 6 t z w X .VtIL. = L.e Y _I_
Y t Wt V t
where:
(3.3.4.3)
t
W. = flow of wage payments from time t to time t+l in region i
. per worker at time t in region i (i = 1,2,... ,n)
Wt = flow of wage payments from time t to time t+l in the nation
per worker at time t in the nation
(a > o, z > 0, X > o,rn > 0, constants)
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Disequilibrating forces are derived, on the capital stock side,
from the assumption that the savings ratio varies directly
with per capita income because it may increase relative
abundance of capital in the richer regions. When this happens,
wages will grow relatively faster in the richer regions and thus
tend to widen regional income differences. On the labor side,
disequilibrium may be obtained as a consequence of labor
becoming relatively more abundant and wages relatively lower
in the poorer regions, and from the assumption that birth rate
varies inversely with per capita income.
The principle of circular and cumulative causation is
expressed in the following equation:
t+l t At
Y. =y.e 1 1 j (3.3.4.4)
(Et t t
where:
tE. = average number of years of school completed by the labor
1 force at time t in regio- i (i = 1,2,...,n)
Et = average number of years of school completed by the labor
force at time t in the nation
t
U. = percentage of population at time t in region i living in
urban communities with more than a given number of inhabitants
Ut = percentage or population at time t in the nation living in
urban communities with more than a given number of inhabitants
(A > 0, 9 > 0, Tr > 0, T > 0, constants)
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FIGURE 3.4
Olsen's Model - Flowchart 1
Urbanization RL (t-l)
Income potential RR (t-l. Urbanization RL (t)
Income per cap. RR (t-l)
Educational RL (t-l
Urbanization RR (t-l)E
Income potential RR (t-l) Educ
Income per cap. RR (t-l
Capital stock RL (t-l
Rate of return on
capital RR (t-l) Cap-ital stock RL (t)
Income potentail RR (t-l
Income per cap. RR Income potentie
RL (t)
Efficiency parameter RL (t-l
Urbanization RR (t-l) Efficiency Regional incomE
Education RR (t-l) parameter RL (t)
Income potential RR (t-l )-RL (t)
Labor force RL (t-l)
Wage rate RR (t-l) Labor force Income per cap:
Income potential RR (t-l) RL (t) Rt
Income per cap. RR (t-ll
Capital stock RL (t) Rate of- rr o
Efficiency parameter RL (..__ RT_ (L
Labor force RL (tWage rate RL
RL = 'regional level'
RR = 'regional ratio', i.e. ratio of a regional level to the
corresponding national average.
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FIGURE 3.5
Olsen's Model.- Flowchart 2
Population
Labor force
Wage rate
-------------------------------------------
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Thus, the efficiency parameter which affects disequilibrating
forces is a function of (1) the regional efficiency parameter
from time t to time t+l; (2) the national overall increase
in productivity; and (3) the different factors of importance
for the inventive activity and the diffusion of innovations.
In the discussion that follows, the model described is
taken in its entirety from Williamson; our purpose here is
to underline the assumptions, parameters, and equations that
could be used in the construction of a similar simulation
model of the Chinese economy. Furthermore, and perhaps more
importantly, we want to point out the changes that have to
be incorporated to account for the structural economic
differences between the American and Chinese economic systems.
The production function is continuous, twice differentiable
and single-valued. Production is assumed to have constant
returns to scale and diminishing marginal rates of substitution.
A Cobb-Douglas specification is adapted for both regions, and
exogenous rates of total factor productivity growth are
allowed to diverge between sectors and regions. This shall be
our basis for examing differential rates of technological
progress by sector on development. This, however, implies
two weaknesses: (1) there are no biases in the form of technical
progress, and (2) no factor intensity reversal is possible.
Let us examine these assumptions in more detail.
L .
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The model is capable of replicating the high Chinese
rate of agriculture mechanization, a particularly important
fact which holds significant implication for both migration
and the locational distribution of economic activities. It,
nevertheless, specifies that agricultural mechanization can
never be more rapid than in the industrial sector in the long
run. If the substitution elasticities are identical or close
to identical in both agriculture and industry, and if one is
initially more capital intensive than the other, then capital
intensity ordering cannot be reversed over time as the wage-
rental ratio rises. In the Williamson model, the elasticity
of substitution is assumed unity in all sectors, and this means
that agriculture can not mechanize more rapidly than the
industrial sector. Thus, in the construction of our model,
it is important to investigate the possibilities of some factor
intensity reversals.
Given a constant returns totscale and common efficiency
levels, the industrial sectors co-exist in the two regions by
virtue of the protective effects of interregional transport cost.
Our machinery for determining differential growth rates between
the two regions will be commodity price differentials between
regions. Per unit transport costs for interregional movement
of goods and factors are treated like exogenous tariff rates.
Percentage differential in regional prices is attributed to
these transport costs. Declining transport rates have impacts
191.
on regional specialization, trade, migration, and per capita
income growth which we will want to evaluate.
Since we are concerned with long term growth, we can
ignore cycles in factor utilization rates and assume full
employment. Assume further that marginal product pricing
rules are met in all regions and sectors. Factor prices need
not be equalized between regions nor between sectors, such that
both interregional and intraregional disequilibria are possible.
Thus, wage and gross rental rates in the West may exceed those
in the East.
Interest payments and depreciation requirements per
unit of capital investment exhaust real gross returns to
physical assets at the margin. Investors receive interest on
the value of their investment minus a transaction cost.
Williamson's model attaches importance to the fact
that, in the early phases of regional growth in the West,
industrial development was largely financed by Easterners and
thus Western assets were claimed by Eastern interests. In the
centrally planned economy of China, all investment decisions
are made by the state and, thus, this issue is minor in our
case. While Williamson specifies that Western regional income
will always be less than its regional product because of factor
income payments to the East, in our case, we do not have to '
account for this condition; it may accelerate growth in the West.
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Transportation costs are introduced exogenously and
fully exhaust regional commodity price differentials, yet
revenue from transport activities must generate factor payments
in the two regions.
We now go to migration rules for our model. This is
one area where we encounter considerable difficulties. First,
population movement in China is rigidly control by the state;
therefore, market resolution or determination of migration via
wage differentials is inapplicable here. Second, even if we
were to incorporate some semblance of migration induced by wage
differentials, we would still be limited by an appropriate
determination of wage differential between sectors and between
regions. In the highly politicized society of China, wages
are controlled by state agencies and jobs are assigned by a
central bureau. While this has characterized Chinese population
movement from 1940 to the present, recent articles in the
Chinese magazine, China Reconstruct, have indicated a gradual
departure from forced population movement towards a more
lenient policy of wage incentives.
Despite the assumptions of traditional neo-classical
general equilibrium models, regional factor price differentials
do not necessarily result in instantaneous factor reallocation.
Indeed, we are interested in whether growth under factor market
disequilibrium is a concept that reflects Chinese regional
development. Disequilibrating forces associated with industra-
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lization, land augmentation in Western expansion, and cost of
living differentials may be too powerful to allow a tendency
towards equalization to assert itself. More importantly,
how do real wages influence migration behavior? In our
migration specification, we assume that regional cost of
living differentials are produced when the expenditure bundle
is significantly weighted by the presence of non-traded services,
or by bulk commodities with high transport costs. As such,
the real regional wage rates deflated by a cost of living index
will be the real income variables relevant for migration
decisions. Therefore, migration is determined solely by the
expected East-West real wage differential.
In Williamson's model, the regional investment allocation
decision is based on partial adjustment during a unit of time
and on the formation of interest rate expectations based on the
immediate past. This allows the possibility of high variance
in regional interest rates and disequilibrium in the national
capital market. The expected East-West interest rate differential
determines interregional transfer subject to a fixed per unit
cost of search or information incurred with an intersectoral
transfer of claims.
Lastly, the model can now be closed by adding some
remaining dynamic equations. Labor force growth is determined
by the rates indigenous to each region. The regional rates
are exogenous but are assumed to be constant. They will be
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estimated from Chinese data. The observed rate of regional
labor migration functions and by the exogenously determined
natural rates of growth.
The last remaining characterization of the Chinese
economy concerns the capital accumulation and aggregate
savings rate. Differential savings rate according to the func-
tional source of income is common in growth literature; in
our model, the savings rate is assumed equal across sectors
and regions,
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CHAPTER FOUR: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIALIST ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
In the last chapter, we reviewed at length what this writer
felt were the better models of regional economic growth developed
in the West. We did so in a research effort aimed at understanding,
explaining, and simulating regional development in China because
progress in this research area in the Socialist-bloc countries
lags behind the West. Our purpose is to forego ideological
justifications for extending Western concepts to the Marxist
domain and to instead concentrate on the technical qualifications
of adapting useful theories and techniques regardless of their
philosophical premises to benefit development efforts in the
developing countries, in our case, China.
If our purpose in the last chapter had been to derive
elements and principles from Western economic theory, then this
chapter is designed to take the logical next step of establishing
the economic framework, i.e., the Chinese economic system, in
which our projected final output, a regional economic planning
model for China, will have to be housed.
This chapter haso dual purpose: firstly, to describe the
principle and philosophical basis of Socialist economic
organization and planning that have influenced Chinese economic
development; and secondly, to use this information as a possible
measure of the usefulness and consistency of the models described
in Chapter Three within the Chinese context.
L, .
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4.1 The Marxist Model of Economic Growth
Our first task, therefore, would be to determine what
the Western economist should carry with him in his professional
luggage when he crosses over to the Socialist frontier.
The marginal analysis employed in the various models covered
in Chapter Three would be of less than marginal use; equilibrium
analysis, likewise, must be reformulated to approximate the
Socialist empirically developed system of "material balances,"
a concept described in later sections. Individual economic
behavior, or micro-economics, is anathema and only macro-
economics is permitted. Questions, such as imperfect or mono-
polistic competition, full employment and the trade cycle, the
multiplier and acceleration principle, that refer to the market
economy, are ignored. Indeed, Socialist economists preoccupied
with practical problems have led to a scarcity of analytical
work, and the Socialist model of development still awaits its
General Theory.
What the Western economist must bring with him is a
familiarity with the Marxist model of economic growth which has
guided Socialist thinking and rethinking in growth strategies.
Marx's model, which he termed the Tableau Economique, is a schema
of "expanded reproduction" that combines a complete process of
reproduction. The model implies a critique of the Smith-Ricardian
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treatment of profit, but seems to have originally been conceived
as a refutation of the Malthusian thesis of linear growth of
resources in a world of exponentially expanding population.
Marx divides the physical output of an economy into two
departments (sectors), producer goods (i ) and consumer goods
(c ), produced respectively by sector I and sector II. Output
is equated to depreciation plus raw materials used (c), wage
bill (v), and surplus value (m). Under this schema, output is
equal to:
c + v + m =i
c2 + v2 + m2 g c
c + v + m = i + c (4.1.1)g g
Where repetitive stationary conditions prevail, output of sector I
must match the capital consumption and raw materials used by
both sectors (c1 + c 2 ), while sector II's output must equal the
grand total of wages and of all surpluses. Consequently, the
necessary and sufficient condition for simple reproduction is
that the demand for investment goods of sector II must equal
the demand of consumer goods of sector I:
c + c2 = c + v + m
or
c2 =v 1 + m (4.1.2)
To realize growth, sector I's output must be larger than
replacements ( Ac >c1 + c2 *
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In the second (expanded) cycle of production, total demand for
producer goods (c') must equal sector I's output in the first
(preceding) cycle:
Ac = c1 + v + m - (c + c2
or
Ac = v 1 + m - c2  (4.1.3)
Another condition for growth stipulates that the surplus (m)
must be allocated three ways: mc set aside for purchase of
additional capital goods and raw material (Ac); my distributed
for wages (Av) of additional workers needed for expanded
production; m spent on consumption of the non-productive
sphere. Demand for consumer goods in the second cycle (wages v'
and consumption outlays of the non-productive sphere mr)
must equal the output of consumer goods produced in the first
cycle:
v + v + mrl + mr2 = c2 + v2 + m2 c
or
c = c2 + v2 + Ac2 + Av2 (4.1.4)
Thus, thE basic Marxist equation for balanced growth in the
two sectors becomes:
c = V! + mrl (4.1.5)
The weaknesses of the model have been widely noted by Soviet
writers on the subject, but one technical flaw presents a
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significant impediment to our research effort: and that is
the absence of a motive force for the growth of the system.
Growth rate is uniquely determined by the legacy of the past
and the rate of capital formation; history plus accumulation,
thus, propel an exponential growth which Marx's celebrated
numerical example was 9.53 percent per annum. While Marx may
have exorcised the Malthusian evils, his equilibrium of expanded
production pivots on his "Law of Value" which links up the two
departments (i.e., sectors) of produces and consumer goods and
secures an equalized growth throughout the system but, more
importantly, brings into focus the significane for society's
class organization.
Lenin includes into this framework, the impact of tech-
nological change. Marx regards growing capital intensity as a
reflection of labor-displacement trend promoted by social
economic forces or the relations of productions. If competition
equalizes throughout the system, and, in a secular trend, profit
is lowered, i.e., ratio of m (unpaid-for labor to total capital
engaged), or m/(c + v). In other words, this schema describes
the rate ofi profit as a function of increasing exploitation of
labor. In a situation of circular causation, competition encourages
more efficient techniques to increase the "organic composition
of capital," or the rising ratio of constant to variable
capital, i.e., increased value of plant and materials employed
1-. ,
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relative to wages. Consequently, capital intensity is considered
a rising function of investment while technological.. change has
a labor-saving bias. In Lenin's words:
"Growth in the production of means of production as
means of production is the most rapid; then comes the
production of means of production of means of
consumption; and the slowest is the rate of growth
in the production of means of consumption."
To restate the Marxist model of growth with Lenin's modifications:
the model is guided by two sectoral pairs of parameters, organic
composition and the sectoral rates of accumulation. A. Zauberman
(1967) describes a model pursued by two Soviet econometricians,
P-lyukhin and Mazarova, along these lines.2 Consider the growth
of two departments, 1 and 2, and assume some parameters as
constant, which are, for the ith sector, three coefficients:
(1) ratio of surplus product to variable capital in the ith
sector Q.=I./V. fixed a priori; (2) incremental ratio of fixed
capital to surplus-product, R.=M ./M. as determined by planner;i cl i
(3) incremental ratio of fixed to variable capital, P .=M ./M .
mi ci vi
also fixed by planner.
In a situation where a sector can obtain products or
inputs from.other sectors without equivalent counter supply,
the growth rate of variable capital (S .=R.Q./P .T) could
vi i-i mi
1 As quoted in A. Zauberman (1967), from Lenin, Collected
Works, Moscow: 1960, Vol. I, p.87.
2 Ibid., p.20.
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differ between departments with the ratios constant because of
their four elements being constants. These ratios are called
the sectoral accelerators. Plyukhin-Mazarova demonstrate that,
under certain conditions, the production growth rate S tends
toward the value of the sectoral accelerator.
The model is then transformed to permit proportionate
development, a concept which defines that, in a closed system,
output of the two departments is partly a function of availa-
bilities of producer and consumer goods produced in the preceding
cycle (note the similarity to Marx's history plus accumulation
motive force). The system's proportionality coefficients are
defined as partial derivatives of the two departments' outputs
in terms of the inputs of fixed and variable capital
(Eiki (t)/d ikXk(t-T)) where XX is the output of the ith
department, dik the fraction of output of department k supplied
to the ith department in the following period. Fundamental
equations for the system are:
X 1 (t) = a 1 (t)+E 1 1 d 1 1 X 1 (t-T)+e 1 2d1 2X 2 (t-T) (4.1.6)
X2(t = a2(t)+C 21 d2 1X1 (t-T)+ 2 2d 2 2 X2 (t-T) (4.1.71
It is shown that when this system of difference equations is
approximated by one of linear differential equations whose
solutions define the departments' output as a sum of exponentials:
X= X1 0 +c /X (eXlt-I)+c 2 /X 2 (e 2t-I) (4.1.8)
X2 X2 0 +c 2 1/X (eXt-I)+c2 2/X 2 eX2t (4.1.9)
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the relative sectoral growth rates tend toward both convergence
and stability (note the importance of this implication for
regional disparities where regional growth could be disaggregated
by sectors or industries!).
Without belaboring the discussion further, let us
conclude this section by presenting 0. Lange's (1961) formalized
theory of reproduction and accumulation. His condition for the
equilibrium growth of a system is given as:
P1/P2 = (a2 c - a2c) (I - alc - alc ) (4.1.10)
This means that the equilibrium output ratio of the two Marxian
departments (P) depends on the sectoral parameters of capital
formation (a) and the sectoral parameters of the efficiency of
the capital (a).
The basic elements of Marxist analysis of economic growth
presented above thus provide us with a starting point for
constructing a regional economic growth planning model in China.
L .--
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4.2 The Chinese Formulation of Economic Equilibrium
Communist Chinese research in economics, and specifically
in general equilibrium theory, is marked by a dearth of theoretical
and quantitative formulations. Economic theory in China is
practically non-existent as a science; what research there is
focuses on two levels. Firstly, there is a preoccupation with
the practical problems of controlling and planning the economy.
Methods of achieving a "dynamic balance" in the economy,
problems of data collection, institutional frameworks for
decentralizing basic economic decisions, centralization of
decision making on basic economic targets for the country,
mechanisms for the efficient allocation of resources and an
effective distribution system, etc., fall under this category.
Secondly, there is a small but increasingly important body of
research that is concerned with determining ideological
justifications for any economic decision followed or proposed.
It is in the second category where this writer feels the
economic fate of China will be decided, not only for the near
future, but . for the next generation of leaders. Two
important factors would determine this trend: (1) the increasing
complexities of the economy and the implications of a relatively
abundant mature economy on the politically sensitive issues of the
distribution of wealth, professional specialization, and the
labor-saving bias of technological progress; and (2) the increasing
I- L
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divergence between the Soviet Union's and China's economic
system and priorities. Where previously China could rely on
the lessons of the Soviet experience, they soon will have to
derive guidance from their own economic research apparatus.
It is also in the second category where the problems
of general equilibrium have been investigated. General
equilibrium is defined to stem from the objective demands of
the development of a socialist economy. Chinese economists
are apt to quote Lenin:
" fhe task of socialist revolution3 is to convert
the entire economic mechanism of the state into a
set of mammoth machinery, an economic organism
whereby hundreds of millions of people can work
according to plan."
From this dictum, Chinese economists infer an implication
that general economic equilibrium in keeping with the demands
of socialist economic laws and under party guidance, methods
for balancing supply and demand should be adopted in accordance
with the intrinsic links between the various phases of social
reproduction (e.g. economic development) and the different
sectors of the economic system.
Even of more significance to us is the assigned role
of general equilibrium in planning. In national economic
growth, equilibrium is posited to be always relative and
temporary while disequilibrium is always absolute and regular.
This dialetic has been pointed out by Mao:
L . __
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"Objectively, there will always be a contradiction
between social production and social demand, and
consequently, the people must adjust it through state
planning. In China, economic planning is made every
year to arrange the proper proportion between
accumulation and consumption as well as to obtain
equilibrium between production and demand. The so-
called equilibrium means the temporary and relative
unity of the opposites. After one year, speaking of
the process as a whole, the equilibrium will be upset
again by struggles of contradiction; the unity will
be broken into fragments. Thus, the equilibrium
becomes disequilibrium, and the unity becomes trans-
formed into disunity. This in turn calls for the
restoration of equilibrium and unity for the second
year. Such is the superiority of our planned economy.
In fact, this kind of equilibrium and unity is
being partially destroyed each month and each quarter,
thus, making it necessary to effect partial adjustments."
In other words, it is insufficient merely to plan for an
equilibrium, but we must instead realize the need for maintaining
equilibrium regularly.
Aside from its philosophical premise, general equilibrium
in China concerns the rate and proportion of national economic
growth. Of particular importance is the intimate relationship
between growth rates and the maintenance of the correct ratios
of growth among various sectors of the economy (and among various
growth rates of regions!). In macro terms, this interrelationship
is manifested in the rates of growth; in micro terms, it is
reflected in the proper ratios of growth among the sectors.
That is, general equilibrium means that sectors should grow in
the right proportions.
Conversely, in their determining of a proper ratio
among various sectors of the economy, their relation must be
such that they maximize their rates of growth. These relation-
1 Mao Tse-tung, (1957), p.12.
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ships are broken down into seven working categories:
(1) The correct ratios of growth between the two great categories
of the production of means of production and the means of
consumption.
(2) The proper relationship between industry and agriculture.
(3) The proper relationship within the industrial sectors
and within the agricultural sector. For instance, in the
industrial sector, correct ratios of growth must be main-
tained between heavy industry and light industry, between
the extracting industry and the processing industry,
between the industry which serves the industrial sector
itself and the industry which serves other sectors. In the
agricultural sector, proper relations must be maintained
among agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary
industry, and fishery, etc..
(4). The correct ratios of growth between production and capital
construction.
(5) The proper distribution of national income among the state
sector, collective sector, and individuals; for instance,
the ratios between the income of state enterprises and
wages, between the accumulations that go to the people's
commune and its members, etc..
(6) The relationship between the supply of consumer goods and
the people's purchasing power.
(7) The ratios between accumulation and consumption.
Given then the Chinese concept of economic equilibrium, the
most important implication for our study of regional growth
is the dialetic process. Disparities in regional growth rates
or income levels are not necessarily as serious a "problem"
when viewed in terms of the relative unity of opposites. In
the short run, for example, divergence in regional growth rates
may not only be not "bad," but actively encouraged if the cumulative
and additive result in the long term is a convergence. This,
A-, --
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then, in contrast to Western theories on the topic, allows us
a flexibility in planning. Realization of the dialetic process,
e.g. bipolar development, suggests that planning should be
geared -towards a more dynamic process in which regional
disparities should not be "planned out" but instead be guided
along a path which would result in some form of regional
equality that is greater than the preceding convergence in a
continual process of parity-disparity, convergence-divergence.
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4.3 Planning by Material Balance
The Chinese instrument for attaining a dynamic balance
in the economy is the material balance. Although there is
little information on how it is done, the Soviet model has
presumably been used as a guide. Basically, future require-
ments of raw materials and capital equipment are calculated
on the basis of technical coefficients. This demand is then
compared with supplies available in the are for which balancing
is being doen, and decisions are made on imports and exports
and the transfer of supplies within the country. This technique
is called "balance transfer" (ch'a-e tiao-p'o).
Material balances are compiled for various commodities,
both final and intermediate, by the various authorities at
each bureaucratic level of the planning machinery. In each
compilation is set, in quantity terms, all the proposed uses
(both intermediate and final) of the commodity in the national
economy against supplies from all sources, e.g; production,
inventories, and imports. Such a schema can be represented
in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 4.1
Schema of Material Balance
Product X
Distribution
1. Production
2. Imports
3. Other sources
4. Stocks with suppliers at
beginning of plan period
1. Production needs
(a) Current inputs into other
sectors
(b) Capital repairs in other
sectors
(c) Other uses
(d) Needs of the construction
industry for investment
2. Market allocation
3. State reserves
4. Reserves of the Council of
Ministers
5. Increases in stocks
6. Exports
In such a schema, which is copied here from the Soviet model,
1. (a) is computed by multiplying planned production targets
for the other sectors by their input norms, or coefficients.
Furthermore, balances of centrally allocated equipment and
manpower are compiled.
This input-output relations on which balancing is premised
are determined by progressive technological standards, derived
Sources
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historically or calculated and projected for the plan period.
A weakness of this process is that complete information as to
the inputs required for postulated outputs is not provided.
It also fails to provide for an "automatic" method for the
computation of full inputs. However, such an inter-industry
flow system may be harmonized, e.g. balanced, by a process of
iterative approximation. If we let [A] be defined as the matrix
of input norms, and
[I - A 1 =I + A + A + A3 + ... + An] n *
then the first attempt is to let:
X = vector of originally planned supplies
Y = vector of planned final outputs
Xd = vector of calculated demand
with:
EAJXs + Y = Xd where Xd>Xs (4.3.1)
Now if AX is the unknown vector of changes in Xs necessary to
obtain a consistent set of material balances, then
I- A AX = (Xd - XS)
AX =I - A (Xd - X (4.3.2)
If we add AX to Xs to get a new level of planned supplies, the
plan will be balanced:
A)(Xs + AX) + Y = (Xs + AX) (4.3.3)
To place the process of material blances into perspective,
let us consider the chronological sequence in which it is
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undertaken. In the typical planning process, a sequence of
decisions are made accordingly:
(1) A statistical analysis of the base period of the plan's
time horizon is made.
(2) Drawing up of control figures (preliminary notes of the
economic plan) which represents a set of aggregate output
targets. The objective here is to equate supply with
demand through material balances.
(3) a. Order of materials (forms) is solicited; materials are
calculated by the "direct method," or output targets
multiplied by input norms or coefficients.
b. Tentative output targets are set.
c. Release of control figures, broken down by ministry
and enterprises, determines their production targets.
d. Determination of the necessary amount of inputs to
fulfill production targets.
e. Orders for inputs are sent out.
f. Bargain process of supplies and counter-supplies.
(4) a. The plan is brought down to the enterprise level and
transformed into detailed operational form.
b. Delivery plan on order, e.g. funds.
c. Funds are received.
d. Determination of production and shipment schedules.
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4.4 Capital Formation and Investment Criteria
Again due to lack of firsthand information on capital
formation and investment criteria in China, we resort to secondary
sources: in this case, we look at some theoretical work on the
subject by Russian writers as discussed in A. Zauberman (1967).
Much of recent Russian writings on the subject have
the criterion propounded by S. G. Strumlin as their basic
philosophy. In Strumlin's one factor world, efficiency of
investment is expressed in terms of the productivity of labor.
Since Strumlin, however, the rate of actualization of investment
has been regarded as one of the planner's two factors macro-
production function relating dynamically use intensities to
efficiencies of labor and capital stock employed and accompanied
by assumptions in the trend of technological progress.
A. L. Lurie (1963) has explicitly related the normative
rate of capital efficiency to capital-labor intensity. In
his model, the rate of differentiated return on assets 6
is a partial derivative of a function describing the dependence
of maximum volume of output on the availability of labor and
capital:
6. = 3f.(L.,K.)/3K. (4.5.1)
l 1 1 1 1
Novikov (1964) assumes a full employment equilibrium but puts
total labor costs as dependent on capital invested per unit
S. G. Strumlin,"Faktor vremeni v proyektiroykekh
kapitalnykh vlosheniy," in A. Zauberman, (1)67), p.154.
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of output (L = f(K)), with the normative efficiency rate as:
pt dC -[I - f'(K)] (~4.5.2)
where C is the total cost and capital cost K is expressed as
L/K, factor intensity.
To translate this into the language of a conventional
production function, take the expression of technical possi-
bilities as a dynamic linear homogenous function of the Cobb-
Douglas type. By differentiation, the equilibrium price of
capital for period t expressed in terms of the economy's
relative factor intensity and labor productivity (a), is a
certain r = (I - a) (Lt/Kt a , where L stands for manpower and
K for capital stock at time t.
In the search for a rate of actualization of capital
outlay corresponding to an equilibrium in the two-factor markets,
capital and labor, Fiszel (1961) and Siwinski (1963) formulate
the problem in natrix terms. A sum of matrices of investment
outlays and running costs discounted to the initial period of,
commissioning of capacities is represented as follows:
M M M
I +(C +L W ) a, Il2+(Cl2+L lW )a,..., IlR+(C l+LlR a
1 2C +2lW2) a 22+22 22 2 2R ( 2R'2
M M4 MI +(C +L W )a, I +(C +L W )a,..., I +(C +L W )at
ml ml ml m mR m2 m2 m mR mR mR m
(4.5.3)
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where I is the matrix of investment, C of current material
cost, L of manpower employed, and W of average wages, in a
total of m sectors under R variants of technology. The output
target is described by the vector (p1 , p2 ' '''' p). The
actualization coefficient a = [(I+r)-I][r(I+r n)], where r is
the unknown rate of discount. The problem is to find r and
thereby the a for minimizing:
m M
E [I +(C +L W)] =min (4.5.4)
n=1 nx nx nx n
m
subject to an availability of factors constraint: m
mE
and m
n L
n=1 nx
1' " " -
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4.5 A Projection Model for a Regional Economy
In this section, we shall review a long-term projection
model of the Chinese national economy formulated by S. Ishikawa
(1966). Our objective here is to adapt the framework of the
model to a regional context.
Ishikawa's model is the first that this writer has come
across that attempts to quantify the relationships 6f the
Chinese economic system. The scarcity of models along this
line is easily explained by the fact that with so little
data available, modelling of the Chinese economy becomes ex
ante a futile exercise. Indeed, the only useful approach is
to construct in the abstract a structure, or framework,
reflecting the Chinese economic system with its attendant
relationships and parameters, and to await the availability of
data. This, in fact, has been Ishikawa's purpose, and it is
also ours in this research effort. With increasing exchange
of information between the West and China, this approach in
retrospect has not been unwise.
Although Ishikawa's model is not well suited to our
purpose, it is very valuable approximation of the framework
in which our own model will have to be framed. Furthermore,
the model is the only explanatory tool of Chinese economic
development in operational form.
The most serious drawback of the model is the number
.L ,
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of simplifying assumptions on which the model is based. It has
also been limited by the lack of available data necessary
with which to derive equations for the model by econometric
methods.
The model is based on the following assumptions:input-
output relation of each commodity (a material and technological
relationships among various economic quantities) is aggregated
for each production sector of the regional economy; the balance-
relation of supply-demand among commodities is shown as the
balance-relation among production sectors (also a material-
technological relationship). Total demand for final goods
(i.e., investment goods and consumer goods) depends on the wage
rate, the farm income level, and the investment ratio.
The regional economy is differentiated between the
organized and the unorganized sectors, as can be seen in
Table 4.2. Labor is reflected in the sectorial relations. The
foreign sector is likewise treated.
Capacity to produce investment goods embodying modern
technology forms the technological basis for the growth of the
modern sector.
Capacity of consumer goods and agricultural subsectors
to produce and sell surplus products serves as an additional
source of employment in the modern sector.
The modern sector is broken down into investment goods
and consumer goods subsectors. The agricultural sector is treated
I- .
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TABLE 4.2
Breakdown of the Regional Economy by Production Sectors
Organized or Modern Sector
Unorganized Sector
fInvestment-goods subsectorConsumer-goods subsector
Agricultural subsector
Ag
Traditional Co
subsector L In
ricultural Inv
nsumer-goods
vestment-goods
estment
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in the unorganized sector explicitly.
Interregional trade in this model is not considered a
basic determinant of growth. Objections to the exclusion of
export earnings as a source of growth is valid; nevertheless,
with restrictions on interregional trade enforced in China,
the assumption becomes less objectionable. In the future,
some level of reconciliation between export as the basic
determinant of regional growth, on the one hand, and export
playing a negligible role where interregional trade is retarded,
on the other hand, must be formulated.
Of concern to us are the increases or decreases in
surplus labor in the unorganized sector, as they will have an
inverse effect on additional agricultural products marketed
in the organized sector.
Planning authorities are assumed to determine (1) savings
rate in the organized sector and (2) the inter-sectoral
distribution of investment goods.
An investment-inducement coefficient is introduced to
account for induced investment in capital accumulation on the
agricultural sector; that is, investment undertaken by individual
farm households or group of farm households utilizing local
materials and labor otherwise left unused.
The government in determining savings ratio and investment
distribution coefficients among sectors is assumed to have as
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its objective maximization of the regional growth rate.
The model consists of 37 equations and identities,
five inequalities or maximization formulaes to represent the
development mechanism. Given the values of predetermined
variables (e.g. output targets, total labor, etc.,). parameters
(labor productivity, critical capital coefficients, etc.,),
and the policy variable (savings ratio, coefficients of
investment distribution in the organized sector), values of the
unknowns can be uniquely determined.
A prime mover of development is the amount of investment
goods (I xt) in the region. Its flow determines the magnitudes
of important variables in the various sectors. If the region
is considered a closed one, then investment goods become
identical to the production of the investment goods sector
(Xit), and the savings ratio (s) becomes a function of the
coefficient of allocation of investment goods to the investment
goods sector (y). In the long run, a high (y) will imply a
high rate of growth.
If, however, the region is opened, then expansion of
the investment goods subsector induces managerial and technical
skill improvements, thus promoting development.
Another prime mover is the surplus of consumer goods
production {[l-(l-c X )C]X2 } and that of agricultural production
{At A CAt I within their respective sectors. These surpluses
enable additional employment in other sectors {Nlt'N 2 t, and N At
220.
For growth to occur, increase in fixed capital must be
accompanied by an increase in employment. This is because
output in each sector (X1 t'X 2t) is not just restricted by the
amount of labor guaranteed by the means of consumption (Cxt
that is necessary to sustain it. The lower the consumption
level (W ,W 2) relative to the productivity of unit employment
(L,L 2 ), the more rapid the increase in employment (Nlt) in
the investment goods sector results in a higher growth rate.
Planners utilizing the model as a planning tool must
be guided by the following considerations: (1) in any given
period A' .s an inverse function of s or y. As such, s or y
must not exceed certain values beyond which A' falls below
a social minimum. In other words, the planner must choose the
highest value of s or ypossible without causing A' to fall
x
below the minimum subsistence level.
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FIGURE 4.1 Adaptation of Ishikawa's Model to
a Regional Context
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TABLE 4.1
Notations of the Model
Notes:
I. This flow chart incorporates certain revisions of the
original version of the projection model, notably the
flow with notation (1) which was assumed in the original
version as equal to Ex Cxt'
II. Symbols enclosed by indicate pre-determined variables;
those encircled by , endogenous variables; those attached
with a *, policy variables; and those attached with a
constants.
III. -+ indicates the direction of the flow of commodities;
.---- +, the direction of the flow of labor;-----
indentical or causal relation; .and - , the assumed
equality relation.
IV. The symbols are classified as follows:
(i) Policy variables:
s net savings ratio of organized sector
y coefficient of allocation of investment-goods
to the investment-goods sector
X coefficient of allocation of investmen-t-goods
to the consumer-goods sector
(ii) Endogenous variables:
X 1 net output of the investment-goods sub-sector
X 2 net output of the consumer-goods sub-sector
Y x net output of the organized sector
I net investment of the organized sector, inclusive
of net investment transferred to the agricultural
sector
C7 private and government consumption in the
organized sector
N number of workes in the investment-goods sub-sector
N2 Number of workers in the consumer-goods sub-sector
Ishikawa, (1966).1From S.
I I
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TABLE 4.3 (continued)
W 1 wage earnings of per-unit worker in the
investment-goods subsector PLUS current
expenditures of the government shared by
per-unit worker
W 2 the same for the consumer-goods sub-sector
E2 amount of the products in the consumer-goods
sub-sector exported
A x that part of agricultural products which is
exported
XA supply of manufactured goods from the organized
to the unorganized sector
A demand of the organized sector for agricultural
products
A net output of the agricultural sub-sector
T net output of the traditional sub-sector
T net output of consumer goods in the traditional
sector (not including A)
T2 net output of investment goods in the traditional
sector directed to the production of T
YA net output of the unorganized sector
IA total capital formation in the traditional sector
directed to the production of A
Ay net output of investment goods in the traditional
sector directed to the production of A
CA consumption of the traditional sector
NA number of labor force productively employed in
the unorganized sector
aI average income per-unit labor force in the
unorganized sector
A' demand of the unorganized sector for the
manufactured goods of the organized sector
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TABLE 4.3 (continued)
A,' supply of agricultural products to the
organized sector
M amount of total imports
E amount of total exports
N number of total labor force
Nu number of labor force unemployed
(iii) Constants (parameters):
V marginal capital-output ratio in the investment-
goods sub-sector
V2 marginal capital-output ratio in the consumer-
goods sub-sector
E fraction of the consumption expenditure of
the organized sector spent on agricultural
products
VA marginal capital-output ratio in the agricultural
sub-sector
T the ratio of T to A
T the ratio of T2 to Al
L per-unit labor productivity of the investment-
goods sub-sector
L 2 per-unit productivity of the consumer-goods
sub-sector
LA per-unit labor productivity of the unorganized
sub-sector
6A fraction of the consumption expenditure in the
organized sector to total net output of the
sector
r the rate of growth of po!ulation (labor force)
(iv) Constants (institutional variables):
c ratio of private and government consumption
in the organized sector to total net output
of the sector
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TABLE 4. 3 (continued)
e coefficient of inducement for agricultural
investment
a average per-capita earnings of the employed
labor force (such as the LABOR DAY remuneration
in agricultural producers' cooperatives)
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CHAPTER FIVE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
This last chapter summarizes the information pre-
sented in the preceding chapters. It concludes this stage of
my research effort. An attempt is made here to describe
the most important features of the Chinese regional economies.
The future tasks of determining the specification of a model,
the choice of variables and forms, is also discussed.
5.1 Features of the Chinese Regional Economies
5.1.1 The Initial Conditions
The realization of a regional development problem in
China by the Communist leadership came in basically the same
way Friedman described Europe's post-war awakening to the
spatial dimension of economic development. There were,
however, numerous and important differences. Recall that in
Europe and in many other parts of the world, the growing
seriousness of the regional problem was brought about by
a number of significant developments: (1) an urban revolu-
tion propelled by vast internal population transfers and
progress in transport technology, i.e., the automobile;
(2) impacts of industralization and structural changes in
the national economy redistributed the spatial dispersion of
economic activities; (3) technological progress sometimes
bypassed traditional centers of growth, creating new 'growth
poles' leaving older areas to cope with with obsolete
facilities, scarce factors of production, and a less dynamic
227.
population; and (4) a rising expectation fueled by industra-
lization and new wealth was often unmet or unmatched for a
large part of the rural and agricultural population.
Although wealth and economic development has tradi-
tionally been unevenly spread over a national territory, the
initial 'random shock' of these developments imparted a
disequilibrating effect on the spatial economy and tended
to accelerate the polarization of population and economic
activities in a few large metropolitan and industrial centers.
These dramatic changes combined with a newly politically
conscious population in the wake of the Second World War
led to the assignment of regional development as major policy
issue. These developments however had only a limited effect
on the Chinese economy in the pre-Communist years (1949).
Note the changes in Europe leading to the attention of regional
development cited by Friedman had taken place during relatively
peaceful years in the pre-war and post-war eras. China, in
contrast, had been in constant political, social, and military
turmoil since the middle of the last century. The initial
conditions of the Chinese regional economies at the start of
our study period (1949 to present) were therefore results of
factors unique to the Chinese political economy.
The spatial economy at the time of the Communist
liberation could be explained directly in terms of her political
economic history. The economy was then marked by a spatial
concentration of modern industry in a few industrial centers
developed during the Japanese occupation of Northeast China.
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The country as a whole had only a few lateral and longtudinal
trunk lines; only the Northeast, the former Manchuria, had
a fairly developed transport network commensurate with the
development of heavy industry in the area.
Population were concentrated mainly along the coastal
areas and in a few regions of geater soil fertility. The
country was comprised of three sectors: (1) a large and self-
sufficient agricultural sector; (2) a modern sector concentrated
in the urban areas devoted to the management of goods and
light industry, and (3). the heavy industrial sector located
in the Northeast. The richer and relatively developed regions
were located along the coast where trade and commerce with
other countries was sufficiently large to sustain the agglome-
ration of population in a few large cities. These cities
were often the loci of entrepreneurship and Western form of
production and industralization.
Another important feature of the Chinese political
economy which has important implications for the regional
distribution of economic activities was that China never
really developed a market economy. Consequently, the older
and larger cities performed more political administrative
functions historically .than economic. Further, there
were only a few metropolitan industrial and commercial centers,
and major markets with concentrated demand for producer and
consumer goods were also few.
Thus, the spatial distribution of economic activities
in the pre-Communist period was largely determined by the
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traditional pattern of agricultural development. Population
was relatively evenly distributed within China proper, with
concentrations in a few areas of superior natural resources.
Cities in China were centers of wealth not necessarily be-
cause they were the most efficient productive places, but
because as sites of political administrative functions, they
were control points of producer and consumer goods monopolized
by the imperial governments. Most of the traditional centers
performed central place functions for the surrounding country-
side.
The impact of Western penetration into the tradi-
tional society of China, and attempts at industralization and
modernization, disturbed existing pattern of settlement and
accelerated the concentration of population and vital economic
activities in a few large cities in the coastal regions. The
result was that a few centers, e.g., Shanghai and Tienstin,
became disproportionately the most productive places. The
modern sector was located almost entirely in a few cities
opened to Western influence. Large parts of the inland
regions remained traditional while the coastal regions
became transitional societies. The initial shock of indus-
tralization therefore increased urban-rural differences and
led to the divergence of regional incomes and the spatial
distribution of economic activities. It was an 'irrational'
spatial pattern of development that the Communist leadership
were faced with when they came to power in 1949.
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5.1.2 Resolution of Contradictions
Chinese regional development policy was first and
foremost an attempt to resolve various political, social, and
economic 'contradictions' defined according to Maoist ideology
and supposedly manifested in the irrational pattern of the
spatial economy inherited by the Communist leadership.
These contradictions may be identified as the following: (1)
an urban-rural dichotomy; (2) an excessive concentration of
heavy industry in the Northeast; (3) a concentration of the
modern sector in a few large metropolises; (4) the dispropor-
tionate concentration of population and economic activities
in the coastal regions; (5) underdevelopment of natural
resources; and (6) a spatial economy shaped by and leading
to class differentiation and functional specialization. The
national development policy that evolved, of which regional
development was a component part, was aimed at emphasizing
the proper economic and political relationships in the
Chinese economy. It was a policy concerned with the practical
problems of economic development but deeply rooted in Maoist
principles.
The most urgent tasks facing Chinese planners at the
time of the Liberation in 1949 were the restoration of the
basic capacity of the economy to pre-49 levels by 1952; the
integration of the various sectors of the economy for the
exchange and flow of goods and services, and preparing the way
for a long-term program of socialization, massive industra-
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lization, and agricultural modernization. Under these
broad objectives, the following policies affecting.regional
development may be discerned:
(1) The development of new industrial centers in the inland
regions. This was an attempt to develope Chinese natural
resources in the frontier areas and to depart from an over-
reliance on the existing industrial centers in the coastal
regions. Industrial locations were determined by proximity
to natural resources and markets, decentralization for defence
purposes, and the transmission of growth to the underdeveloped
regions. It is important to note that the industries established
in these regions, such as steel and fuel industries, have
assumed the role of primary growth sectors in the Chinese
economy. The infrastructure and industrial base for further
expansion of the regional economies have therefore been esta-
blished.
(2) The creation of communes changed dramatically the units
of political, social, and economic organization. This meant
the standardization of population groupings in both urban and
rural areas, in both developed and.underdeveloped regions.
It consolidated various sectoral activities under a given
production unit and communes were called forth to establish
both industrial and agricultural enterprises. It also
created economies of scale in production (collectivization),
internalized external economies, and enhanced self-sufficiency.
More importantly, it carried the principle of balanced economic
development to the most basic unit of production. The dynamics
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of regional economic growth can consequently be analyzed in
terms of a region's composition of communes engaged in
specific sectoral activites. Once a sector's contribution
to the gross domestic output can be ascertained, regional
economic growth may possibly be estimated by determining the
number of communes or production units engaged in that sector's
activities.
(3) The multi-sectoral activities of production units within
a commune began to eradicate urban-rural distinctions between
traditional versus modern economic activities. One should
therefore avoid Western distinctions between rural, largely
non-industrial, sector on one hand and of an urban, largely
industrial, sector on the other hand. Chinese planners have
tried to avoid the domination of the country by a few giant
industrial cities or of the economy by functionally specia-
lized urban-oriented technocrats. In our modelling effort
therefore, it would be difficult to arbitrarily fragment
various sectoral contributions to regional economic growth
in a society predominated by communes whose agricultural
and industrial elements are closely interdependent.
(4) The changing priority between heavy industry, light in-
dustry, and agriculture in Chinese develcpment policy affect
the pattern of regional growth. Regions whose economic structure
happen to be favorable with current development priorities
would benefit in proportion to the region's share of the sectors
marked for growth. A region whose share of industry is greater
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than agriculture, for example, would obviously develope more
rapidly under a policy of priority development of industry;
alternately, agricultural regions would undergo more develop-
ment under an 'agriculture first' policy. Our attempt to
simulate Chinese regional development must therefore account
for regional impacts of the changing and in fact ambivalent
development priorities.
(5) Investments have been maintained at a very high level
through various authoritarian government measures which
shifts income from consumption and unproductive private
investments to state investments. Although the rate of in-
vestment is impressive, it is not remarkable because Chinese
prices generally overstate the value of investment and pro-
ducer goods relative to consumer goods. Investments in the
Chinese economy may be distinguished between the'Traditional
and the Modern sectors. Regional economic performance may be
partly explained in terms of the relative share of investments
in these sectors.
(6) Agriculture was often the primary source of savings finan-
cing the industralization program, especially in the First Five
Year Plan period. Savings were generated by the agricultural
sector providing inputs at extremely low costs to the indus-
trial sector which was then able to sell products at relatively
high state-controlled prices. Enterprises' profits have thus
formed a major source of savings.
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(7) Savings has become the chain linking the various sectors
of the economy. Since light industry was heavily dependent
on the agricultural sector for its needed inputs, and since
it is the major source of savings, expansion in the heavy
industry sector was dependent in turn on the light industry
sector, and ultimately on the agricultural sector. In China
however, regional expansion of the industry sector need not
necessarily be dependent on the performance or growth of the
agricultural sector within the region because planning by
material balances permit interregional movement of scarce
factors. In a centrally planned economy such as China's,
investment decisions could 'balance' the supply and demand of
factors in all regions regardless of the region's own pro-
ductivity. For example, agriculturally poor regions such as
Kansu and Sinkiang are still able to develope a large indust-
rial sector financed by savings from agriculture of other
regions. In other words, regional industralization need not
be premised on agricultural development although the existence
of the latter will obviously speed national development, i.e.,
more,.resources in the national macro-economy. This feature
of the Chinese regional economies however does not deny the
crucial importance of natural resource exploitation in regional
development.
(8) Although planning by material balances equate the demand
and supply of needed factors in a given region, overall
Chinese regional policy has been to encourage regional self-
L _
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sufficiency. Regional economic cooperation meant that industries
should rely more on materials derived from the particular
administrative region rather than on materials that had to be
imported from some distant source. If needed materials were
not available, they were to be developed within their own
particular region or substitutes had to be found. This policy
of restricting interregional movement of both producer and
consumer goods was a consequence of high transport costs due
to an inadequate transport network. Each region can be considered
an enclave protected by high tariff barriers, and developing
complementary economic activities instead of regional spe-
cialization. A logical extension of this policy was that
in addition to the requirements of enterprises purchasing
materials and equipment within their own administrative units,
products had to be marketed within their own particular area.
The size of the market for a region's products was therefore
limited. More importantly, exports were less able to play
a growth-propelling role. As the Chinese economy developes
and as the transport network expands, one can expect greater
interregional movement of factors and commodities. At present
however, the kinds of regional income convergence obtained
through either factor or commodity price equalization from
interregional movement of factors and commodities is unlikely.
This point is not crucial because prices are controlled by the
state and policy has been to achieve a uniform price level.
To the extent that marginal analysis is useful (valid?) in
a socialist economy, regional growth potential determined by
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the relative rates of return to various factors is not as
plausible a theory as in the free market economies.
(9) A noteworthy aspect of Chinese population policy has been
the rural restification of urban youths. Although this policy
probably derives basically from purposes of political education,
there are possible economic impacts. The settlement of urban
youths in the countryside could bring skills and organizational
abilities. There could therefore be benefits of moderniza-
tion. The predominant aspect of migration policy however has
been to restrict urban in-migration from the rural areas.
Population movement is rigidly controlled. The implications
for regional growth is that migration as an equilibrating factor
in regional income analysis is a powerful but re-
latively unused policy tool. Although there has been tre-
mendous population movement from the East to the unsettled
North, Northwest, and Southwest, the size and magnitude of
this movement is small compared with China's population.
(10) In national economic growth, equilibrium is posited
to be always relative and temporary while disequilibrium is
always absolute and regular. It is therefore insufficient
merely to plan for an equilibrium, one should instead realize
the need for maintaining equilibrium regularly. The impli-
cation for regional growth is the dialetic process of deve-
lopment. Disparities in regional growth rates or income levels
may not be defined as a problem when viewed in terms of the
relative unity of opposites. Realization of the dialetic
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process, e.g., bipolar development, suggests that planning
should be geared towards a more dynamic process in which regional
disparities should not necessarily be planned against but
instead guided along a path which would result in some form of
regional equality that is greater than the preceding conver-
gence in a continual process of parity-disparity, income
convergence-divergence.
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5.2 Summary of the Chinese Spatial Economy
The most important conclusions of the Chinese spatial
economy described in the preceding chapters may be summarized
as follows:
(1) The expansion in the number of medium size cities indicates
that development has been consistent with avowed official policy
of promoting small and medium size cities; because of the limit
of our sample size, it is difficult to determine absolute
increase in the number of small cities. Relatively, their
number has dropped, but it is reasonable to assume an absolute
increase considering that the total increase in national
urban population is greater than the total increase in population
of our selected 117 cities. These residuals must lie with
unaccounted smaller size cities.
(2) There has been increased urbanization but not at the high
level anticipated based on the history of other developing
and underdeveloped countries. This may be attributed to the
official policy of discouraging migrating from the rural areas
to the cities.
(3) The conspicious increase in the number of large cities
is significant and results in an overall impact which appears
to contrast with what might have been expected from an
announced policy of discouraging growth of the large cities.
This may be attributed to the change in policy that occurred
later when planners began to deplore over-zealousness in the
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establishment of new economic areas at the expense of the
general rate of economic expansion.
(4) Premature development of the inland industrial centers
brought about a relatively slower increase in production
output. This slow increase can be seen in the changing rates
of growth of industrial production and of the GNP. The rate
of increase of adjusted modern industrial output was 16 percent
in 1953 to 1954, and 8 percent in 1954 to 1955. It later
rose to 26 percent in 1955 to 1956 when priority was duly
given to the large developed industrial centers.
(5)- Regions with the highest growth rates are also regions
that contain the largest number of cities; economic development
seems to have been accompanied by a concomitant increase in
urbanization.
(6) The rank relationship describing the distribution of
cities in Communist China during intense periods of greatly
increased economic activities indicates despite increased
urbanization, the distribution remains basicaaly unchanged.
(7) A closer examination of the rank size regression lines
indicates that a levelling off suggest a less abrupt distri-
bution of cities in 1958 than for 1953.
(8) The absolute drop in the predominance of China's largest
city in spite of increased economic activities suggests a
departure from primacy. China's primacy index for her urban
system actually dropped from 1953 to 1958.
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(9) The hypothesis that industralization eventually implies
a smooth rank size distribution and departure from primacy
seems to bore out by this study of China's spatial economy.
Our two analyses employing the rank size principle and primacy
not only substantiate this hypothesis, but are congruent
to each other's result.
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5.3 Future Research
5.3.1 Factors in Regional Development
The study of the Chinese regional economy presented
in this thesis is insufficient to begin identifying the
factors in regional development. Paucity of data is the
major constraint on this aspect of the research. A further
constraint is what I feel to be limited usefulness of the
major theories of regional econmic growth. As mentioned in
Chapter Three, theory not only lags behind policy needs but
it is more descriptive than explanatory. The most useful
theory appears to be the location theoretic approach which
emphasizes the role of natural resource exploitation and the
sequence of developments inducing the localization of indus-
tralization. The concept of linkage effects is also a useful
explanation of why certain initial conditions lead to further
development. Export base theory and regional income theory
however seems to be of limited use in an economy where res-
trictions of factor and commodity trade is enforced.
Given the features of Chinese regional economies
presented in this thesis, the identification of factors in
Chinese regional development is now dependent on the availa-
bility of Chinese regional economic data. The real task
of future research will Vie in the construction of regional
income accounts. Only then will the identification of the
causes of regional growth have any theoretical and empirical
validity. The review of theoretical and operational models
in Chapter Three can then serve as an important guide in an
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attempt to isolate the crucial factors in regional development.
It will also be especially important to compare the factors
identified in these Western and market-oriented models to the
factors we might be able to determine in the Chinese case.
The similarities and differences can have important policy
implications.
5.3.2 Specification of a Model
It would be premature at this stage to list the
specification of a model, the choice of variables and mathe-
matical forms, but the recent appearance of two models of the
Chinese economy constructed by Japanese economists offer
interesting suggestions.
The projection: model of Ishikawa presented in Chapter
four is a valuable starting point. The following features
can be adapted to the regional context: (1) differentiation
of the economy into the organized (modern) and the unorga-
nized (traditional) sectors; (2) the further breakdown of the
organized sector into the producer and consumer goods sub-
sector, a specification consistent with the two departments
economy of Marx; (3) the limited role of export earnings as
a source of growth; (4) the attention of surplus labor effects;
(5) the role of an investment-inducement coefficient to
account for the total utilization of materials and labor
normally left unused; (6) government determination of savings
ratio and investment distribution coefficients among sectors
(and possibly an extension to regions) towards regional growth
1_'
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rate maximization; (7) the assumption of the amount of pro-
ducer goods as a prime mover of development; (8) the assump-
tion of consumer goods and agricultural production surpluses;
and (9) a condition for growth based on an unique relationship
between increase in fixed capital and a concomitant increase
in employment.
The other important model is an input-output table
constructed for the 1956 Chinese economy recently developed
by Niwa (1970). It is also a valuable prototype if we are
interested in constructing Chinese regional accounts through
the use of an input-output analysis. The following tasks
will have to be followed in our next stage of research: (1)
estimating the gross regional output value in each industry;
(2) estimating the regional final demand; (3) estimating the
amount of value added in each industry in a particular region;
(4) estimating the amount of current transactions between
endogenous sectors in a particular region; (5) estimating
the amount of imports and exports; and (6) balancing.
In the construction of a simulation model replicating
the pattern of regional income convergence-divergence or of
regional income growth, it would be important to include the
effects of urbanization which has been ignored in both the
models discussed above.
L.-
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